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Introduction 
 
 
 
lobalization is one of the most momentous economic shifts of the recent decades. In 
most of the world’s countries, cross-border flows of goods, capital, and information 
have increased in a way that fundamentally transformed their economies.1 
Nowadays, national economic outcomes are less and less the product of national circumstances. 
Instead, they are increasingly influenced by developments that occur across national borders and 
thus inter-nationally. According to the vast scholarly literature on the topic, the economic 
consequences of globalization are manifold and substantial.2  
This poses a problem for the nation-state. In the era of globalization, national governments 
increasingly lose their political control over national economic outcomes. They can influence the 
developments in other states that affect their domestic economies only to a very limited degree 
when acting unilaterally. To manage the international economic interdependencies that come 
with globalization, national governments increasingly cooperate and coordinate their policies in 
a multilateral fashion. To do so, they have created a large number of international organizations 
(IOs) that deal with these economic interdependencies.3 In the globalized world, such IOs play 
an important role as powerful ‘global’ actors of so-called ‘global governance.’ 
While much of the public and academic attention often centers around national politics, 
international organizations are now active and influential in virtually all policy areas.4 In the 
economic realm, IOs like the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
                                                     
1 The underlying definition of “economic globalization” follows Keohane and Nye (2000, 4). See Dreher (2006a) as well 
as Dreher, Gaston, and Martens (2008) for a discussion and an empirical operationalization of this definition. 
2 For literature reviews on the economic effects of globalization, see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), Grossman and 
Helpman (2015), de Haan and Sturm (2016), Harrison, McLaren, and McMillan (2010), Kanbur (2013), Potrafke (2015). 
3 See Keohane (1984). Note that this is just one out of several reasons for why IOs are created. Dreher and Lang (2016) 
provide an overview of some of the arguments that are discussed in the scholarly literature. 
4 Today, the median country is a member of more than 50 international intergovernmental organizations (calculation 
based on CIA 2018; KOF 2016). 
G 
2 
Development (OECD), or the secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) are key actors for tackling some of the world’s most pressing 
contemporary economic challenges: The World Bank is tasked with taking on global poverty, the 
OECD works on political responses to international tax evasion, and the UNFCCC deals with the 
economic consequences of climate change. Given the substantial amount of international 
coordination and cooperation that these and similar global challenges require, it seems highly 
unlikely that national governments will solve any of these problems without the help of 
international organizations. 
This general development is the key motivation for this dissertation to focus – to paraphrase its 
title – on how international organizations govern the globalized economy. It addresses this overarching 
question by examining both the input and the output dimension of IOs: In its first part the 
dissertation looks at IO decision-making (“input”); the second part focuses on IO effects 
(“output”). The guiding theme behind this dual focus is the perspective that international 
organizations – to paraphrase the dissertation’s title again – make highly political decisions with 
important economic effects. The four chapters, which are written as stand-alone papers, shed new 
light on specific elements of both the decision-making and the effectiveness of international 
organizations as well as on the links between political decisions and economic effects. 
The empirical focus of this dissertation is on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as it is often 
perceived as the most powerful IO when it comes to international economic policy.5 IMF expert 
Randall Stone (2002, 1) even goes as far as to describe the IMF as the “most powerful international 
institution in history.” What does this organization do to deserve this characterization? 
According to its self-description, the IMF is “working to foster global monetary cooperation, 
                                                     
5 The only non-regional IO with a similarly large amount of financial resources and similarly potent policy instruments 
is the World Bank. I focus on the IMF rather than on the World Bank because my research questions center around 
how international organizations interact with national politics and national economic outcomes. Whereas the World 
Bank’s power is more relevant at the level of individual development projects, the IMF’s power, arguably, refers more 
directly to the level of the national government. Chapter 2 has a dual focus on both the IMF and the World Bank, as it 
focuses on one of several policy areas in which the two organizations collaborate. 
Many of the theoretical arguments in this dissertation are general enough to relate to international organizations in a 
general sense and to extend beyond the IMF. Nevertheless, my empirical results, which focus on the IMF, do not allow 
me to draw the conclusion that they will necessarily hold for other IOs. The fact that no IO is quite like the other 
requires future research on the extent to which these theoretical arguments apply to other IOs. 
3 
secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable 
economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world.”6 In practice, the IMF attempts to 
achieve this very broad set of goals primarily by means of its lending and surveillance activities.7 
Via both of these main activities, the organization can exert substantial power on the national 
economic developments in its member states. 
The IMF is most famous for its lending activities. Originally, IMF loan programs were intended 
to provide short-term liquidity support to countries with temporary balance-of-payments 
problems. However, the IMF’s role has evolved. From the 1970s onwards, the IMF began to 
increasingly lend to countries with more protracted crises or structural economic problems. In 
fact, IMF programs became so frequent that – with the notable exception of Western Europe and 
the Anglosphere – there are very few countries that did not have at least one IMF program over 
the past half-century: When excluding states with less than a million inhabitants, in South Asia 
the only exception is Bhutan; in Latin America, there are only two exceptions (Cuba and Puerto 
Rico), and in Sub-Saharan Africa there are only four (Botswana, Eritrea, Namibia, and South 
Sudan). The world map in Figure 1 illustrates this. 
Figure 1 – IMF Lending, 1973-2013 
 
Note: Percentages indicate the share of years with an active IMF program in the 1973-2013 period. 
Source: Dreher (2006, updated). Own illustration. 
                                                     
6 http://www.imf.org/en/about (last accessed: 5 May 2018) 
7 See Reinhart and Trebesch (2015) for an account of how the IMF oscillated between these two main fields of activity 
over time. The subsequent paragraph partly builds on this paper. 
4 
In these loan programs, the IMF’s role is rarely limited to providing short-term liquidity. By 
making its loans conditional on the implementation of policy reforms, the organization often has 
a substantial impact on reforms in countries that experience economic crises. For instance, the 
IMF played key roles in economic adjustments during the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s, 
in the restructuring of post-Soviet economies after the end of the Cold war, in how countries dealt 
with the Asian financial crisis in the mid-1990s, and – most recently – in influencing reform 
agendas during the European debt crisis.8 These and many other countries participated in IMF 
programs in critical crisis periods during which far-reaching reforms seemed necessary. Not least 
the fact that increasingly specific IMF policy conditions9 influenced countries’ policy reforms 
during these critical times made the organization very powerful. For a dissertation that aims to 
understand how international organizations govern, this makes IMF loan programs an important 
object of investigation. Three of this dissertation’s four chapters focus on the IMF’s lending 
activities (chapters 1, 3, and 4). 
The IMF’s second major field of activity is ‘surveillance.’ The organization gathers statistics, 
analyzes economic trends and policy reforms, gives policy advice, makes macroeconomic 
forecasts, and rates countries’ economic performance. The output produced by these surveillance 
activities informs policy debates all around the world – and not only in countries with active IMF 
programs. What is more, research shows that the output of the IMF’s surveillance activities has 
tangible economic effects. Financial markets and governments react to such outputs as IMF 
growth forecasts, and public information notices resulting from the IMF’s Article IV consultations 
(Beaudry and Willems 2018; Fratzscher and Reynaud 2011). In light of these findings, it helps this 
dissertation to paint a more comprehensive picture of the IMF’s activities that – in addition to its 
focus on IMF lending in three chapters – one chapter also examines the organization’s 
surveillance activities (chapter 2). 
                                                     
8 See Klein (2008), Stiglitz (2002), Stone (2002), Vreeland (2003) for background information on many of these cases. 
9 See Polak (1991), Dreher (2009a, 2009b), as well as Kentikelenis et al. (2016) for accounts of how IMF conditionality 
evolved over time. The general view in this literature is that IMF conditionality over time covered an increasingly large 
number of policy areas and became much more specific. Other channels of IMF influence discussed in the literature 
are the disbursed loans themselves and the policy advice the IMF gives to countries participating in its programs 
(Dreher 2006b). 
5 
While addressing different fields of IMF activity, this dissertation consists of two main building 
blocks: a) the analysis of the IMF’s decision-making, and b) the analysis of the IMF’s effects. 
Underlying this dual focus is the idea that international organizations are most comprehensively 
understood when approaching them from both an “input” and from an “output” perspective. As 
“input” I consider all processes that influence the decisions that IOs make and that lead to the 
“output” that they eventually produce. As “output” I consider all effects that IOs have on their 
environment (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2 – The Input and Output of International Organizations 
 
In the first half of this dissertation (chapters 1 and 2) the primary focus is on the input dimension; 
in the second half (chapters 3 and 4) it is on the output dimension. There are two overarching 
themes in these two parts: First, I provide support for the view that the decision-making of IOs is 
to a substantial degree political. The IMF is not an apolitical, independent, and technocratic 
institution.10 Instead, its decision-making (“input”) is deeply embedded in world politics and the 
IO is frequently used as a political tool to help its most powerful member countries achieve their 
political goals. The dissertation’s chapters zero in on specific variants of such political influencing. 
The second overarching theme concerns the output dimension: IOs can have important economic 
effects. They are not weak and unimportant institutions.11 Instead, this dissertation shows that an 
IO like the IMF can affect economic outcomes like inequality, growth, and capital market access, 
and thus influence the daily lives of many people very directly and very substantially.  
                                                     
10 See Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik (2009) for a paper that emphasizes this perspective on IOs. 
11 See Mearsheimer (1994) for a paper that emphasizes this perspective on IOs. 
International
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6 
In short, international organizations make political decisions with economic effects. Each chapter of 
this dissertation makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to specific elements of this 
overarching perspective. I discuss the theoretical and the empirical approach underlying these 
contributions in turn. 
Theoretical Approach 
To analyze the input and output of IOs, I apply a particular theoretical framework. IOs are 
considered from a political economy perspective. As I discuss in a related paper with Axel Dreher 
(Dreher and Lang 2016), this theoretical approach goes beyond viewing IOs and their member 
states as monolithic actors. Instead, it focuses on the individual, rational actors that constitute IOs 
and their member states. The focus thus shifts from “states” to politicians, voters, as well as 
domestic political interest groups, and looks at how these actors interact within the domestic 
political system. Inside the IO, this perspective considers actors like government representatives 
and IO staff, and examines their relationship within the IO’s organizational set of rules. Each of 
the dissertation’s four chapters zeros in on a particular aspect of this complex network of actors 
that surround international organizations. 
Chapter 1 begins the analysis of the input dimension and examines the influence that the 
governments of the most powerful member countries have on the IMF. It finds that the United 
States (US) government is particularly powerful and able to exploit its influence over the IMF in 
a very specific way. When the exertion of political influence on other countries involves ‘dirty 
work’ that voters could punish electorally, the US government uses the IMF as political cover. 
The empirical evidence in this chapter suggests that the United States uses IMF loans to buy the 
votes of hostile countries in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). As such deals between 
governments made via international organizations like the IMF are less visible for the public and 
less clearly attributable to individual governments, states can use IOs to hide and “launder” 
unpopular foreign policy decisions.12 Such “laundering” activities appear to constitute an 
important ‘input’ element of the political influence exerted on IOs. 
                                                     
12 This argument goes back to Vaubel (1986). See also Abbott and Snidal (1998). 
7 
Chapter 2 retains the focus on the influence that different actors exert on the IMF but zeros in on 
the inner workings of the organization. This helps the chapter to shed light on the channels that 
allow such political influence as identified in chapter 1 to materialize. Building on the political 
economy perspective, it further breaks up the IMF as a monolithic actor and looks at its internal, 
organizational rules of decision-making (see Figure 3, where blank arrows symbolize influence).  
Figure 3 – The Inner Workings of International Organizations 
 
The chapter differentiates between government representatives and staff, and analyzes how these 
actors interact when decisions are made. More specifically, the chapter provides explicit empirical 
evidence for the influential “informal governance” model (Stone 2008, 2011, 2013), according to 
which both formal and informal rules regulate IOs’ decision-making processes. It tests the model 
in the context of IMF-World Bank Debt Sustainability Analyses and shows that the formal process 
of debt rating is more often overruled in favor of the rated country when this is in the interest of 
the United States. The results provide evidence for both sets of rules and suggest that the ‘room 
for discretion’ that the formal rules leave gives political influence the opportunity to enter via 
informal rules. 
Chapter 3 then shifts the attention from the input dimension to the output dimension. Its focus is 
on the IMF’s effect with regards to one of its most fundamental goals: helping countries overcome 
balance-of-payments problems. To gauge the IMF’s effectiveness in this respect, this chapter 
analyses how assessments of sovereign creditworthiness change when countries enter into IMF 
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loan programs. The chapter suggests that these effects are complex. IMF programs, on average, 
have economically contractionary effects but also send positive signals to market participants, 
which prevent the program country’s creditworthiness from deteriorating despite these 
contractions. While the appropriateness of the contractionary adjustments is debatable,13 the 
chapter suggests that to the extent that IMF programs are intended “to help cushion the impact 
of adjustment” (IMF 1998) they work as intended.  
Chapter 4 continues the analysis of the IMF’s output but turns to an unintended consequence by 
connecting the IMF’s decision-making with its effects. To do so, it further complexifies the agent 
structure involved in the decision-making process of IOs (see Figure 4).  
Figure 4 – The Long Delegation Chain 
 
On the one hand, the chapter retains the analytical differentiation between staff and government 
representatives inside the IMF. Additionally, however, it also differentiates between 
governments and voters inside member states as well as between different relationships between 
governments and voters of member countries with different political systems. The chapter thus 
takes into consideration the entire ‘chain of delegation’ from voters to IO staff. As the blank 
arrows in Figure 4 illustrate, this chain runs from voters via their domestic political systems 
                                                     
13 See, for instance, Blanchard and Leigh (2013) for evidence suggesting that the IMF systematically underestimates the 
contractionary effects of fiscal austerity. See also Przeworski and Vreeland (2000), Barro and Lee (2005), and Dreher 
(2006b), for critiques of the IMF on the basis of its programs’ negative effects on economic growth. See Bas and Stone 
(2014) for evidence pointing in the other direction. 
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(which includes additional actors like parties, interest groups, parliaments) to their governments; 
from governments to their delegates in the IMF’s executive board; and from the IMF’s board via 
a set of formal – and informal (chapter 2) – organizational rules to the IMF’s staff. The argument 
in chapter 4 is based on the observation that this delegation chain from the “ultimate principal” 
affected by the IMF to those who make the decisions in the IMF is long and fraught with several 
principal-agent problems (chaper 1, chapter 2, Nielson and Tierney 2003).14 The chapter examines 
the argument that this can lead to situations where the IMF’s policy output deviates from the 
preferences of the people that are affected by it. It provides evidence for this argument by 
showing that IMF programs increase income inequality in democracies. 
Chapter 4 thus brings together theoretical arguments on IO input from chapters 1 and 2 with the 
examination of IO output, which began in chapter 3: Chapter 1 points to the principal-agent 
problem arising from the fact that some members have disproportionally strong influence. 
Chapter 2 adds that much of this political influence is informal and establishes that staff 
preferences that arise out of bureaucratic incentives also influence the decision-making, thereby 
adding another principal-agent problem. Chapter 4 then links these principal-agent problems to 
unintended effects of IMF programs. In sum, in a literature that is often divided in studies that 
examine the determinants of the IMF’s activities (input) and in studies that examine their effects 
(output) this dissertation points to new links between input and output.15 The specific decision-
making structure of the IMF – in which political and bureaucratic interests, informal governance, 
and principal-agent problems play an important role – influences its output’s effectiveness. In 
short, it matters for the IMF’s economic effects, that its decision-making is political. 
                                                     
14 See also Hawkins et al. (2006) and Vaubel (2006). 
15 I do not claim to be the first to make the argument that IMF decision-making and IMF effectiveness are connected. 
Stone (2002) as well as Chapman et al. (2015) make the related argument that US influence on the organization interferes 
with the organization’s effectiveness. To the extent that more extensive IMF conditionality leads to better policy output, 
the results in Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland (2015), which suggest that political influence can reduce the scope of IMF 
conditions, can also be considered as providing support for this link. Nevertheless, the connection between the 
principal-agent problems discussed in chapter 4 and unintended economic effects is rarely made explicit in empirical 
studies on the IMF. Rather, one set of studies looks at the determinants of IMF decisions-making (for the key studies 
in this literature see chapter 2), and another looks at the IMF’s effects (see chapter 4 for the key studies). Note that the 
argument is also related to the finding that political motivations in aid allocation reduce aid effectiveness. Kilby (2015) 
provides evidence for this argument by examining World Bank projects. Dreher, Eichenauer, and Gehring (2016) 
provide evidence in the context of bilateral aid. 
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Empirical Approach 
Having discussed the dissertation’s broad theoretical framework, I now turn to its empirical 
approach. Each chapter puts its theoretical predictions concerning the specific research question 
it poses to the empirical test. The guiding principle behind the choice of the particular empirical 
approach of the chapter is to get as close as possible to estimating causal effects without letting 
the quest for causality hurt the relevance of the research question that is analyzed.  
Over the course of the last decade, the academic fields that this dissertation contributes to have 
gone through what Angrist and Pischke (2010) called the “credibility revolution.” Empirical 
economists now increasingly apply “design-based approach[es] that emphasize […] the 
identification of causal effects” (Angrist and Pischke 2010, 1). This dissertation, on the one hand, 
follows this trend in the discipline because it aims to make causal rather than correlational 
statements on the effects and mechanisms its hypotheses address. On the other hand, however, 
the dissertation does not go as far as some recent studies, which – out of the desire for internal 
validity and causality – limit the scope of their research question to a more marginal level at which 
the study’s external validity and its (policy-)relevance are impaired.16 
In particular, it does not adopt the view that real experiments, which are sometimes referred to 
as the ‘gold standard,’17 are necessarily the best or the only way to generate credible empirical 
knowledge. As for this dissertation’s research questions conducting real experiments is not 
feasible – the IMF would, for instance, not agree to allocate its loan programs randomly – 
applying such a radical ‘randomista’ perspective would lead the researcher to either dramatically 
shift the focus and limit the scope of the research question or refrain from studying it altogether. 
Faced with the choice of not studying these topics or studying them in the best way possible, I 
decide for the latter.18  
                                                     
16 See Deaton (2009) for a general critique on design-based approaches along these lines. 
17 In his critique of the “pervasive view among statisticians […] that glorifies randomization as the ‘gold standard’ of 
causal inference” Heckman (2005, 148), for instance, uses this term. 
18 This choice also reflects my personal conviction that these topics are politically too important to be left unstudied. If 
scholars decide against studying research questions that are highly relevant for politics and the public, unfounded 
speculations and simplistic arguments will dominate political and public discourses. This is why in my view, a world 
in which scholars provide some insights on such questions, even if not in the form of definite causal statements, is 
preferable to a world in which these scholarly insights are absent. 
11 
When ‘real experiments’ are infeasible and gathering anecdotal or correlational evidence will not 
give satisfactory answers to the research questions, scholars now increasingly make use of 
‘natural experiments’ for causal inference. This is the approach I adopt in this dissertation. I draw 
on a variety of statistical tools that make use of sources of quasi-random variation that occur in 
the real world for the identification of causal effects. The dissertation as a whole applies a range 
of identification strategies: It makes use of a natural experiment that leads to quasi-random treatment, 
an instrumental variable strategy, settings that resemble difference-in-differences approaches, another 
setting that exploits a particular institutional rule, a regression discontinuity design, and an event-
based identification building on the usage of two-dimensional fixed effects. 
Perhaps the most straightforward identifying assumption features in the natural experiment 
exploited in chapter 1. It is based on the finding that the timing of temporary membership in the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is conditionally exogenous to relevant outcome 
variables (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Dreher et al. 2014). Primarily due to the adherence 
to a turn-taking norm (Dreher et al. 2014), in this setting, it suffices to condition on a limited set 
of control variables and panel fixed effects to make endogeneity bias unlikely. 
Instrumental variables are part of the empirical analysis in chapters 3 and 4. To identify the effect 
of IMF programs they exploit the differential effect of changes in the IMF’s liquidity on loan 
allocation depending on a country’s history of IMF program participation as a source of 
exogenous variation. As these chapters will discuss in detail, the identifying assumption 
underlying this approach, which uses an interaction term as an instrumental variable, resembles 
the identifying assumption of a difference-in-differences approach. 
A related strategy is one of the building blocks of chapter 2. It exploits the fact that the timing of 
national elections introduces quasi-exogenous temporal variation in the setting under study. In 
both of these settings, the time-varying variables (IMF liquidity and elections) lead to ‘differences’ 
in the association between the respective outcome and an explanatory variable. Under standard 
difference-in-differences assumptions, this ‘difference’ has a causal interpretation (Bun and 
Harrison 2018; Nizalova and Murtazashvili 2016). 
In chapter 2, this identification strategy is implemented to enhance the plausibility of the 
assumption underlying its baseline analysis: The chapter’s core empirical design is based on a 
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particular institutional feature of the IMF’s Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) that makes 
endogeneity bias in the baseline regressions unlikely. The same chapter, in addition, includes a 
regression discontinuity design that exploits a second particular institutional feature of the DSF: The 
theoretical considerations suggest that the density function of projections used in the DSF could 
exhibit a discontinuity at particular values. Such a ‘density discontinuity’ (see Calonico, Cattaneo, 
and Titiunik 2014; Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma 2016; McCrary 2008) at this particular threshold 
would be highly unlikely to result from an omitted factor and, thus, makes a causal interpretation 
of the finding plausible. 
An empirical test that supplements the main analysis and is based on an alternative identifying 
assumption is also part of chapter 3. It builds on an event-time specification that isolates temporal 
variation of high-frequency data within individual country-year observations by making use of 
two-dimensional fixed effects. The identifying assumption underlying this approach is that these 
fixed effects control for all unobserved omitted variables that could bias the coefficients of 
interest. The fact that this assumption is entirely different to the identifying assumption of the 
chapter’s main analysis, but results in a finding that is consistent with the main analysis should 
increase confidence in the chapter’s empirical results.  
Key ingredients of the quantitative data used for these statistical analyses are original. Chapter 1 
is based on a newly coded dataset on UNSC voting behavior with resolution-specific 
information.19 Chapter 2 is based on the mechanical reconstruction of the ratings of the Debt 
Sustainability Framework from an internal IMF database consisting of macroeconomic 
projections. Chapter 3 uses, inter alia, an original set of monthly data on IMF program approvals 
to exploit monthly variation in data on sovereign credit ratings in a new way.20 For chapter 4, I 
compiled a new dataset of different measures of the IMF’s liquidity for the 1973-2013 period.  
The dissertation complements these statistical analyses with supplementary qualitative evidence. 
All chapters include anecdotal evidence from exemplary cases that illustrate the statistical results. 
                                                     
19 Vreeland and Dreher (2014) use a preliminary version of the dataset that we introduce in this paper in some 
regressions. 
20 The monthly credit ratings come from Fuchs and Gehring (2017). They deserve the credit for coding these data. 
However, in their study, the key explanatory variables are at the yearly level. Chapter 3 of this dissertation, which is 
co-authored with Gehring, involves an empirical setting where the key explanatory variable is at the monthly level and 
thus allows us to exploit this monthly variation in their data in a new way. 
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Chapter 3 additionally includes a qualitative text analysis. More generally, several arguments 
made in this dissertation are inspired by background information that I gathered in interviews at 
the IMF’s headquarters in Washington, DC. In particular, the theoretical argument in chapter 2 
benefitted from insights gained in these interviews, which were conducted in November 2016 
and November 2017.  
Policy Areas and Policy Implications 
The four chapters of this dissertation address three different policy areas. In light of the 
aforementioned perspective that international organizations have gained importance not least 
because of intensifying global interdependencies, it is no coincidence that these policy areas are 
all directly related to the economic challenges and opportunities that come with globalization. 
Chapters 2 and 3 focus on countries’ access to global capital, a core theme in many contemporary 
political debates in both advanced economies and developing countries. The conditions under 
which countries can refinance themselves played an important role, for instance, in the context of 
the recent European debt crisis. During the crisis, countries like Greece, Portugal, and Ireland 
effectively lost market access, and many placed their hopes on the IMF to help these countries 
regain creditworthiness. The question of the extent to which the IMF is able to do so, is thus highly 
topical. However, the issue is also relevant for low-income countries. As Presbitero et al. (2016) 
show, many of these countries increasingly gain access to global capital markets while integrating 
in the globalized economy. The findings of this dissertation suggest that the IMF plays an 
important role in this policy area: both in influencing countries’ creditworthiness (chapter 3) and 
in assessing (and thereby also indirectly influencing) it (chapter 2). For rich and poor countries 
alike, the IMF’s activities in the area of sovereign access to capital markets, have important 
economic consequences as access to credit markets can promote economic development 
(Berensmann, Dafe, and Volz 2015; Fink, Haiss, and Hristoforova 2003). By pointing to some of 
the benefits but also to some of the problems connected to the IMF’s activities in this policy area, 
these two chapters aim to inform the debate on how the IMF can help countries to enhance (or 
regain) their access to global capital most effectively. A direct policy implication of chapter 2 is 
that a cutback of the “room for discretion” that formal IMF and World Bank rules leave would 
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help reduce the opportunities for political biases to take effect. From chapter 3 governments of 
crisis countries can learn that capital markets are unlikely to react adversely when they decide to 
ask the IMF for financial support. 
The policy area that chapter 1 addresses is related. It also looks at international capital flows but 
focuses exclusively on official flows. More specifically, it examines explanations for the allocation 
patterns of bilateral aid flows and the IMF’s multilateral loans. In the globalized economy, these 
official flows play an important role: On the one hand, because they are considered as a means to 
reach global development goals.21 On the other hand, because they are political tools that donors 
use to reach their strategic goals in other countries in an increasingly interconnected world. The 
results of chapter 1 place the focus on the latter aspect and suggest that IMF loans are sometimes 
used to hide unpopular policies when the United States exerts political influence on a developing 
country. By uncovering this mechanism, this chapter points to an important hidden motive 
behind the allocation of multilateral loans. As both multilateral and bilateral aid where shown to 
be less effective for economic development when politically motivated (Dreher et al. 2013; Dreher, 
Eichenauer, and Gehring 2016; Kilby 2015), a direct policy implication of this result it to find ways 
to reduce the opportunities of powerful donor governments to use multilateral organizations as 
tools for laundering their “dirty work.” Increasing the transparency of internal IO decision-
making processes seems to be an important starting point. 
The final chapter tackles a policy area that is often at the center of public debate and, at least since 
Piketty’s (2014) Capital in the 21st Century, of the academic debate as well: inequality. Recent 
reports by the World Bank (2016a) and the World Inequality Lab (2017) confirm rising trends of 
economic inequality in many countries. While the evidence suggests that globalization is at least 
one driver of this trend,22 the growing literature on the determinants of inequality increasingly 
stresses the role of changing national policies and institutions (Dabla-Norris et al. 2015; OECD 
                                                     
21 The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), for instance, see a key role for bilateral aid (see SDG target 17.2.). On its 
relevance for the SDGs the IMF states: “The IMF is committed, within the scope of its mandate, to the global partnership 
for sustainable development. The IMF has launched a number of initiatives to enhance its support for its member 
countries in crucial ways as they pursue the SDGs” (IMF 2018b). 
22 In a paper, which I wrote with Marina Mendes Tavares during my time as a PhD student, but which is not part of 
this PhD dissertation, we show that economic globalization tends to increase income inequality (Lang and Tavares 
2018). See the literature quoted therein for further literature on this topic. 
15 
2011). Chapter 4 contributes to this literature by suggesting that the IMF has, during critical 
periods in many countries, contributed to policy reforms that promoted rising inequality. To link 
this finding to the current political debate inside the IMF, the institution seems to be increasingly 
determined to avoid adverse distributional effects: Its Managing Director, Christine Lagarde, 
recently claimed that “reducing excessive inequality [...] is not just morally and politically correct, 
but it is good economics” (IMF 2015). The final chapter’s empirical result thus highlights an 
unintended consequence of the IMF’s lending arrangements and may encourage the Fund to 
continue revising its policy advice and conditionality with regards to their distributional 
implications. The chapter also suggests that the IMF’s recent internal reforms that increase more 
participative decision-making processes and emphasize national ownership of reforms under 
IMF programs can help reduce this adverse distributional effect. 
In sum, I hope that the findings of this dissertation in the policy areas of sovereign market access, 
official international flows, and income inequality will not only be of interest for scholars but will 
also be of help for policy practitioners that aim to promote inclusive economic development. 
Structure and Summary of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation consists of four chapters and proceeds as follows: 
Chapter 1 shows how major shareholders can exploit their power over international 
organizations to hide their foreign-policy interventions from domestic audiences. The chapter is 
part of an ongoing project with Axel Dreher, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland. 
We argue that major powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the 
intervention favorably. When domestic audiences are more skeptical of a target country, favors 
are granted via international organizations. We test this theory empirically by examining how the 
United States uses bilateral aid and IMF loans to buy other countries’ votes in the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). To do so, we introduce a new dataset on voting behavior in the UNSC 
that covers a total of 36,460 individual votes on 2,524 proposed resolutions along with resolution-
specific information. Our results show that US “friends” receive more bilateral aid when voting 
in line with the United States in the UNSC, while concurring votes of US “enemies” are rewarded 
with loans from the IMF. Temporary UNSC members that vote against the United States do not 
16 
receive such perks. These results suggest that the United States choses bilateral channels to 
reward friends but relies on obfuscation via international organizations when buying favors from 
hostile countries. In sum, we argue that powerful countries can use international organizations 
as political tools to do their “dirty work.” 
Chapter 2 then sheds light on a more fine-grained mechanism that can, inter alia, help understand 
the kind of political influence on the IMF for which chapter 1 provides empirical evidence. It is 
co-authored with the IMF economist Andrea F. Presbitero. His institutional affiliation helped us 
to get access to the internal data used for the analysis and allowed us to conduct interviews with 
IMF and World Bank staff to gather background information. The paper was published in the 
Journal of Development Economics before this dissertation was submitted (Lang and Presbitero 
2018). 
In this chapter, we examine how powerful states exert “informal” influence on the IMF and the 
World Bank. We exploit the degree of discretion embedded in the World Bank-IMF Debt 
Sustainability Framework to understand the decision-making process inside the two 
organizations. Our unique, internal dataset covers all debt sustainability analyses conducted 
between 2006 and 2015 for low-income countries. These data allow us to identify cases where the 
risk rating implied by the application of the DSF’s mechanical rules was overridden to assign a 
different official rating. In contrast to much of the previous literature, we can thus shed light on 
the internal decision-making processes of IOs. We can directly examine the extent to which 
informal influence interferes in technocratic rules instead of only comparing how they relate to 
differences in outcomes. Our results show that formal rules are adhered to but also that political 
interests and bureaucratic incentives influence the decision to intervene in the mechanical 
decision-making process. Countries with political ties to the institutions’ major shareholders are 
more likely to receive improved ratings; especially in election years and when the mechanical 
assessment is not clear-cut. Supplementary evidence from a regression discontinuity design 
additionally suggests that the macroeconomic projections underlying the ratings are also biased. 
These results suggest that the “room for discretion” IOs have can be a channel for informal 
governance and a source of biased decision-making. 
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While in chapter 2 we also provide some correlational evidence suggesting that the DSF ratings 
matter for sovereign market access, a rigorous empirical test of how the IMF affects the conditions 
under which countries have access to capital markets follows in chapter 3. This paper is co-
authored with Kai Gehring. An earlier version of it was published as a CIS Working Paper before 
this dissertation was submitted (Gehring and Lang 2018).  
The chapter starts with the observation that the loan programs of the IMF are often considered to 
carry a “stigma” that triggers adverse market reactions. Countries are thus sometimes hesitant to 
engage with the Fund.23 Our results, however, suggest that the presence of an IMF program sends 
a positive signal to investors that prevents creditworthiness from falling despite substantial 
economic contractions under IMF programs. Using monthly data on credit ratings from various 
agencies and professional investors for 100 countries in the 1987-2013 period as measures of 
creditworthiness, we apply three different methods to circumvent the severe endogeneity 
problem associated to studying the IMF’s effects. For our main identification strategy, we exploit 
the differential effect of changes in the IMF’s liquidity on loan allocation as a source of exogenous 
variation. We find that adjustments under IMF programs reduce GDP growth in the short-run, 
but do not lower creditworthiness. When examining the underlying channels, we find evidence 
of a positive signaling effect on perceptions of creditworthiness that offsets the negative adjustment 
effect on aggregate output. IMF involvement appears to create positive expectations about the 
program country’s future policy path and thereby ‘cushions’ the drop in creditworthiness that 
countries undergoing such contractionary adjustments would usually suffer from. Event-time 
specifications exploiting monthly variation within country-year observations and a systematic 
text analysis of rating statements support this interpretation. 
In addition to investigating this relationship, chapter 3 uses the high-frequency monthly data on 
sovereign credit ratings also to illustrate the severe endogeneity problem that studies focusing on 
the IMF’s effects need to deal with. We document that countries usually experience substantial 
drops in credit ratings in the months before they enter IMF programs. Our results also suggest 
that controlling for observables is unlikely to remove the entire bias resulting from this. They 
                                                     
23 This is a key insight I gained at the IMF headquarters: IMF staff repeatedly told me that they were worried that the 
IMF loses global relevance because countries fear such a stigma effect. See also Andone and Scheubel (2017). 
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underline the importance of employing an appropriate identification strategy when examining 
the IMF’s effects. This is also a key issue in the empirical analysis of chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 is single-authored. An earlier version of it was published as a Heidelberg University 
Discussion Paper (Lang 2016). Like chapter 3, it examines an economic effect of IMF programs. The 
reader will notice that the chapter places emphasis on the theoretical argument whereas chapter 
3 focuses more on the empirical analysis.24 But like chapter 3, chapter 4 also makes both empirical 
and theoretical contributions to the literature. 
Empirically, the main contribution is introducing the new instrumental variable for IMF 
programs, which is also one of the identification strategies applied in chapter 3. For this IV, I 
exploit exogenous time variation in the IMF’s liquidity and cross-sectional variation in a country’s 
probability of having a lending arrangement with the IMF. The interaction term of the two 
variables is excludable to country-specific economic characteristics and allows determining a 
causal effect via quasi-random assignment relative to country-year-specific economic outcomes. 
This construction of a plausible counterfactual by means of the IV is important for testing the 
theoretical predictions made in this chapter. I argue that the IMF, not least because of the specific 
principal-agent problems in its delegation chain, which are also addressed in chapters 1 and 2, 
suffers from a relative lack of accountability to the people affected by its policy output. By 
interfering in domestic politics, it might thus restrict the responsiveness of democratic 
governments to the distributional preferences of their citizens. I develop the hypothesis that 
democracies under an IMF program – relative to a plausible counterfactual of the same 
democracies in the same circumstances not under an IMF program – will experience increases in 
income inequality. Using panel data for 155 countries over the 1973–2013 period, the results show 
that IMF programs substantially increase income inequality. The effect is driven by the 
democracies in the sample, and there is no evidence for such an effect in non-democracies. The 
evidence also suggests that the IMF’s recent enhancement of accountability mechanisms is 
associated with a mitigation of its inequality-increasing effect. 
  
                                                     
24 This has to do with the fact that the paper was submitted to a general interest political science journal. 
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20 
1.1 Introduction 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the United States´ key geostrategic goals was to 
reduce the threat Russia posed to the country´s security. To do so, the United States attempted to 
influence political developments in Russia during the 1990s, and in the early years of the decade 
bilateral aid was one of the main policy instruments: US disbursements of bilateral aid to Russia 
amounted to one billion US dollars (USD) in 1993 and 2.5 billion USD in 1994.25 In 1994, these aid 
packages came under increasing popular pressure at home. According to a Congressional 
Research Service report, “concerns regarding the US budget deficit [and] the unpromising 
outcome of the December 1993 Russian parliamentary elections,” amongst others, led to 
substantial reductions in US aid. Between 1996 and 1998 annual disbursements of US aid to Russia 
were reduced to about half a billion USD. 
At about the same time, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) became heavily involved in 
Russia. In 1995, it approved a 6 billion USD loan program, increased it to more than 10 billion the 
next year and to an extraordinarily large 18 billion USD loan in 1998. The United States strongly 
supported this. US President Clinton stated: “I believe the loan will go through, and I believe that 
it should. I do support it strongly.”26 And Russian President Yeltsin said that to get the IMF to 
commit to these loans “[w]e had to involve Clinton, Jacques Chirac, Helmut Kohl, and [John] 
Major.”27 Further anecdotal evidence that the United States put pressure on the IMF abounds 
(Congressional Research Service 2002; Goldgeier and McFaul 2005; Stone 2002). As Goldgeier and 
McFaul (2005, 152) put it: “[t]he Clinton administration wanted to use the IMF to support Yeltsin 
in his time of need; the IMF obliged.” And more generally: “[i]n essence, the Clinton 
administration transferred the responsibility for assisting Russia’s economic transformation from 
the United States to the IMF” (p. 100). 
                                                     
25 Some US politicians justified these large aid disbursements by arguing “that the U.S. defense budget would be $100 
billion greater in the next year if the Soviet Union still existed as a military threat” (Congressional Research Service 
2002, referring to a speech on March 4, 1993, by US Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee, in which he called for a one-billion-dollar aid package). 
26 Quoted in Goldgeier and McFaul (2005, 152). 
27 https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/23/world/russia-and-imf-agree-on-a-loan-for-10.2-billion.html (last accessed May 
20, 2018). 
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This episode seems to suggest that the United States initially used bilateral aid to pursue a key 
geopolitical goal. When directly giving its own aid became increasingly difficult to justify 
domestically, it switched to the IMF and used the organization to support the country with 
international aid.28 
Of course, the example of Russia might be an isolated case rather than representative of a general 
pattern. The scholarly literature that compares bilateral and multilateral aid typically argues that 
political interests are less prevalent for multilateral aid, and takes the relative absence of political 
motives as a reason why multilateral aid is more effective for promoting development (Derek 
2008; Milner and Tingley 2013).29 Much of the recent literature therefore concludes that donors 
use multilateral aid to promote development and other international public goods, while they 
use bilateral aid to promote their own political agenda (Schneider and Tobin 2016).30 
The focus of this recent literature on multilateral aid as a largely apolitical instrument of burden-
sharing for promoting development goals stands in contrast to the literature on international 
organizations. Woods (2003) and McKeown (2009) document that the United States virtually 
controls major decisions at the IMF and the World Bank. According to Rieffel (2003, 28–29), “[t]he 
IMF is an instrument of the G-7 countries. There is no example that comes easily to mind of a 
position taken by the IMF on any systematic issue without the tacit, if not explicit, support of the 
United States and the other G-7 countries.” Quantitative evidence supports the view that 
multilateral lending reflects the interests of international organizations’ major shareholders 
(Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009a; 2009b; Kilby 2013a; 2013b; Kuziemko and Werker 2006; 
Vreeland and Dreher 2014).31  
Even though a large number of papers has investigated the importance of political motives for 
multilateral and bilateral aid giving, no empirical work exists that can easily reconcile the two 
different strands of literature. Taken at face value, these two literatures suggest that donor 
countries use multilateral aid for pursuing their own political agendas while, at the same time, 
                                                     
28 We use the term “aid” for all forms of official support channeled to recipient countries, including Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), Other Official Flows (OOF), and multilateral loans and credits. 
29 For the importance of geo-strategic motives for the effectiveness of aid see Dreher, Eichenauer, and Gehring (2016). 
30 Also see Dietrich (2013). According to Dietrich, governments use multilateral (and other non-state) aid when they 
want it to promote development in recipient countries with low governmental quality. 
31 For a broad overview of this literature see Dreher and Lang (2016). 
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bilateral channels seem more politicized than multilateral channels. In our view, this begs the 
questions how states decide between bilateral and multilateral channels for exerting political 
influence and why multilateral aid is often perceived as less political than bilateral aid. In this 
paper we offer an explanation that sheds new light on these questions. 
We argue that donor governments use multilateral channels for exerting political influence when 
the domestic public is hostile towards supporting the recipient. Bilateral channels, on the other 
hand, will primarily be used for countries that the domestic audiences view more favorably. Our 
argument is based on the idea that multilateral organizations can be used to do their major 
shareholders’ “dirty work” (Vaubel 1986). Some governments have substantial influence over 
multilateral organizations, which they can exploit to pursue policies vis-à-vis other states without 
drawing on bilateral channels. Multilateral organizations can thus help to “launder” 
governments’ political activities that are unpopular with domestic audiences when conducted 
bilaterally but acceptable when executed via multilateral organizations (Abbott and Snidal 1998; 
Vaubel 1986). As politics inside multilateral organizations is difficult to observe for the public, 
governments can implement their preferred policies without having to fear adverse electoral 
consequences. Conversely, when they aim to give aid to friendly countries they can use the more 
visible bilateral channel. 
For such “laundering,” major shareholders exploit multilateral organizations’ reputation as a 
politically neutral donor to hide unpopular policies from their voters. To keep this reputation 
alive, governments thus rarely interfere in their decision-making, and the organizations grant 
loans according to need, on average. Politics thus seem to be less prevalent in the allocation of 
multilateral aid compared to bilateral aid. But rather than being free of political motives, 
multilateral aid is highly political – governments just use it for political purposes in selected 
salient cases when it would be politically costly to draw on bilateral resources. This is also why 
political motives in the lending of these organizations are more difficult to detect empirically – 
for voters and scholars alike. The average multilateral loan is more likely to be given for non-
political reasons, compared to bilateral aid. And the fact that politically motivated loans are given 
to ‘strange bedfellows’ (i.e., recipients that are not among the donors’ traditional allies) makes it 
even harder to detect the underlying political motives. 
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This is why testing this theory requires a new empirical setting.32 After all, we aim to detect 
patterns that are deliberately hidden. We test it focusing on vote buying in the United Nations’ 
most powerful organ, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Specifically, we examine how 
voting behavior in the UNSC is linked to the allocation of bilateral aid flows and loans from 
multilateral financial institutions. Dissenting votes in the UNSC are rare and major powers use 
incentives and disincentives for other members to avoid them. We expect governments to use 
increases in aid as reward for loans and reductions in aid as punishment. Countries that vote 
against powerful governments in the UNSC thus should receive less bilateral and multilateral 
support. However, patterns of bilateral aid are easily observable by domestic audiences. Those of 
multilateral aid are not; as we discuss in more detail below, publics tend to perceive international 
organizations as independent actors and do not easily attribute their lending to the influence of 
their own government. We thus expect that bilateral aid will be used to buy favors from 
befriended governments, which domestic audiences can easily agree to provide aid to. In cases 
where domestic audiences are likely hostile towards the recipient government, we expect 
powerful shareholders to use their power over international organizations to extend support. 
They will increase multilateral aid rather than bilateral aid. This is the case that fits the Russian 
example above. 
To test our theory, we compile a new dataset that covers the universe of UNSC votes that were 
cast by all member states in the seven decades over the 1946-2015 period. We record a total of 
36,460 individual votes on 2,524 proposed resolutions. We consider all available UNSC proposals 
– those that have passed (resolutions) and those that have failed (vetoed resolutions and failed 
majorities). To our knowledge, this is the first such dataset, which we collected from the United 
Nations (UN) Library in Geneva, as well as from UN web pages. Along with each member state’s 
decision, we code resolution-specific information, such as the policy area concerned and the 
amount of media attention the resolution generated. 
Armed with the new data on UNSC voting we test our theoretical argument and find 
considerable support for it. First, the evidence is consistent with the view that votes in the world’s 
                                                     
32 The “dirty-work” hypothesis goes back to Vaubel (1986) but has never been tested in a large-n setting. His own work 
uses “the methodology of example giving” (Vaubel 1986, 45). 
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most important international institution are for sale. We find that temporary members of the 
UNSC that vote in line with the United States receive both more bilateral aid from the United 
States and larger IMF loans than non-members. Countries that vote against the United States in 
the UNSC do not receive such perks during their time as temporary members. We then turn to 
testing our argument on the choice of bilateral versus multilateral channels. We find that the 
United States uses bilateral aid to buy the votes of UNSC members it is politically close to and 
multilateral loans to buy the votes of members to which it is politically more distant (as measured 
by voting coincidence in the UN General Assembly prior to entering the UNSC). While our main 
analyses focus on the trade-off between bilateral US aid and IMF loans, we also show that the 
results hold for World Bank loans. 
Our results add important nuances to the literature on how donors chose between bilateral and 
multilateral support. Rather than being less political than bilateral aid, donors benefit politically 
from not influencing multilateral aid on average, so that multilateral organizations maintain their 
reputation as politically neutral. They can then use them to perform their dirty work in 
strategically important cases. We see this theory as complementing rather than contradicting 
previous work and, interestingly, results obtained in previous research support our argument. 
Milner (2006) finds that right-wing governments give more multilateral aid then left ones. She 
concludes that “it is hard to understand this result” which is “robust and puzzling” (2006, 132). 
It cannot be explained with Milner’s theory which expects donors to use bilateral aid to pursue 
political goals. Given that right-wing governments typically pursue more aggressive foreign aid 
policy than left ones (e.g., Milner and Tingley 2010), it is however exactly what our theory would 
predict. Strand and Zappile (2015) proxy donor interest in a country with its economic aid, 
following Fleck and Kilby (2006). They expect countries that receive more economic aid from a 
member of a multilateral development bank to also receive more aid from the bank itself but find 
the opposite. This result is contrary to the authors’ expectations but is exactly what we would 
expect to find when multilateral aid is used in countries where bilateral aid is difficult to give. 
In addition to adding important insights to the literature on donors’ choice among bilateral and 
multilateral aid, our results speak to several other literatures: First, our paper links to the 
literature on associations between aid flows and voting in the UN, which has so far focused on 
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the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (Thacker 1999; Stone 2008; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, 
and Thiele 2008; Kilby 2013; Carter and Stone 2015). Our results suggest that vote buying extends 
beyond the UNGA and also relates to the UN’s most powerful organ, the UNSC.  
Second, we qualify the ‘UNSC effect.’ Multiple recent studies have shown a relationship between 
temporary UNSC membership and favorable treatment from aid donors and multilateral 
organizations (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009a; 2009b; 2015; Kilby 2013b; Kuziemko and 
Werker 2006; Mikulaschek 2017b; Reynolds and Winters 2016; Vreeland and Dreher 2014). For 
the case of US aid and IMF loans we show that those temporary members of the UNSC that vote 
in line with the United States rather than membership itself drive this effect. Our results thus add 
more direct evidence for the conjecture that the larger aid flows to UNSC members are used for 
vote buying. 
Third, and closely related, which countries control the IMF is contested in the literature. While 
some argue that the United States is by far the most powerful of the IMF’s shareholders (e.g., 
Stone 2008), others hold that “the United States does not unilaterally control IMF lending; rather, 
the G5 countries as a group exercise substantial influence” (Copelovitch 2010a, 73). We find that 
temporary members of the UNSC whose voting behavior resembles the voting behavior of the 
other four permanent five UNSC members do not receive more IMF loans than non-members. 
This link only emerges as far as voting similarity relative to the United States is concerned. We 
interpret this as evidence that primarily the United States is responsible for the association 
between UNSC membership and increased access to IMF resources and, thus, as support for the 
view that the United States is the dominant shareholder in the IMF. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. We develop our theoretical argument in section 
1.2. Section 1.3 provides some background on the IMF and the UNSC. In section 1.4, we present 
the new dataset on UNSC voting behavior along with the other data used for the empirical 
analysis as well as our method of estimation. The results of this analysis are presented in section 
1.5. Section 1.6 concludes this chapter. 
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1.2 The Argument 
1.2.1 Bilateral and Multilateral Aid  
A number of recent papers have investigated the conditions under which donors prefer bilateral 
over multilateral aid. According to the standard view, multilateral aid allows different donors to 
share the burden of aid-giving, at the cost of losing control over how exactly the aid is spent 
(Milner and Tingley 2013; Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Knack 2017).33 To the extent that donor 
preferences are aligned, donors prefer multilateral aid over bilateral aid, as it is cheaper and more 
cost efficient compared to fragmented aid from different donors (Milner and Tingley 2013). As 
holds true for multilateral cooperation at large, multilateral aid can realize efficiency gains, pool 
risks, materialize economies of scale, and encourage wide cost sharing (Abbott and Snidal 1998). 
Over bilateral aid, on the other hand, donors have more direct control and can, thus, use it as a 
tool to promote their own political interests in other countries. Evidence on political motivations 
in bilateral aid giving abounds (for a survey of this literature see, e.g., Hoeffler and Outram 2011; 
Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp 2014). 
Overall, the literature sees multilateral aid as less politicized than bilateral aid and as more 
effective (Derek 2008; Milner 2006; Schneider and Tobin 2016). Governments use the two types of 
aid as substitutes to achieve the same foreign policy goals, on average (McKeown 2009; Milner 
and Tingley 2013; Schneider and Tobin 2016). The results of this literature, however, stand in 
stark contrast to the literature that focusses on aid from multilateral organizations. 
According to this literature, there is now a good deal of evidence that the United States uses its 
influence at multilateral organizations like the IMF and the World Bank to favor governments of 
developing countries it considers strategically important. Again, anecdotal evidence abounds 
(e.g., Andersen, Harr, and Tarp 2006; McKeown 2009). The first scholar to provide systematic 
quantitative evidence is Thacker (1999), who shows that IMF programs are more likely to go to 
governments that move towards the United States in terms of their voting at the United Nations 
General Assembly. Dreher and Sturm (2012) show that the correlation holds across the G7 
                                                     
33 These costs can be minimized by delegating to an international organization with an aid portfolio that closely matches 
the donor’s preferences (Schneider and Tobin 2016). 
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countries, while Copelovitch (2010a) stresses the importance of the G5 as a group. Stone (2002; 
2004) shows that governments favored by the United States in terms of bilateral aid, which is 
well-known to be influenced by international politics, receive lighter punishments for 
noncompliance with IMF conditionality. According to Stone (2002, 62), “[a]lthough the United 
States holds a minority of votes, it does indeed call the shots at the IMF, as critics allege.” Fratianni 
and Pattison (2005) summarize evidence showing that the G7 are in control of the IMF on the 
most important issues and that staff autonomy is restricted to areas that are of marginal interest 
to its shareholders. This conclusion is consistent with Stone’s (2008; 2011) ‘informal governance’ 
model, according to which powerful shareholder use their informal power to intervene in IMF 
decision-making in cases that are of strategic interest to them and in normal times leave the 
organization governed by its formal rules (see also chapter 2). In addition to the IMF, there is also 
substantial evidence that the major shareholders’ political interests are also reflected in World 
Bank decisions (e.g., Kersting and Kilby 2016b; Kilby 2009; 2013). 
The two strands of literature combined provide an interesting puzzle. The literature on donors’ 
choice of multilateral versus bilateral support sees multilateral aid mainly as a way to share the 
burden of aid-giving and realize efficiency gains, while the literature on the IMF and the World 
Bank characterizes the organizations as political tools of their major shareholders, and in 
particular of the United States. How can multilateral aid be perceived as non-political and highly 
politicized at the same time? If bilateral aid is used as a political tool, why is there also evidence 
on political interests in multilateral aid? If both bilateral and multilateral channels are used to 
shape political developments in other countries, how do governments decide between them? 
1.2.2 The Dirty-Work Hypothesis 
We expect governments to prefer multilateral aid over bilateral aid when the benefits of doing so 
exceed the costs. As politicians are interested in winning elections and gaining popularity, a key 
benefit we see in supporting recipients via multilateral organizations is the ability to hide one’s 
support for an unpopular recipient (Vaubel 1986).34 Governments might even publicly shame an 
                                                     
34 As a further benefit that is not central to our argument, multilateral aid reduces the scope for citizens to compare the 
success of aid across different donors, so that donor governments cannot be held accountable for failures (“yardstick 
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international organization for supporting regimes that are unpopular with its domestic audience, 
while secretly pressing international organizations to provide support. As Voigt and Salzberger 
(2002, 295) point out, “an ability to shift blame will bring a legislator to prefer delegation.” In line 
with Vaubel (1986) as well as Voigt and Salzberger (2002), we thus expect aid to be channeled via 
an international organization when it is unpopular at home. The main costs of channeling the aid 
to multilateral organizations is the damage this imposes on the reputation of the organization as 
politically independent and neutral actor. Only when the issue at stake is sufficiently salient to 
the donor, and bilateral action would be sufficiently costly, will the benefits of using the 
organization exceed the costs. We thus expect multilateral aid to prevail when donor 
governments want to channel resources to countries that its own public would not want it to 
support. We expect governments to use international organizations to shield them from the views 
of their domestic audiences. 
Our argument rests on two main pillars which we briefly discuss in turn. First, we argue that 
domestic audiences in donor countries have sufficiently strong preferences against supporting 
certain types of regimes with aid for their governments to take note. Second, we argue that 
domestic audiences know little about the decision-making processes of multilateral 
organizations. Not least because these processes are often non-transparent for the public, they 
perceive these organizations as largely independent organizations so that the role of their own 
government in granting aid to a specific country largely goes unnoticed. 
We expect governments to be sensitive to the foreign policy preferences of their domestic 
audience (Moravcsik 1997). Recent evidence suggests that the public has an aversion to providing 
bilateral aid to hostile countries (Heinrich and Kobayashi 2018). As they point out, “people 
believe that aiding such regimes is morally unacceptable as it signifies complicity in promoting 
harmful policies” (2018, 2). In short, “voters abhor giving aid to such regimes” (Heinrich and 
Kobayashi 2018, 3). What is more, publics prefer humanitarian aid over political aid (Milner 2006). 
Among the examples given by Milner (2006, 118), Lumsdaine (1993, 43) points out that “[p]ublics 
when asked consistently said aid should go to needy countries that would use it well rather than 
                                                     
competition,” Vaubel 2006). What is more, of course, multilateral aid is “cheaper” from an individual donor’s 
perspective. 
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being used to promote narrow national interest.” She also cites McDonnel et al. (2003, 20) pointing 
out that “[i]n most cases, the overwhelming [public] support for foreign aid is based upon the 
perception that it will be spent on remedying humanitarian crises.” According to Milner and 
Tingley (2015, 3), “[e]fforts at using positive inducements, such as economic aid and trade, have 
often found bitter opposition within the United States.” They point out that the US President is 
unsuccessful in obtaining congressional approval on a crucial foreign policy in around one third 
of the time. What is more “Congress, interest groups, and the public constrain the president in 
foreign policy, but, crucially, the extent of this constraining varies across policy instruments” 
(Milner and Tingley 2015, 13). Overall, domestic audiences care about the type and recipients of 
aid, so that it becomes difficult to channel political aid to hostile recipients. 
Domestic audiences in donor countries know little about the IMF. As one example, consider IMF 
Managing Director Christine Lagarde’s threat to pull out of Greece ahead of a 2016 meeting of 
Eurozone finance ministers (discussing an extension of a Greek bail-out package). Her threat was 
taken at face value in newspapers discussing the bail-out.35 The fact that Christine Lagarde could 
hardly take such decision against the will of the major IMF shareholders has largely gone 
unnoticed. According to Vaubel (1986) voters are to some extent rationally ignorant, so that 
governments can use international organizations to increase voters’ information costs. As Vaubel 
(2006, 134) points out, “[m]ost parliaments and voters know very little about their executive 
directors.” He cites Gerster (1993: 101), according to whom “the manner in which executive 
directors and their domestic authorities regularly report to parliament and the public on their 
participation in the Fund and the Bank is […] only poorly developed.” Gerster (1993, 107) 
concludes that “there is an institutionalized bias against public accountability of executive 
directors.” In addition, Grigorescu (2013) finds that a certain ‘culture of secrecy’ is visible in many 
international organizations. He argues that this is, amongst others, the case as “[g]overnments 
want to maintain their monopoly over information to control IOs [and] [i]nformation on 
bargaining is too sensitive to release to domestic audiences” (Grigorescu 2007, 630). Similarly, 
                                                     
35 One representative example is a May 6, 2016 article in The Guardian, see 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/06/imf-threatens-greece-eurozone-christine-lagarde (accessed May 10, 
2018). 
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Stasavage (2004) suggests that such secrecy allows member states to blame the international 
organization for unpopular decisions. 
We expect governments to make use of voters’ lack of knowledge about international 
organizations and use them to hide unpopular policies. Governments collude with pressure 
groups at the expense of their voters. They hide the costs of concessions to interest groups (such 
as domestic banks) and shirk domestic responsibilities for unpopular policies (such as a bail-
out).36 International organizations raise the costs of information for voters, but not for well-
organized interest groups. As a consequence, “[t]o the extent that foreign aid is unpopular in the 
donor countries, the multilateral aid institutions help the national politicians to collude against 
their voters and to avoid responsibility for specific grants and the inevitable scandals” (Vaubel 
1986, 50). The longer chain of control along the principal-agent relationship from donor 
populations to recipient populations weakens citizens’ ability to achieve their will (Nielson and 
Tierney 2003; Vaubel 2006; see also chapter 4). 
1.2.3 Contributions to Previous Literature 
Our argument is closely related to recent literature on the allocation of aid. As Heinrich and 
Kobayashi (2018) point out, “by simply giving less aid, the donor can distance itself from the nasty 
policies of the recipient.” According to our argument, while the donor will indeed give less 
bilateral aid to unpopular regimes, we expect the donor will simply use multilateral aid instead. 
Governments give “aid to nasty regimes because they tend to be the optimal target to bribe for 
concessions” (Heinrich and Kobayashi 2018, 3; also see Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). 
Given this, it would be surprising if donor governments would not try to find alternative channels 
of influence in cases in which bilateral aid is unpopular to use. Indeed, Heinrich and Kobayashi 
(2018, 5) posit that “donor governments could attempt to divert the public’s attention from the 
recipients’ nasty policies and thus not have to give up the policy concessions” that it can buy with 
its aid. We argue that multilateral aid achieves exactly this. 
                                                     
36 For instance, Germany’s insistence on involving the IMF in the highly unpopular bail-out for Greece during the 
European debt crisis can be considered from this perspective. 
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The importance of international organizations’ “laundering function” has also been discussed 
before. In addition to Vaubel (1986) and Voigt and Salzberger (2002), Abbot and Snidal (1998) 
come to mind. However, there are subtle but important differences to what we argue here. 
According to Abbott and Snidal (1998), states structure international organizations so that they 
further their powerful members’ interests but also incentivize weaker states to participate. They 
designed the IMF so that, on average, neutral economics guide its policies, but in a way that they 
can use it for their own geostrategic interests in cases that are important to them. In line with 
what we argue here, Abbott and Snidal (1998, 19) observe that “[p]owerful states face a tension 
between the immediate advantages of dirty laundering versus the long-run costs of jeopardizing 
IO independence.” According to Abbott and Snidal (1998, 18), however, this function mainly 
serves as a tool to implement policies in recipient countries without being blamed by recipient 
audiences. They expect multilateral action to reduce the impact of domestic lobby groups, and 
leading to less politicized actions. This is the opposite of what we expect in this paper. The fact 
that unpopular policies can be hidden from domestic audiences should strengthen the role of 
domestic lobbies and lead to more politicized actions. 
Our characterization of the donor-recipient relationship in a principal-agent framework is 
likewise not new. According to the seminal study by Milner (2006), multilateral aid is used to 
signal to its own voters the donor governments’ commitment that the aid is used for non-political 
or non-commercial goals. She points out that “[g]iving (more) aid to a multilateral forum ties the 
leader’s hands relative to that aid but also makes the voters more likely to approve of greater aid 
overall” (Milner 2006, 119). Our argument is the opposite. Rather than tying donors’ hands to 
humanitarian goals, multilateral aid allows donors to exert political influence in cases this would 
be too costly to do bilaterally. 
Hicks, Parks, Roberts, and Tierney (2010) focus on the principal-agent relationship as well. They 
argue that donors use multilateral aid to tie their hands ex ante to be able to provide public goods. 
They argue that the threat to withhold bilateral aid from strategic allies in terms of non-
compliance with developmental policies would not be credible, so that donors use multilateral 
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aid in case they aim to link their aid to developmental goals.37 Again, this is contrary to our own 
expectation, where we expect multilateral aid to be as politicized as bilateral aid. 
We would like to emphasize that our theory does not contradict these previous contributions. 
Rather, we would expect the different theories to be all true, but at different points in time. In 
order to exploit an international organization’s reputation as an independent actor, major 
shareholders must invest in such reputation and refrain from interfering with its policies too 
frequently. According to Milner (2006), governments channel resources through multilateral 
organizations to assure voters the aid is beneficial, on average. She shows that donors give aid via 
non-state actors when recipient country government quality is low, so as to maximize the impact 
of aid. We argue that these same governments can use multilateral organizations for their 
geostrategic purposes in specific cases of importance to them. They thus create multilateral 
organizations that give their publics the impression of impartiality and benevolence but use these 
organizations for their “dirty work” when needed. The importance of political donor motives in 
the allocation of average multilateral aid will be less easy to detect compared to bilateral aid. We 
need to focus on specific cases to do so. These cases are situations where donors have a strong 
interest to give aid to countries which they would not want to be seen giving to. 
Finally, it is important to compare our theory to the insights of the burgeoning literature on 
informal governance (Stone 2008; 2011; 2013). As we do, this literature sees an important role for 
international organizations in being useful in particular cases, while being sufficiently 
technocratic to incentivize minor powers to participate in them. As Stone (2008, 590) explains, 
“[i]nformal influence must be exercised with discretion, however, in order to avoid undermining 
the legitimacy of the organization.” He argues that “[t]he other leading states tolerate these 
practices, so long as they are not exploited too frequently” (p. 590). According to Stone (2013, 125-
126), “the design features of international organizations are equilibrium outcomes of a game that 
balances the power and interests of the leading state, or group of states, and the rest. Informal 
meddling by great powers is made costly enough, usually in terms of bad publicity, to keep 
manipulation from becoming routine.” Stone’s expectations sound familiar but are different from 
                                                     
37 The Samaritan’s Dilemma is also analyzed in Hagen (2006). In Hagen’s model the donor is highly interested in 
providing a collective good, so that it is not credible to withdraw aid in case of non-compliance. 
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what we argue here. According to Stone, powerful shareholders cannot intervene in international 
organizations too often, as otherwise the other member states would no longer “tolerate these 
practices” (Stone 2008, 590). According to the theory we test in this paper, intervention in 
international organizations’ policies is costly not because it affects other countries’ willingness to 
engage in these organizations, but because such intervention taints the organizations’ legitimacy 
in the eyes of domestic audiences and consequently makes them less useful tools of foreign 
intervention. 
We would like to conclude this section in pointing out that the argument we discuss in this paper 
can explain a number of puzzling results in the recent aid allocation literature. We introduced 
two of them above: First, according to Milner (2006, 132), “it is hard to understand” why right-
wing governments give more multilateral aid then left-wing ones. However, given that right-
wing governments typically pursue more aggressive foreign aid policy than left ones (e.g., Milner 
and Tingley 2010), this is exactly what our theory would predict. 
Second, the same holds for Strand and Zappile’s (2015) analysis that shows that countries 
receiving bilateral economic aid – their proxy in a donor’s interest in a specific country – obtain 
less aid from multilateral development banks. While their result is contrary to the authors’ own 
expectations, it is exactly what we would expect to find: multilateral aid is used in situations 
where bilateral aid is difficult to give. Rather than being substitutes for each other, bilateral and 
multilateral aid are used as complements. 
A third puzzle our paper speaks to has recently been raised by Schneider and Tobin (2016). They 
find that donors chose among a number of different multilateral organizations, so that the 
preferences of the organization about how to allocate aid match those of the donor. Schneider 
and Tobin (2016, 658) conclude with a puzzle: “If […] governments pursue goals with bilateral 
and multilateral aid that are largely similar, why do they use both venues instead of either going 
fully bilateral of fully multilateral? The similarity of bilateral and multilateral aid portfolios 
provides an important puzzle that needs to be addressed in future research.” In this paper, we 
provide a simple answer. A large number of international organizations hide the costs of 
unpopular policies. While governments can obtain the same allocation of their aid via multilateral 
and bilateral aid alike, their support is hidden when using the former, but highly visibly when 
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using the latter. Governments use bilateral aid to signal their support of a recipient to their 
domestic audiences and use multilateral aid to hide such support. Even when the preferred 
allocation of aid is exactly the same, both types of aid continue to serve their purpose. 
 
1.3 The IMF and the UNSC 
In order to test our theory, we look at two international organizations: the IMF and the UNSC. 
We focus on UNSC voting, because donor governments care a great deal about these votes. UNSC 
voting is thus sufficiently salient for us to expect our theory to have some traction. We focus on 
the IMF rather than all multilateral aid because the United States has substantial influence over 
IMF loans and IMF loans are sufficiently large to be considered as substitutes for US bilateral 
support – both from the donor and the recipient perspective.38 We discuss them in turn and begin 
with how the United States can go through the IMF to exert political influence. 
First, power on the IMF Executive Board is explicitly linked to the financial contributions that 
they provide to the organization. With nearly 17 percent of the total votes, the United States has 
veto power over certain decisions that require an 85 percent majority. Beyond this formal power, 
the United States also has a degree of informal influence over the institution (Stone 2008; 2011; 
chapter 2). The IMF Executive Board typically operates according to a consensus rule, which gives 
the management agenda-setting power. The management, in turn, is subject to pressure from the 
United States, both because proposals are shaped to avoid US opposition and because – as the 
IMF headquarters are located in Washington – representatives of the US Federal Government are 
actively involved in important IMF meetings. A further channel of US influence is through the 
US Congress, which must periodically approve increases in US contributions to the IMF (Broz 
2008; 2011; Broz and Hawes 2006). As the United States is the largest contributor and influences 
other contributors on whether to approve increases, IMF management and staff pay due attention 
to the preferences of US policy-makers. 
                                                     
38 We test robustness focusing on the World Bank rather than the IMF. In the empirical section we also turn our attention 
to organizations where the United States is less powerful and use them as placebo tests. See also the introduction and 
chapter 3 for a discussion of the global relevance of IMF loans. 
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While the IMF can be used for exerting influence in many regards, we focus on buying favors in 
one of the world’s most powerful international institutions, the United Nations Security Council. 
The UNSC is the primary organ of the United Nations with responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The Security Council is the only UN body with the power to 
make binding resolutions. It may adopt legally binding measures in order to maintain or restore 
international peace – including the investigation of international disputes, the imposition of 
economic sanctions, and the use of armed forces.  
Historically, when the United States acts in concert with the UNSC, it bears a smaller share of the 
burden of international campaigns (Hartley and Sandler 1999). So it stands to reason that the 
United States should care about UNSC resolutions. Yet, the elected members of the UNSC have 
a limited impact on passing them. Veto power on the Security Council belongs to each of the five 
permanent members (the victors of World War II: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States). The ten elected members, which represent various regions of the world, 
are rarely pivotal (O’Neill 1996). Still, nine total votes are required for a resolution to pass, and 
since permanent members sometimes abstain, upwards of four out of the ten elected members 
must vote in favor. 
A likely reason to care about the votes of elected UNSC members, beyond their formal voting 
power, is legitimacy (Hurd 2007; Voeten 2005; Vreeland and Dreher 2014). As Hurd (2007) 
explains, the elected members serve the purpose of giving voice to the “rest of the world” on the 
Security Council. And the legitimizing effect of the Security Council extends beyond the 
international level and into domestic politics: Chapman and Reiter (2004) find that US Presidents 
enjoy higher levels of public support for actions endorsed by the UNSC, an effect not found for 
any other international organization they test. In the absence of UNSC legitimacy, domestic 
public support might be more difficult to achieve and US Congress might be more recalcitrant 
(Hurd 2007; Hurd and Cronin 2008; Voeten 2001). Voeten (2001) provides examples. He cites the 
memoirs of James Baker (Baker 1995, 278), emphasizing domestic support to be the main reason 
for the US government to seek a multilateral solution to the Gulf War. He also cites Malone (1998, 
ix), arguing that it was easier for the Clinton administration to secure the support of the UNSC as 
compared to that of the US Congress. Mikulaschek (2017b) shows that the signal incorporated in 
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UNSC resolutions is most valuable in terms of popular support when it is unanimous, as it signals 
consensus among foreign elites. There is thus a premium for getting unanimous votes, and every 
single vote matters. 39 
Although no one has systematically studied UNSC voting behavior to see if it is related to aid, 
Kuziemko and Werker (2006) show that temporary members on the UNSC receive substantial 
increases in US aid. As their argument goes, the United States desires influence on the UNSC. The 
governments of some developing countries may care more about the aid than they care about the 
global security issues considered important by the US government. If major donors like the 
United States value the voting behavior of developing countries more than their aid, votes-for-
aid trades are possible. Like all subsequent studies on the benefits that come with temporary 
UNSC membership, Kuziemko and Werker test their vote-buying argument without data on 
actual voting behavior.40 Among these studies, the ones that are most closely related to our 
empirical analysis are Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland (2009b; 2015), who show that elected 
members of the UNSC are more likely to participate in IMF programs and the conditions attached 
are fewer in number and narrower in scope than for other countries. They take this as evidence 
of IMF favoritism for UNSC members. 
In addition, there is a substantial body of circumstantial evidence that the United States regularly 
engages in vote-buying at the Security Council. Eldar (2008) provides examples. For one, the 
United States promised to support a World Bank loan for China in return for support on the 
Security Council for the first Gulf War in 1991. As another example, the United States helped 
China obtain World Bank loans (and provided security guarantees regarding Taiwan) in return 
for allowing a UNSC resolution to restore democracy in Haiti in 1994. More generally, Eldar 
(2008, 17) argues that in order to get UNSC support for the Gulf War, the United States made “a 
promise of financial help to Columbia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia and Zaire; a promise to the USSR 
                                                     
39 The legitimacy may derive from the idea that UNSC members have been elected to represent their respective regions 
and also from the idea that UNSC votes represent informed decisions. Members of the UNSC have access to sensitive 
documents and private discussions regarding the importance of taking international action. For more on these 
informational theories, see Fang (2008), Chapman (2007), and Thompson (2006a). 
40 These studies include Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland (2009a; 2009b; 2015); Kilby (2013); Mikulaschek (2017b); and 
Reynolds and Winters (2016). Vreeland and Dreher (2014) use a preliminary version of the dataset that we introduce 
in this paper in some regressions. 
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to keep Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania out of the November 1990 Paris Summit conference and to 
persuade Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to provide it with hard currency.” He further argues that 
before the second Gulf war, the United States again attempted to buy votes of temporary UNSC 
members. Another example was published in the memoirs of US Secretary of State James Baker. 
Baker points out that the United States cut all foreign aid to Yemen when their government failed 
to support the UNSC resolution that authorized the use of force in Iraq in 1990 (Baker 1995, 278). 
Baker was quoted saying “[t]hat is the most expensive vote you have ever cast” and the United 
States subsequently cut all of its USD 70 million in aid (Bandow 1992). 
The most recent ‘smoking gun’ is from late 2017: On December 18, the United States vetoed a 
Security Council resolution that called for the withdrawal of US President Donald Trump’s 
recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The resolution was supported by all remaining 
14 UNSC members. Two days later, Donald Trump threatened to cut foreign aid to countries that 
vote against the United States at the United Nations. He stated: “these nations that take our 
money and then they vote against us at the Security Council […]. We’re watching those votes. Let 
them vote against us, we’ll save a lot.”41 
In this study, we shed light on the general patterns behind such remarks by means of the 
following data and method. 
 
1.4 Data and Method 
1.4.1 A New Dataset on UNSC Voting Behavior 
The previous literature on vote buying in the UNSC primarily built on a binary variable 
indicating UNSC membership for a given country i in a year t (Kuziemko and Werker 2006; 
Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009a, b). Testing our theory however requires data on how 
countries voted during their time as temporary members. One of this paper’s contributions to the 
literature is to introduce new data that allow such tests. 
                                                     
41 The full passage of the statement reads: “For all of these nations that take our money and then they vote against us 
at the Security Council or they vote against us potentially at the [General] Assembly. They take hundreds of millions 
of dollars and even billions of dollars and then they vote against us. Well, we’re watching those votes. Let them vote 
against us, we’ll save a lot. We don’t care.” https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/20/donald-trump-threat-
cut-aid-un-jerusalem-vote (last accessed: 28 April 2018).  
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We have collected data on voting behavior in the United Nations Security Council from various 
sources. Voting behavior on successful resolutions is available from the United Nations 
Bibliographic Information System (UNBISNET).42 We added information on vetoed resolutions 
from the official United Nations veto list (UN document A/58/47, Annex III, for the 1946-2004 
period), from archival research in the UN Library in Geneva, and from the online archive of the 
Dag Hammarskjöld Library.43 Most difficult to obtain are data on failed majorities. We include 
voting behavior on these failed majorities obtained from our archival research in the UN library 
and from searching for keywords in UNSC meeting minutes.44 
Overall, we obtained data on the votes of all UNSC members in 2,524 decisions (2,259 resolutions, 
230 vetoes, and 35 failed majorities) over the seven decades of the 1946-2015 period.45  This 
translates into 36,460 individual votes. We also record the title of the proposed resolution, its 
number (if it passed), and the date of the decision. In addition, we collected and coded additional 
resolution-specific information to categorize the proposed resolution’s policy area and to proxy 
its political importance. We describe these data in more detail in Appendix 1.A. 
First, we use these data to calculate a member -year specific count of how often member countries 
voted against the United States in the UNSC in a given year. Figure 1.1 shows a histogram of the 
distribution of this count variable. As in the UNSC (in contrast to the UNGA) the vast majority of 
resolutions are unanimously adopted, this variable is positively skewed and often equals zero.  
In light of this distribution, we code two variables 𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 and 𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 that indicate 
whether or not a specific recipient country that served on the UNSC has voted in line with the 
United States on all votes in a year.46 Given the large number of unanimous decisions, one 
disagreement per year indicates a notable deviation in articulated preferences over foreign policy. 
Furthermore, Mikulaschek (2017a) shows that domestic audiences value unanimity in the 
                                                     
42 See http://unbisnet.un.org/ (last accessed May 3, 2018). 
43 The archive of the Dag Hammarskjöld library is available online: http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/ (last 
accessed May 3, 2018). We also identified one veto that was cast in a secret vote via searching for keywords in UNSC 
meeting minutes. 
44 Unfortunately, we cannot guarantee that the data on failed majorities are complete. 
45 In our dataset the indicator for temporary UNSC membership is coded one for 620 observations. This reflects the fact 
that the UNSC had six temporary members between 1946 and 1965 and ten such members between 1966 and 2015. 
46 For temporary members, the mean of 𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 is 1.42 (the standard deviation is 2.19). Of 620 member-year 
observations this variable equals one in 321 cases. 
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UNSC,47 so that the United States is likely to have an interest in temporary members always 
agreeing. Thus, we expect this binary variable of voting alignment to capture much of the 
variation in voting behavior that we are interested in. 
Figure 1.1 – Voting against the United States in the UNSC 
 
Notes: The figure shows the histogram of the number of votes per temporary-UNSC-member-
year where a country’s votes differ from those of the United States. 
 
To exploit more information compared to what is contained in this binary indicator, in alternative 
regressions we additionally code continuous measures of country-specific UNSC voting 
alignment variables, following the literature on voting behavior in the UNGA. We calculate the 
number of votes in which a member disagrees with the United States relative to the total number 
of votes that were cast in a given year (𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡). In the construction of this variable we 
follow the approach proposed by Kegley and Hook (1991) for measuring voting alignment in the 
                                                     
47 Mikulaschek (2017: 25) finds that “the unanimous endorsement of a U.S. military intervention by the UN Security 
Council increases popular support for the use of force by six to ten percentage points, in comparison to the Council’s 
approval of the same action despite dissent.” 
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UN General Assembly and discard abstentions or absences.48 We exclude unanimous votes when 
we construct the share of votes against the United States. As the UNSC often decides 
unanimously, this ensures that we exclude decisions on relatively uncontroversial matters and 
thereby significantly reduce the noise in this measure of voting alignment. When running 
regressions with this variable, we include a binary variable indicating UNSC membership 
(𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡) and its interaction with the share of votes against the United States (𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡).49 
1.4.2 Empirical Model and Additional Data 
Armed with these key explanatory variables, we turn to the first set of regressions we estimate. 
They are at the recipient-year-level and take the following form: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡  (+𝛽6𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  (1) 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡  (+𝛽6𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  (2) 
In these regressions, we consider two different outcome variables, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, that are both aid amounts 
to recipient country i in year t: US bilateral aid on the one hand, and multilateral IMF loans, on 
the other.50 
We build our regressions on those in Vreeland and Dreher (2014). IMF loans are therefore logged 
commitments in millions of current SDR (Special Drawing Rights, the IMF’s unit of account).51 
                                                     
48 Our results are robust to employing the approach proposed by Wittkopf (1973), who includes abstentions and 
absences and codes agreements for both countries abstaining and both being absent. 
49 In our full dataset the indicator for temporary UNSC membership is coded 1 for 620 observations. This reflects the 
fact that the UNSC had six temporary members between 1946 and 1965 and ten such members between 1966 and 2015. 
50 To make the sample of the two sets of regressions with the two different outcome variables comparable we restrict 
the sample to countries that according to the OECD are eligible to receive Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 
year t. As the OECD does not provide the list of ODA eligible countries for the early years of our sample, we follow 
the OECD definition and denote a country i in year t as ODA eligible if it has not “exceeded the high-income threshold 
for three consecutive years” according to the World Bank’s definition and is neither a member of the European Union 
nor of the G8 (OECD 2018a). 
51 We add one before we take the natural logarithm to avoid losing zero observations. Note that our regressions include 
fixed effects for years, which capture changes in the overall level of prices (inflation). We therefore prefer to not deflate 
the original IMF data or convert them to USD.  
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IMF loan commitments are better suited to test the influence of major donors on IMF loans 
compared to disbursements, as disbursements are typically made in equal tranches and mainly 
depend on borrowers’ compliance with IMF conditions. While US influence could also be 
important to receive loans in spite of non-compliance, compliance is likely endogenous and can 
depend on the borrowers’ standing with major powers, their economic development, as well as 
on their political willingness to implement IMF-mandated policy reforms. The loan size the IMF 
commits to, however, is determined before the program starts. It is here that we expect US 
influence to be most visible.52 In our largest sample, the data cover the years 1960 to 2015. During 
this period, 143 different countries participated in IMF programs. In these countries, a total of 
2,536 out of 7,352 possible country-year observations – and thus roughly a third of the years in 
these countries – are under an IMF program. For observations with an active loan program, the 
mean IMF loan size in our sample is 422 million SDR (roughly 600 million USD in 2015). 
When turning to regressions of US bilateral aid, we again follow Vreeland and Dreher (2014), and 
measure US aid as logged disbursements (in constant 2015 million USD) rather than 
commitments.53 Unlike loans from the IMF, disbursements of US aid follow no clear pattern 
relative to commitments, do typically not depend on compliance with specific ex post policy 
conditions, and are often substantially delayed, so that we assume favoritism to shorten these 
delays and thus to materialize at the disbursement rather than the commitment level. As Carter 
and Stone (2015) show, the US executive branch makes use of its discretion to deviate from 
previously committed aid levels to use aid for political purposes. Net US aid disbursement data 
come from the OECD and cover the 1960-2015 period. In this period, a total of 150 countries have 
received ODA from the United States. Of these countries, the average country has received a total 
of 4.6 billion USD (in constant 2015 dollars) over the entire period. 
We test robustness to using various alternative measures, including binary indicators for IMF 
programs, IMF purchases, and US aid commitments. 
                                                     
52 The IMF usually does not disburse more than what was originally agreed upon, so political pressure is likely to be 
exerted when the loan size is decided. Additional regressions show that our results hold when we substitute the IMF 
loan variable with a binary variable indicating the start of an IMF program. This supports the expectation that political 
interests are exerted at the design stage of a program. 
53 Again, we add one before taking the natural logarithm to avoid losing zero observations. 
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We include a number of important control variables. Previous research has argued that the timing 
of being elected to the UNSC is “not random [but] largely unrelated to aid and political and 
economic development” (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010, 72). In their analysis of the 
determinants of election to the UNSC, Dreher et al. (2014) find that “turn-taking is likely an 
exogenous source of variation” while noting that for such settings their results also “suggest the 
importance of controlling for population and income” (p. 80). We follow this advice and add the 
natural logarithm of 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 size and per capita GDP (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1) as control variables to all 
regressions.54  
Dreher et al. (2014) and Vreeland and Dreher (2014) also find the involvement in warfare to 
reduce the likelihood of being elected to the UNSC. We therefore also add a country-year specific 
𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 indicator.55 Furthermore, as previous participation in IMF programs is one of the strongest 
predictors of receiving IMF loans (Sturm, Berger, and de Haan 2005; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 
2009b; Moser and Sturm 2011) and increases the precision of the estimation without reducing the 
size of our sample, we add a variable indicating previous IMF participation in the regressions 
focusing on IMF loans (𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑖𝑡). We include country fixed effects 𝛾𝑖 and year fixed effects 𝜏𝑡 in 
all regressions to rule out that time-invariant country characteristics and global trends that affect 
all countries equally drive the results. Estimation is by ordinary least squares (OLS); 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents 
the error term.56 
Both sets of models arguably allow us to make the identifying assumption that temporary UNSC 
membership is conditionally exogenous. The coefficients on the membership indicator 𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 
will thus not be biased by endogeneity. As regards the possibility to interpret our results as causal 
there are nevertheless two important caveats. 
First, while membership itself can be considered exogenous, UNSC voting behavior cannot. It is 
likely to be correlated with potential determinants of receiving aid (like a country’s general 
political orientation, its economic conditions, etc.). Therefore, our estimates do not allow to infer 
                                                     
54 We lag GDPpc by one year to avoid that any economic effects resulting from UNSC membership introduce 
endogeneity bias (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Dreher, Eichenauer, and Gehring 2016). 
55 The variable is set to one for country-years with more than 1000 battle-related deaths. Removing the variable does 
not affect the results. 
56 Appendix 1.B reports descriptive statistics of all variables. Appendix 1.C contains sources and definitions. 
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whether the links between voting behavior and aid allocation are also causal. What we can test, 
however, is whether or not any causal effect of UNSC membership on aid allocation is driven by 
countries that exhibit a certain kind of voting behavior. Some countries’ votes might be easier to 
buy, some might vote with the United States in any case for reasons we do not capture in our 
models. Essentially, the UNSC voting variable is an interaction between membership and voting 
because it is not observed for non-members. It thus indicates whether the causal effect of UNSC 
membership differs for countries with different kinds of voting behavior (and potentially 
unobserved variables correlated with it). 
The second caveat concerns the order of events. We do not observe the exact order of votes and 
commitments or disbursements of aid, and thus cannot test whether decisions at the level of the 
UNSC precede decisions at the level of the IMF and the donor government. Even if we find that 
IMF loans or aid disbursements precede a change in UNSC membership and voting behavior we 
could not know whether the loan is paid as a reward or rather as a bribe. Even if the loan precedes 
the vote, it could well be paid in anticipation of a positive vote rather than a bribe. For testing our 
argument, we are interested in whether bilateral and multilateral aid allocation is influenced by 
geopolitical considerations. Whether aid is used to change the voting behavior of countries in the 
UNSC or countries are rewarded for their voting behavior is of secondary importance. 
To test our core hypothesis, we modify the above model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.  (3) 
This model differs from our baseline model (1) in that we introduce a proxy for each recipient 
country’s political proximity to the United States – 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 – that we interact with our 
indicators 𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 and 𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡. We code 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 as a moving average of the share of 
votes that a country casts in line with the United States in the UNGA over the period from t-5 to 
t-2. We do not include the years of UNSC membership (t and, potentially, t-1), so that potential 
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changes in UNGA voting behavior that may result from UNSC membership do not bias the 
estimates.57 
We use this measure because voting positions in the UNGA have clear relevance for whether or 
not a country is perceived as an ally of the United States. According to the US Department of State 
(1985), examining UN votes makes it possible “to make judgments about whose values and views 
are harmonious with our own, whose policies are consistently opposed to ours, and whose 
practices fall in between.” A report from the same department in 2000 states that “a country’s 
behavior at the United Nations is always relevant to its bilateral relationship with the United 
States, a point the Secretary of State regularly makes in letters of instruction to new U.S. 
ambassadors” (US Department of State 2000).  
In the regressions of US bilateral aid our theory predicts a positive coefficient for the interaction 
of 𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 – countries that are close to the United States should be rewarded 
with more bilateral aid when they vote in line with the United States in the UNSC. Conversely, 
we expect a negative coefficient for the same interaction in the regressions of IMF loans. This 
reflects our expectation that the US will buy or reward the Security Council votes of countries 
that are politically distant to the United States by means of IMF loans. Finally, we do not expect 
temporary members that vote against the United States in the UNSC to receive more aid or loans 
than non-members. 
 
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 UNSC Voting and Aid Allocation 
Table 1.1 sets the stage. Columns 1 to 6 investigate determinants of US aid, columns 7 to 12 report 
the results of the analogous regressions of IMF loans. Across all regressions, richer countries 
receive less aid and smaller loans, at the one percent level of significance. At the ten percent level, 
larger countries receive more aid from the United States (while population size is not associated 
                                                     
57 We prefer voting coincidence – which measures actual voting behavior on the specific topics up for voting in each 
year – over countries’ ideal point distance, which takes account of differences among topics over time (Bailey, 
Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). Our results are however robust to using either of them. 
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with the size of IMF loans). The coefficient of War is insignificant; and countries that had IMF 
programs in the past on average tend to receive significantly larger IMF loans in the present.  
Turning to our variables of interest, we start with including a binary indicator for temporary 
membership in the UNSC (𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡), along with our control variables, country-, and year fixed 
effects. While US aid (column 1) increases with UNSC membership (significant at the 10 percent 
level), IMF loans (column 7) do not.58  
Column 2 shows results for equation 2 above. The regression includes both the UNSC 
membership indicator and our first measure of UNSC voting similarity (𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡). As 
voting behavior is only observed for members, voting similarity is implicitly an interaction with 
the UNSC variable. Accordingly, the two variables must be interpreted jointly: The coefficient on 
𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 provides the estimate for the effect of UNSC membership on aid when 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 
equals zero. The coefficient on 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 then estimates the extent to which voting against 
the US changes the size of the UNSC effect. The results show that both UNSC membership and 
its interaction with the share of votes a country casts against the United States are statistically 
significant at the one percent level. Figure 1.2 illustrates the marginal effect of UNSC membership 
on US aid along the range of 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡. As can be seen, the positive effect of UNSC 
membership on aid is positive for members that regularly vote in line with the United States and 
turns insignificant (at the 10 percent level) for members that vote against them in more than 20 
percent of controversial UNSC decisions. The marginal effect is negative for countries that vote 
against the United States in at least forty percent of the votes. A significantly negative effect is 
visible for the very small set of observations for which we record a share of voting against the 
United States in controversial decisions that is larger than 80 percent. 
Column 8 reports the analogous regression for IMF loans. Neither the coefficient of UNSC 
membership nor its interaction with the vote share are statistically significant. Figure 1.3 shows 
that the marginal effect of UNSC membership on the size of IMF loans decreases with the share  
 
                                                     
58 Note that the latter result does not contradict previous research. Dreher et al. (2009b) find that temporary membership 
in the UNSC affects the probability to be under an IMF program, but not the amount of loan commitments. We turn to 
IMF programs below. 
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Figure 1.2 – Effect of UNSC Membership on US aid for Varying UNSC voting 
 
Notes: The figure shows the marginal effect of UNSC membership on US aid for different levels of political proximity, 
based on the regression in Table 1.2, column 1, in concert with the 90 percent confidence interval. The histogram shows 
the distribution of political proximity to the United States. 
 
Figure 1.3 – Effect of UNSC Membership on IMF loans for Varying UNSC voting 
 
Notes: The figure shows the marginal effect of UNSC membership on IMF loans for different levels of political 
proximity, based on the regression in Table 1.2, column 5, in concert with the 90 percent confidence interval. The 
histogram shows the distribution of political proximity to the United States. 
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a country votes against the United States in the UNSC; it is however not significant at 
conventional levels.  Columns 3-6 and 9-12 turn to our binary measures for voting with the United 
States – 𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 and 𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 (equation 1 above). Columns 3 and 9 focus on all votes, while 
the remaining columns report regressions for which we differentiate between votes according to 
their importance. We define importance in three different ways. First, we code the number of 
Google hits that appear when searching for “United Nations Security Council Resolution 
[number]” via the Google search engine. 59  We consider a resolution to be important if its number 
of Google hits is above the median of all resolutions of a given year. In addition, all votes that did 
not produce a resolution because of a veto or a failure to reach the required majority are also 
coded as important. 
Our second definition of importance includes votes on topics related to Israel exclusively.60 
Resolutions related to Israel stand out as the single most important topic in the UNSC. 140 out of 
the 2524 resolutions included in our sample refer to this key US ally. Resolutions against Israel 
are particularly vigorously debated, typically with large majorities voting against the United 
States (as in the aforementioned example regarding Donald Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as 
the country’s capital). The US government and public clearly care about these votes (Becker et al. 
2014; Hillman and Potrafke 2015).  
Our third definition of importance follows Kuziemko and Werker (2006), who argue that UNSC 
membership is more valuable in years in which the institution is of major geopolitical importance. 
They proxy importance with the number of New York Times (NYT) articles that include the 
words “United Nations” and “Security Council” and separate the years into different categories 
of importance. We do the same for our sample period based on the NYT online archive.61 
                                                     
59 We do this for all resolutions from 1 to 2259 and enter the search term in quotes, thereby ensuring that the words 
appear in this exact order on the webpages that Google lists. For this we use the Google Custom Search Engine and run it 
via a program written in Python. See Appendix 1.A for details. 
60 To determine which resolutions concern Israel, we code the title of each resolution and search for the keywords 
“Israel,” “Palestine,” “Jerusalem,” and “Golan.” See Appendix 1.A for details. For future research, our data also include 
variables indicating resolutions that concern Lebanon, Cyprus, humanitarian issues, tribunals, sanctions, the admission 
of new members, and those that extend an existing resolution. This set of variables could easily be expanded. 
61 Contrary to Kuziemko and Werker (2006), who do not differentiate between members with different kinds of voting 
behavior, we only use two instead of three categories of importance to reduce the number of categories when the voting 
variables are added to the regressions, but the results are qualitatively similar when three categories are used. Our 
cutoff value that defines the two categories is the median. 
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Table 1.1 – UNSC Voting and Aid, OLS, 1960-2015 
  USA USA USA USA USA USA IMF IMF  IMF  IMF  IMF  IMF  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
UNSC member 0.169* 0.315***     0.063 0.175     
 [0.097] [0.113] 
    [0.123] [0.150]     
UNSC member   -0.685***      -0.481     
    * Share of votes against US   [0.207]      [0.418]     
UNSC, voted all with US   0.350*** 0.324*** 0.607***    0.403** 0.382** 0.099  
 
  [0.115] [0.113] [0.190]    [0.169] [0.171] [0.178]  
UNSC, voted not all with US   0.009 0.030 0.008    -0.229 -0.214 -0.168  
 
  [0.137] [0.135] [0.131]    [0.171] [0.169] [0.228]  
UNSC, voted all with US,      0.480***      0.576** 
    important years (NYT)      [0.128]      [0.242] 
UNSC, voted all with US,      0.143      0.096 
    unimportant years (NYT)      [0.205]      [0.317] 
UNSC, voted not all with US,      0.253      -0.281 
    important years (NYT)      [0.206]      [0.263] 
UNSC, voted not all with US,      -0.125      -0.202 
    unimportant years (NYT)      [0.161]      [0.201] 
GDP/capita (ln, t-1) -0.95*** -0.96*** -0.95*** -0.95*** -1.11*** -0.952*** -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.42*** -0.34*** 
 [0.280] [0.278] [0.280] [0.280] [0.309] [0.279] [0.127] [0.128] [0.127] [0.127] [0.147] [0.127] 
Population (ln, t-1) 1.264* 1.217* 1.254* 1.256* 1.287* 1.253* -0.002 -0.014 -0.018 -0.016 0.010 -0.023 
 [0.671] [0.661] [0.670] [0.670] [0.717] [0.670] [0.394] [0.395] [0.395] [0.395] [0.453] [0.394] 
War 0.022 0.039 0.021 0.021 -0.136 0.020 -0.311 -0.311 -0.313 -0.313 -0.403* -0.316 
 [0.249] [0.243] [0.249] [0.249] [0.266] [0.249] [0.206] [0.206] [0.206] [0.206] [0.209] [0.205] 
Past IMF program       1.525*** 1.532*** 1.516*** 1.517*** 1.507*** 1.517*** 
 
      [0.159] [0.160] [0.159] [0.159] [0.167] [0.159] 
p-value 
(all with vs. not all with) 
  0.036 0.059 0.008 0.316   0.008 0.012 0.331 0.008 
R-squared 0.136 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.124 0.138 0.124 0.123 0.125 0.125 0.144 0.126 
Observations 6142 6066 6142 6142 4222 6142 5826 5757 5826 5826 4051 5826 
Notes: OLS regressions with country- and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the country-level in brackets. Significance levels * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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The results of Table 1.1 paint a clear picture. Countries voting exclusively in line with the United 
States in the UNSC receive more aid and larger IMF loans than non-members. Specifically, US 
aid increases by approximately 42 percent (e0.350 – 1  0.42) for members that voted with the United 
States on all votes (at the one percent level of significance), but not for members that did defect 
at least once (column 3). Investigating the difference between the two coefficients shows that 
members that always vote in line with the United States receive more aid than members that do 
not, at the five percent level of statistical significance. 
The coefficient of voting exclusively with the United States for the definition of importance based 
on Google hits (column 4) is similar in magnitude, with the coefficient indicating that voting 
exclusively with the United States increases aid by 38 percent. As expected, the effect on US aid 
is starkest when it comes to votes on Israel (column 5). Voting exclusively in line with the United 
States increases aid by more than 83 percent, at the one percent level of significance. The New 
York Times-based definition of importance shows that voting exclusively in line with the United 
States increases aid by 62 percent, while there is no significant increase in unimportant years or 
for countries that do not always vote in line with the United States (column 6).  
Results for IMF loans are similar, both in terms of statistical significance and magnitude. 
Countries voting always in line with the United States on all votes receive an increase in IMF 
loans by 50 percent, at the five percent level of significance (column 9). The corresponding 
increases are 46 percent for voting on important votes according to the Google-based definition 
(column 10), and almost 78 percent according to the definition based on the New York Times 
(column 12). Only the coefficient for resolutions on Israel fails to be significant at conventional 
levels (column 11). Overall, our results clearly show that membership on the UNSC is associated 
with more aid from the United States and larger loans from the IMF – but only for countries that 
permanently vote with the United States. 
1.5.2 Main Results 
Table 1.2 turns to our core regressions (equation 3 above). Columns 1–4 investigate US bilateral 
aid; column 5–8 focus on IMF loans. Before introducing the measures of UNSC voting behavior, 
we interact Proximity with the simple UNSC membership indicator. 
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Table 1.2 – UNSC Voting and Aid to Friends and Enemies, OLS, 1960-2015 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  USA USA USA USA IMF IMF IMF IMF 
UNSC -0.404**    0.314    
 [0.196] 
   [0.247]    
UNSC * Political proximity to US 2.010***    -1.107    
 [0.710] 
   [0.733]    
UNSC, voted all with US  -0.373 -0.398 -0.511  0.897** 0.872** 0.911* 
 
 [0.256] [0.258] [0.359]  [0.364] [0.361] [0.469] 
UNSC, voted all with US * Political proximity to US  1.959** 1.953** 2.426**  -1.541* -1.543* -2.361** 
 
 [0.928] [0.931] [1.039]  [0.879] [0.881] [1.131] 
UNSC, voted not all with US  -0.436 -0.441 -0.321  0.089 0.085 -0.574 
 
 [0.323] [0.321] [0.314]  [0.300] [0.299] [0.472] 
UNSC, voted not all with US * Political proximity to US  2.098 2.221* 2.213*  -1.740 -1.653 1.953 
 
 [1.300] [1.266] [1.276]  [1.225] [1.220] [1.826] 
Political proximity to US 3.172*** 3.172*** 3.176*** 2.918*** 0.027 -0.017 -0.016 0.221 
 [1.024] [1.029] [1.029] [1.091] [0.526] [0.531] [0.531] [0.570] 
Votes all all important Israel all all important Israel 
Observations 5113 5113 5113 3344 4982 4982 4982 3341 
R-squared 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.157 0.113 0.116 0.116 0.132 
Notes: OLS regressions with country- and year fixed effects. Includes GDP per capita, Population, and War. IMF regressions also include 
Past IMF program. Standard errors clustered at the country-level in brackets. Significance levels * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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For US aid we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction (column 1). 
Jointly interpreted with its constituent terms it suggests that only UNSC members that are 
politically close to the United States benefit from more US aid. The marginal effect of UNSC 
membership on US aid is positive only for countries that vote with the United States in the UNGA 
in more than 20 percent of the votes. When it comes to IMF loans (column 5), the coefficient is 
negative, as expected, but fails to be significant at the ten percent level (p-value= 0.133). 
The remaining columns of Table 1.2 again separate UNSC members that exclusively voted with 
the United States from those that did not and test out core hypotheses. The results paint a clear 
picture that is in line with these hypotheses. Column 2 shows that countries that are politically 
close to the United States and vote exclusively in line with it in the UNSC receive more aid. This 
result holds when we focus on important votes in column 3 (Google definition) and column 4 
(Israel definition).62 The results of these regressions are best illustrated graphically. Panels A and 
B of Figure 1.4 visualize the result for the specification including all votes, in concert with the 90 
percent confidence interval (column 2). The plots show that UNSC members that always vote in 
line with the United States receive more US aid when political proximity to the United States is 
high. Countries that are politically more distant to the United States do not receive more US aid 
when they serve on the UNSC and always vote in line. Panel B shows a similar picture for UNSC 
members that do not always vote in line with the United States. While the confidence interval is 
wider, it seems that sufficiently close friends of the United States can benefit from US aid also 
when they vote against the United States in the UNSC at least once. 
Columns 5-8 replicate the analysis for IMF loans. In line with our theory, we find the opposite 
pattern as compared to bilateral aid. The effect of receiving larger IMF loans when serving on the 
UNSC and consistently voting with the United States increases with political distance to the 
United States. Panel A of Figure 1.5 visualizes these results for all votes (column 6). Only countries 
that are politically distant to the United States receive larger IMF loans when they serve on the 
UNSC and – in spite of their political distance –consistently vote with the United States. Countries 
that do not always vote with the United States do not receive lager IMF loans. On the contrary, 
                                                     
62 We do not include the New York Times-based definition of importance which would result in a triple interaction 
with eight interaction coefficients to estimate and would thus be difficult to interpret. 
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Figure 1.4 – Effect of UNSC Membership on US Aid for Varying Political Proximity 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the marginal effect of UNSC membership on US aid for different levels of political proximity, 
based on the regression in Table 1.2, column 2, in concert with the 90 percent confidence interval. Panel A focuses on 
the marginal effect of UNSC membership for countries that always voted with the United States in a year; panel B 
shows those for countries that voted against the United States at least once. The histogram shows the distribution of 
political proximity to the United States.  
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Figure 1.5 – Effect of UNSC Membership on IMF Loans for Varying Political Proximity 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the marginal effect of UNSC membership on IMF loans for different levels of political 
proximity, based on the regression in Table 1.2, column 6, in concert with the 90 percent confidence interval. Panel A 
focuses on the marginal effect of UNSC membership for countries that always voted with the United States in a year; 
panel B shows those for countries that voted against the United States at least once. The histogram shows the 
distribution of political proximity to the United States. 
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for close allies of the United States that vote against them, the ‘UNSC effect’ turns negative (Panel 
B of Figure 1.5).  
We consider these results as strong evidence for the hypothesis that the channel used for buying 
UNSC votes depends on the donor’s political proximity to the ‘trading partner.’ In short, the 
United States uses bilateral aid to buy or reward the votes of its friends and multilateral aid when 
it comes to its enemies. Friends can be paid off openly, as reputational costs for giving aid to allied 
countries are low. For enemies, however, reputational costs will be high. For these countries the 
IMF is used for obfuscation and laundering ‘dirty work.’ 
1.5.3 Extensions and Robustness Tests 
We extend the analysis in a number of ways. First, previous results have shown that temporary 
membership in the UNSC increases the probability to be under an IMF program, but not the size 
of IMF loan commitments. Our regressions offer an explanation for this puzzle. Given that some 
temporary members of the UNSC vote against the United States, average commitments for 
members do not necessarily increase. The frequently cited example of Yemen introduced above 
comes to mind. Yemen was a temporary member in 1990 and failed to support the UNSC 
resolution that authorized the use of force in Iraq in 1990 (Baker 1995). Though being a member 
of the UNSC, Yemen received less rather than more aid from the United States and the IMF. With 
our new data on voting in the UNSC, we find results for commitments that previous work was 
unable to detect (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009b). Still, we think it is interesting to replicate 
the analysis focusing on IMF programs rather than loan size. These additional regressions also 
allow interesting insights as to whether countries with existing IMF programs receive larger loans 
when voting with the United States in the UNSC (intensive margin) or whether countries receive 
additional programs (extensive margin). 
More importantly, we investigate commitments and disbursements in more detail. Remember 
that the above regressions focus on US aid disbursements and on IMF commitments, in line with 
previous work (Carter and Stone 2015; Vreeland and Dreher 2014). In this section we test whether 
and to what extent our theory holds for commitments of US aid and IMF “purchases” (i.e., the 
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amount of the loan that the program countries draws on). For completeness, we also investigate 
whether the results discussed for US aid above are driven by the intensive or extensive margin. 
Third, we investigate the allocation of World Bank aid. While this paper has focused on the IMF, 
the United States has substantial power over the World Bank as well (e.g., Kilby 2013b), so that 
our theory should hold for the Bank. The dependent variable for this regression is the World 
Bank’s commitment of ODA to country i in year t. 
Fourth, we show regressions that focus on international organizations where the United States 
cannot plausibly be expected to exert dominant influence on loan allocation. We investigate the 
effect of voting in line with the United States on aid from the Asian Development Bank, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Islamic Development Bank. While 
political influences in these organizations are certainly important (Ben-Artzi 2005; Hernandez 
and Vadlamannati 2017; Lim and Vreeland 2013), and the United States has some influence in the 
Asian Development Bank (Lim and Vreeland 2013), and usually nominates the vice-president of 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Babb 2009), this influence is arguably 
not large enough to influence the allocation of their loans in line with our theory. These 
regressions thus offer an important placebo test. Given that the United States is unlikely to have 
insufficient influence over the lending patterns of these organizations, significant interactions 
with voting in line with the United States would cast doubt on our interpretation of results. 
Finally, we extend the analysis beyond the United States. In principle, our theory applies to all 
donors, to the extent that they are able to sufficiently influence IMF lending. Of the other 
permanent UNSC members, the United Kingdom and France are often considered to be 
influential IMF shareholders (Copelovitch 2010a).63 As previous research has focused on UNSC 
membership rather than UNSC voting it was thus unable to investigate which country is 
responsible for the link between temporary UNSC membership and increasing access to Fund’s 
lending. Our data allow such test. We therefore show results for IMF loans, when we focus on 
temporary members’ voting behavior relative to the other four permanent UNSC members. As 
far as voting relative to Russia and China is concerned we consider these regressions as placebo 
                                                     
63 While in principle we could also analyze voting behavior relative to temporary UNSC members that have some 
influence on the IMF (e.g., Germany and Japan), this would substantially reduce the sample. 
56 
Table 1.3 – Extensions and Tests for Robustness 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10 
UNSC, voted all with US 1.032*** 0.557 -0.366 -0.721 -0.160 -0.048 0.574** -0.029 0.051 0.001  
[0.372] [0.456] [0.372] [0.598] [0.170] [0.167] [0.278] [0.202] [0.177] [0.163] 
UNSC, voted all with US * Political   
    proximity to US 
-2.739** -0.313 1.653 2.296 0.923 -0.145 -2.225** 0.185 -0.092 -0.021 
[1.179] [1.169] [1.635] [2.039] [0.600] [0.733] [0.984] [0.539] [0.470] [0.335] 
UNSC, voted not all with US 0.383 -0.073 0.015 -0.683 -0.359 -0.405 -0.077 0.050 0.026 0.109  
[0.485] [0.593] [0.313] [0.603] [0.234] [0.248] [0.265] [0.134] [0.034] [0.144] 
UNSC, voted not all with US *  
    Political proximity to US 
-0.143 -2.948 -0.719 3.209 1.373 1.482 0.768 -0.388 0.145 -0.472 
[2.053] [2.402] [1.299] [2.707] [0.937] [1.050] [1.196] [0.625] [0.363] [0.571] 
Political proximity to US 1.510* -0.412 0.821 5.727*** 1.496** 3.137*** 2.178** 0.779 1.185** 0.811** 
 [0.896] [0.859] [0.605] [0.942] [0.684] [1.157] [0.839] [0.665] [0.560] [0.380] 
Country FE, Year FE, Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4295 1993 4795 3493 3993 4926 4926 5113 4926 5113 
R-squared  0.135 0.088  0.230 0.163 0.074 0.082 0.049 0.194 
Dependent Variable IMF 
program 
IMF 
loan size 
IMF 
purchases 
US aid 
indicator 
US aid 
disburs. 
US aid 
commit. 
World 
Bank aid 
AsDB 
aid 
EBRD 
loans 
IsDB 
aid 
Sample 
full 
IMF prog. 
active 
full full 
US aid 
recipient 
full full full full full 
Notes: OLS regressions with country- and year fixed effects. Conditional logistic regressions (conditioned on country fixed effects) if the outcome variable is binary (columns 1 and 4). 
Includes GDP per capita, Population, and War. IMF regressions also include Past IMF program. Standard errors clustered at the country-level in brackets. Significance levels * p < 0.1; ** 
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 
 
57 
tests, as Russia and China do not have sufficient influence in the IMF to influence its lending 
patterns. We should thus not see the same pattern as for the United States.  
Tables 1.3 shows the results of the first set of additional regressions. As can be seen, our results 
hold for the presence of an IMF program, but neither for IMF purchases nor IMF commitments 
for programs that already exist.64 UNSC voting thus seems to affect the extensive but not the 
intensive margin. As we argued above, we expect US influence to be more visible in IMF 
commitments compared to disbursements, given that disbursements of IMF loans are typically 
made in equal tranches and mainly depend on borrowers’ compliance with IMF conditions. What 
is more, unlike for bilateral aid, loan commitments typically determine the maximal size of the 
loan, which only in exceptional cases exceeds initial commitments. For the average loan, where 
recipients comply with conditions and agreed upon tranches are disbursed absent any US 
influence, there might just not be sufficient leeway in IMF decisions for US influence to be 
measurable. 
Table 1.3 also shows that none of the interactions is significant at conventional levels when we 
focus on a binary indicator for US aid recipients, additional commitments for previous US aid 
recipients nor overall US aid commitments. The interaction of voting exclusively with the United 
States and political proximity comes closest to statistical significance for loans to preexisting 
recipient countries (column 5, p-value = 0.126). In concert with our main results regarding aid 
disbursements, UNSC voting seems to affect the intensive margin but not the extensive margin. 
As argued above disbursements of US aid, unlike IMF loans, follow no clear pattern relative to 
commitments, do typically not depend on compliance with specific ex post policy conditions, are 
often substantially delayed, and can easily exceed initial commitments of aid. This is in line with 
arguments in Carter and Stone (2015, 15) who explicitly design their variables so that they “can 
be interpreted as discretionary deviations by the executive branch from appropriated aid levels.“  
                                                     
64 In additional regressions, we find that the results for IMF programs hold if we only consider the start of such 
programs. (This alternative indicator variable is set to one only for program starts rather than for the whole period in 
which the IMF program is active.) This supports the view that political influence is particularly important when IMF 
programs are prepared and decided upon. See also Kilby (2013b) for related evidence linking shorter preparation 
periods of World Bank projects to US political interests. 
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The further results summarized in Table 1.3 show that our results for the IMF hold for the World 
Bank. Countries that vote always with the United States in the UNSC receive more World Bank 
aid if they voted less than 25 percent of the times with the United States in the UNGA before 
entering the UNSC. 
The results also show that UNSC voting behavior is not associated with loans from the ADB, 
EBRD, and IsDB, regardless of a recipient country’s proximity to the United States. Given that the 
United States does neither have sufficient influence nor interest in these international 
organizations to shape their allocation of loans, this result is in line with expectations. 
Table 1.4 investigates the influence of the other permanent UNSC members on IMF loan 
allocation. We replicate the baseline specification of equation 1 (voted all vs. voted not all, Table 1.1 
column 9) for all permanent UNSC members. Column 1 initially reports the regression results for 
the United States for comparison. The results in the subsequent columns show that voting in line 
with the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia in the UNSC is not associated with larger 
IMF loans. This suggests that the vote buying activities of the United States are behind the link 
between temporary UNSC membership and increased access to IMF loans. 
 
Table 1.4 – Who Controls the IMF? 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
j = US j = UK j = France j = China j = Russia 
UNSC, voted all with j 0.403** 0.206 0.146 0.054 0.182 
 [0.169] [0.158] [0.137] [0.115] [0.162] 
UNSC, voted not all with j -0.229 -0.260 -0.308 0.112 -0.134 
 [0.171] [0.179] [0.192] [0.386] [0.193] 
Country FE, Year FE, Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5825 5825 5825 5825 5825 
R-squared 0.125 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.124 
Notes:  Dependent variable: IMF loan size (ln). OLS regressions. Controls include GDP per capita, 
Population, War and Past IMF program. Standard errors clustered at the country-level in brackets. 
Significance levels * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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1.6 Conclusion 
This paper investigates how major shareholders can exploit international organizations to hide 
their policies from domestic audiences (“dirty work”). The argument that international 
organizations can be used in this way goes back to Vaubel (1986). The theory explains how 
multilateral organizations can be used to hide governments’ costs of concessions to interest 
groups when such concessions are unpopular with domestic audiences. However, the theory has 
never been confronted with data. When “national politicians […] try to get rid of their 
‘unpleasant’ activities, their ‘dirty work’” Vaubel (1986, 48), then the allocation of multilateral aid 
should be in line with the political interests of their major shareholders. Previous empirical 
analyses confirm that IMF and World Bank lending indeed follows the interests of their major 
shareholders (Dreher et al. 2009a; 2009b; Vreeland and Dreher 2014).  
The recent literature investigating the allocation of bilateral and multilateral aid, however, comes 
to the opposite conclusion. It shows that multilateral aid is less political and more effective 
compared to bilateral aid (Milner 2006; Schneider and Tobin 2016). The results of these literatures 
stand in some contrast to each other and thus offer an interesting puzzle. 
Our theory addresses this puzzle and reconciles the two strands of literature. We argue that major 
powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the intervention favorably. 
When domestic audiences are more skeptical of a recipient, favors are granted via international 
organizations. They will use their power over international organizations selectively, so that the 
average loan is not affected by donors’ political considerations in an obvious way. The previous 
literature indeed investigated the overall allocation of multilateral aid versus bilateral aid. It is 
thus unsurprising that politics turned out as less important in the allocation of multilateral aid. 
We are instead not interested in overall aid portfolios, but in whether international organizations 
can be used in particular cases that are of importance to the donor to pursue their geostrategic 
interests, even though they are designed not to, on average.  
We test our theory focusing on US aid and IMF loans. Using new data on UNSC voting over the 
1960-2015 period, our results show that US “friends” receive larger bilateral aid when voting in 
line with the United States in the UNSC, while positive votes of “enemies” are rewarded with 
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loans from the IMF. Multilateral aid is thus highly political in important cases where the 
preferences of politicians differ from those of their domestic audiences. 
Our results have important implications for the nature of multilateral interventions. According 
to Milner (2006, 110), “[d]onor governments desire to use foreign aid for political and economic 
purposes that are related to donor interests. Publics, however are more interested in addressing 
the needs of the recipient countries.” According to her results, publics are more confident that 
multilateral aid is developmental compared to bilateral aid, so that governments can give more 
aid when making use of multilaterals in the presence of skeptic publics. She finds that public 
opinion is indeed an important determinant of the choice of how to allocate aid. When the public 
dislikes aid, more aid is given multilaterally rather than bilaterally. According to Milner (2006, 
111), “[m]ultilateral aid thus helps solve a domestic principal-agent problem. Domestic politics 
may be a reason that governments chose to use multilateral international institutions.” We 
certainly agree to the latter, but strongly disagree with the former. According to our argument, 
multilateral aid makes domestic principal-agent problems worse (see also chapter 4). Multilateral 
aid is given via international organizations when publics dislike aid, not to make it more 
developmental, but rather because it is easier to hide from the donor’s domestic audience. 
Our results also add to the literature on who controls the IMF. According to our results, voting in 
line with the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia in the UNSC is not rewarded with IMF 
loans. Of the five permanent UNSC members, only the United States seems to have sufficient 
power over, and interest in, exploiting IMF loans to further its political goals. 
Furthermore, our results can explain why governments have an interest in founding new 
international organizations and make them seem legitimate (see also Rocabert et al. 2017).  
Schneider and Tobin (2016) argue that governments prefer large numbers of international 
organizations so that they can delegate to those organizations with an aid portfolio that most 
closely matches the government’s preferences. Our results show that multilateral aid allows 
donors to obfuscate payments to a country that the donors’ voters do not want to support. 
Our results provoke us to be bold and make predictions about the future development of the 
international aid architecture. A May 2018 poll by the institute Infratest Dimap shows that 59 
percent of the (German) respondents are in favor of reducing foreign aid to countries that do not 
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cooperate sufficiently in taking back refugees – a position that German Minister of Development 
Gerd Müller is clearly opposed to.65 Similarly, substantial shares of the populations in major 
countries of the European Union are opposed to a Greek bail-out, while leading academics and 
politicians see such support as a necessary condition to maintain the Euro and potentially the 
European Union.66 We expect this difference in views to make multilateral aid attractive from a 
politician’s perspective. This can explain the insistence of German politicians to keep on involving 
the IMF in the Greek bail-out, which large parts of the German electorate are not in favor of (see 
a 2010 Poll cited in Schneider and Slantchev 2018, 21).67 
In the same vein, we thus predict that major European donors will react to the recent refugee 
crisis by channeling larger shares of foreign aid through the budget of the European Union. The 
degrees of freedom that politicians gain from the existence of an international organization also 
explain political support for the creation of new organizations, and their resistance towards 
abolishing existing ones.68 The recent creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and 
the New Development Bank are cases in point. We do not expect these organizations to make 
Chinese support less political and more developmental, on average, but to allow China to better 
obfuscate its political influence. We also expect a ‘European Monetary Fund’ to be called in 
existence in due course, and additional European organizations in charge of foreign aid and loans 
to follow later. The potential benefits of international organizations in pursuing policies that 
domestic audiences strongly dislike seem too strong for national governments to resist.  
                                                     
65 See https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article176217850/Migration-Mehrheit-will-unkooperativen-Staaten-
Entwicklungshilfe-kuerzen.html (in German, accessed May 10, 2018). 
66 See for example a 2015 YouGov survey “Greece: Germans and Finns back a hard line, but support for Grexit 
wanes,” https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/07/10/germans-and-finns-public-prefer-hard-line-support-/ and a May 29, 
2017 article in the Journal of International Affairs “Germany's Domestic Politics Complicate the Greek Debt Crisis”, 
https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/germanys-domestic-politics-complicate-greek-debt-crisis (last accessed 
May 23, 2018).  
67 See also again the May 29, 2017 article in the Journal of International Affairs, https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-
articles/germanys-domestic-politics-complicate-greek-debt-crisis (last accessed May 23, 2018).  
68 According to Haberler (1974, 156) “international institutions may change their names or lose their function but they 
never die’’ (cited in Vaubel 2006, 127). Also see Gray (2018). 
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1.7 Appendices to Chapter 1 
1.7.1 Appendix 1.A: Coding of Resolution-specific UNSC Voting Data 
As described in the main text, we initially measure the importance of a vote following Kuziemko 
and Werker (2006), who argue that UNSC membership is more valuable in years in which the 
institution is of major geopolitical importance. They proxy “importance” with the number of New 
York Times articles that include the words “United Nations” and “Security Council” and separate 
the years into different categories of importance. We code the same variable for our sample 
updating it until 2015 based on the New York Times online archive. Unlike Kuziemko and Werker 
(2006) we focus on two rather than three categories of importance, to reduce the number of 
categories when the voting variables are added to the regressions.69 Our threshold for important 
years is the median number of New York Times articles. 
In addition to that, we propose other ways of identifying relevant votes for measuring voting 
alignment in the UNSC. The fact that we use data on the resolution-level allows us to additionally 
exploit resolution-specific rather than only year-specific information. 
First, we exploit information contained in the resolution’s title. To this end, we identified key 
words that frequently appear in resolution titles, using word counting software. This allows 
coding variables that indicate the policy area the resolutions address. Table 1.5 shows the 100 
most frequent keywords. For this study we only show regressions that restrict the sample of 
resolutions to those that concern Israel.70 A relatively large number of UNSC decisions focus on 
this key US ally (140 out of 2524), and our expectation is that the United States will consider these 
decisions as particularly important.  
Second, for all resolutions we code the number of Google hits that appear when searching for 
“United Nations Security Council Resolution [number]”71 via the Google search engine. Figure 1.6 
illustrates these data and shows that there is no visible time trend in this variable. We then 
                                                     
69 Our results are qualitatively similar when we use three categories of importance. 
70 To determine which resolutions concern Israel, we code the title of each resolution and search for the keywords 
“Israel,” “Palestine,” “Jerusalem,” and “Golan.” 
71 We do this for all resolutions from 1 to 2259 and enter the search term in quotes, thereby ensuring that the words 
appear in this exact order on the webpages that Google lists. For this we use the Google Custom Search Engine and run it 
via a program written in Python. 
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consider a resolution as important if its number of Google hits is above the median of a given year. 
In addition, all votes that did not produce a resolution because of a veto or a failure to reach the 
required majority are also coded as important. When using this information for the analysis on 
the country-year level we then only consider the “important” votes when aggregating. 
 
Figure 1.6 – Google Hits of UNSC Resolutions 
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Table 1.5 – Frequency of Words in UNSC Resolution Titles (100 most frequent) 
 
744 (6%): un 
651 (6%): mandate 
475 (4%): extension 
415 (4%): mission 
342 (3%): situation 
342 (3%): force 
190 (2%): membership 
187 (2%): peace 
177 (2%): against 
171 (1%): observer 
167 (1%): republic 
150 (1%): Cyprus 
137 (1%): security 
129 (1%): admission 
127 (1%): establishment 
125 (1%): extends 
121 (1%): lebanon 
111 (1%): south 
108 (1%): question 
105 (1%): resolution 
103 (1%): military 
95 (1%): general 
91 (1%): east 
89 (1%): congo 
88 (1%): council 
86 (1%): keeping 
86 (1%): tribunal 
84 (1%): angola 
84 (1%): renewal 
83 (1%): democratic 
83 (1%): sanctions 
81 (1%): implementation 
80 (1%): iraq 
79 (1%): yugoslavia 
79 (1%): interim 
78 (1%): western 
77 (1%): somalia 
76 (1%): measures 
75 (1%): disengagement 
75 (1%): liberia 
74 (1%): application 
74 (1%): sudan 
71 (1%): sahara 
68 (1%): assistance 
67 (1%): middle 
67 (1%): rwanda 
65 (1%): bosnia 
64 (1%): africa 
64 (1%): operation 
64 (1%): herzegovina 
63 (1%): former 
62 (1%): secretary 
61 (1%): between 
60 (1%): referendum 
59 (1%): humanitarian 
56 (0%): arms 
50 (0%): d'ivoire 
50 (0%): côte 
48 (0%): agreement 
48 (0%): cease 
48 (0%): african 
48 (0%): monitoring 
48 (0%): haiti 
46 (0%): embargo 
45 (0%): conflict 
44 (0%): israel 
44 (0%): leone 
44 (0%): protection 
44 (0%): criminal 
43 (0%): sierra 
42 (0%): afghanistan 
42 (0%): settlement 
41 (0%): court 
41 (0%): fire 
41 (0%): observers 
41 (0%): stationing 
41 (0%): deployment 
40 (0%): complaint 
40 (0%): all 
40 (0%): armed 
39 (0%): commission 
39 (0%): concerning 
39 (0%): forces 
38 (0%): calling 
38 (0%): minurso 
37 (0%): states 
37 (0%): territories 
37 (0%): southern 
36 (0%): central 
36 (0%): israeli 
36 (0%): imposed 
35 (0%): group 
35 (0%): rhodesia 
35 (0%): authorization 
34 (0%): justice 
34 (0%): peacekeeping 
33 (0%): under 
33 (0%): palestinian 
33 (0%): process 
32 (0%): office 
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1.7.2 Appendix 1.B: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.6 – Desciptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
US aid disbursements (million USD, ln) 6142 2.54 2.07 0.00 9.51 
IMF loan size (million SDR, ln) 6142 1.09 1.95 0.00 10.36 
UNSC member 6142 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Share of votes against US 6066 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
UNSC, voted all with US 6142 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
UNSC, voted not all with US 6142 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
UNSC, voted all with US (important Google) 6142 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
UNSC, voted not all with US (important Google) 6142 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
UNSC, voted all with US (important Israel) 4222 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
UNSC, voted not all with US (important Israel) 4222 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
UNSC, voted all with US (important year NYT) 6142 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
UNSC, voted all with US (unimportant year NYT) 6142 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
UNSC, voted not all with US (important year NYT) 6142 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
UNSC, voted not all with US (unimportant year NYT) 6142 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Political proximity to US 5114 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.88 
IMF program 5826 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
IMF purchases (million SDR, ln) 5494 1.12 1.88 0.00 9.78 
US aid indicator 6142 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 
US aid commitments (million USD, ln) 5798 2.70 2.07 0.00 9.92 
World Bank aid commitments (million USD, ln) 5798 1.56 2.22 0.00 8.36 
IsDB aid commitments (million USD, ln) 6142 0.20 0.67 0.00 6.46 
AsDB aid commitments (million USD, ln) 6142 0.48 1.34 0.00 7.57 
EBRD aid commitments (million USD, ln) 6142 0.13 0.72 0.00 7.29 
GDP per capita (ln) 6138 7.57 1.11 4.75 10.04 
Population (ln) 6141 15.39 2.02 9.11 20.99 
War 6142 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Past IMF program 5826 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
 Note: The sample used for calculating these statistics is the sample of column 1 of Table 1.1. 
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1.7.3 Appendix 1.C: Data Sources and Definitions 
Table 1.7 – Data Sources and Definitions 
Variable Source Description 
US aid disbursements  
(million USD, ln) 
OECD (2018) Bilateral US net disbursements of Official Development Assistance. 
IMF loan size  
(million SDR, ln) 
Dreher et al. (2009a),  
own update with data from 
IMF (IMF 2018a) 
Total amount agreed of IMF loan. IMF (2018) provides the total amount of the 
agreed upon loan. We divide this number by the years of subsequent program 
duration, assuming equal phasing of the loan over the program period. 
UNSC member Dreher et al. (2009b),  
own update 
Binary, indicating observations in which country i was a temporary UNSC 
member in year t. 
Share of votes against US multiple sources  
(own coding, see main text) 
The number of UNSC votes country i cast in line with the United States in year t 
divided by the number of UNSC votes in year t. Unanimous votes are excluded. 
UNSC, voted all with US multiple sources 
 (own coding, see main 
text) 
Binary, indicating observations in which country i was a UNSC member in year t, 
and voted in line with the United States in all votes of year t. 
UNSC, voted not all with US multiple sources  
(own coding, see main text) 
Binary, indicating observations in which country i was a UNSC member in year t, 
and voted against the United States in at least one vote of year t.  
UNSC, voted all with US 
(important Google) 
multiple sources  
(own coding, see main text) 
As above, but only considering UNSC votes on resolutions whose number of hits 
on the Google search engine surpasses the yearly median and UNSC votes that did 
not produce a resolution (see Appendix A for details). 
UNSC, voted not all with US 
(important Google) 
multiple sources  
(own coding, see main text) 
As above, but only considering UNSC votes on resolutions whose number of hits 
on the Google search engine surpasses the yearly median and UNSC votes that did 
not produce a resolution (see Appendix A for details). 
UNSC, voted all with US 
(important Israel) 
multiple sources  
(own coding, see main text) 
As above, but only considering UNSC votes on resolutions whose title is related 
to Israel (see Appendix A for details). 
UNSC, voted not all with US 
(important Israel) 
multiple sources  
(own coding, see main text) 
As above, but only considering UNSC votes on resolutions whose title is related 
to Israel (see Appendix A for details). 
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UNSC, voted all with US 
(important year NYT) 
multiple sources 
 (own coding, see main 
text) 
As above, but the indicator is set to zero if the year's number of New York Times 
articles that include the words “United Nations” and “Security Council” is below 
the median of the observation period (see Appendix A for details). 
UNSC, voted all with US 
(unimportant year NYT) 
multiple sources  
(own coding, see main text) 
As above, but the indicator is set to zero if the year's number of New York Times 
articles that include the words “United Nations” and “Security Council” is above 
the median of the observation period (see Appendix A for details). 
UNSC, voted not all with US 
(important year NYT) 
multiple sources  
(own coding, see main text) 
As above, but the indicator is set to zero if the year's number of New York Times 
articles that include the words “United Nations” and “Security Council” is below 
the median of the observation period (see Appendix A for details). 
UNSC, voted not all with US 
(unimportant year NYT) 
multiple sources  
(own coding, see main text) 
As above, but the indicator is set to zero if the year's number of New York Times 
articles that include the words “United Nations” and “Security Council” is above 
the median of the observation period (see Appendix A for details). 
Political proximity to US Bailey, Strezhnev, and 
Voeten (2017) 
A country's share of votes in line cast with the United States in the United Nations 
General Assembly, moving average from t-5 to t-2. 
IMF program Dreher et al. (2009a), 
updated with data from 
Kentikelenis et al. (2016) 
IMF program active at any point in year t. 
IMF purchases 
(million SDR, ln) 
World Bank (2018) Amount of the IMF loan "purchased" by the IMF program country. 
US aid indicator OECD (2018b) Binary, indicating country-years with positive US aid disbursements. 
US aid commitments 
(million USD, ln) 
OECD (2018b) Bilateral US commitments of Official Development Assistance. 
World Bank aid 
commitments 
(million USD, ln) 
OECD (2018b) World Bank commitments of Official Development Assistance. 
IsDB aid commitments 
(million USD, ln) 
OECD (2018b) Islamic Development Bank commitments of Official Development Assistance. 
AsDB aid commitments 
(million USD, ln) 
OECD (2018b) Asian Development Bank commitments of Official Development Assistance. 
68 
EBRD aid commitments 
(million USD, ln) 
OECD (2018b) European Bank for Reconstruction and Development commitments of Official 
Development Assistance. 
GDP per capita (ln) World Bank (2018) Gross Domestic Product per capita, constant 2010 USD. 
Population (ln) World Bank (2018) Population size. 
War Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (2015) 
Binary, indicating years with more than 1000 battle-related deaths in year t in 
country i. 
Past IMF program Dreher et al. (2009a), 
updated with data from 
Kentikelenis et al. (2016) 
Binary, indicating countries that had an IMF program in any of the years prior to 
year t. 
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2.1 Introduction 
A considerable body of literature suggests that the major international financial institutions 
(IFIs) are not the independent, technocratic organizations many expect them to be. Instead of 
making decisions exclusively based on objective and economic criteria, their behavior also 
reflects the particular interests of individual actors, which appear to bias the organizations’ 
decision-making in their favor.72 Focusing on the two most powerful IFIs, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) and the World Bank, a first strand of literature shows that the 
political interests of major shareholders play a significant role in their lending decisions. 
Countries that are politically aligned with or important for the United States and other “G5” 
governments73 have privileged access to financial assistance from the Fund and the Bank 
(chapter 1; Barro and Lee 2005; Dreher and Jensen 2007; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009a; 
2009b; 2015; Kilby 2009; 2013a; 2013b; Reynaud and Vauday 2009; Stone 2008; Thacker 1999). 
A second strand of literature identifies bureaucratic incentives as a specific source of bias in 
the IMF and World Bank decision-making processes. According to this view, which follows 
standard public choice models and approaches underlining the importance of organizational 
culture, staff in international organizations aim to increase their budget, power, prestige and 
independence. As a result, the decisions IFIs make are not always economically optimal and 
technocratic, but can also reflect the bureaucracy’s particular interests and beliefs (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004; Chwieroth 2013; Copelovitch 2010a; Nelson 2014; Stone 2008; Vaubel 1986; 
1996; 2006). 
In this paper we exploit a specific feature of the design of the Debt Sustainability Framework 
(DSF) for low-income countries (LICs), developed jointly by the World Bank and the IMF to 
assess debt sustainability, as an ideal set-up to understand the decision-making of IFIs. We use 
a unique dataset on the application of the DSF that allows us to reconstruct internal decision-
making processes and to identify decisions that deviated from the mechanical application of 
formal rules. In particular, the DSF assigns a rating (low risk, moderate risk, high risk) for the 
risk of debt distress to a given country according to the projected evolution of its debt levels 
over a 20-year period, with respect to policy-dependent debt thresholds. While the assessment 
of the risk of debt distress is based on a mechanical, model-based rule, the final rating may 
                                                     
72 For a recent survey of this literature see Dreher and Lang (2016). 
73 In addition to the United States, this group of powerful shareholders of the Bank and the Fund comprises the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan. 
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involve the use of judgment by staff. The DSF explicitly allows staff to override the mechanical 
rating if they consider that country-specific circumstances justify this choice. In practice, in a 
number of cases this room for discretion translates into deviations of the final risk ratings from 
the ones obtained by mechanically applying the rule. Our data allow us to identify the cases 
in which such overrides of the mechanical rating took place. In the empirical analysis we 
examine the determinants of these overrides. 
Specifically, we test for the presence of political and bureaucratic biases by looking at whether 
the country’s political alignment with the organizations’ major shareholders and the staff’s 
desire to maintain its existing risk rating are related to overrides of the mechanical risk rating. 
In addition, we also investigate the role that other macroeconomic variables play in 
determining the actual risk rating, with the aim of shedding light on the design of the DSF, 
whose simplicity—a result of the need to make it accessible to a wider set of stakeholders—
could result in a limited capacity to take into account important macroeconomic developments 
in the mechanical risk rating.  
In the context of the literature on the political economy of international organizations (IOs) 
our empirical approach allows us to explicitly test the influential model of “informal 
governance” (Stone 2008; 2011; 2013). This model, which has been initially developed for the 
IMF, posits that the influence of powerful states on international organizations primarily runs 
through informal channels.74 While formal rules and a relatively autonomous bureaucracy 
regulate the IOs’ day-to-day operations, powerful states retain influence through informal 
practices that allow them to intervene in formal processes when urgent strategic interests are 
at stake.75 The model furthermore suggests that such informal influence must only be 
selectively exercised to avoid undermining the IO’s legitimacy, which in turn is an important 
reason for powerful states to act through IOs in the first place (see also chapter 1). Transferred 
to our setting, the room for discretion embedded in the DSF is a potential channel for such 
informal political influence. Furthermore, it gives bureaucrats the opportunity to influence 
decision-making according to the bureaucracy’s preferences. It would be consistent with this 
                                                     
74 See Stone’s (2011) book and the 2013 special issue of the Review of International Organizations (volume 8, issue 2) 
on “Informal Governance in International Organizations.” See also Copelovitch (2010a) for a related model, which 
posits “common agency” by the largest shareholders and the bureaucracy. 
75 In the words of Stone (2013, 124) “all international organizations operate to some degree at variance with their 
formal rules. The formal rules—standard operating procedures, voting rules, organizational chains of command, 
written policies—provide stable and predictable policy outputs. Derogations from these standard procedures are 
made to safeguard the interests of powerful states.” 
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model’s predictions if political interests and bureaucratic incentives were reflected in the use 
of judgment and if, in addition, the political bias were more significant a) when overruling is 
less clearly opposed to the formal rules, and b) when political interests are particularly strong. 
We test the former hypothesis by allowing for heterogeneity of the political interests effect 
depending on how clear-cut the mechanical rating is, and the latter by examining whether the 
political bias is stronger in election years of the rated country.  
In addition to the explicit test of the informal governance model in a particularly suitable 
setting, the main contribution of our approach is threefold. First, we can directly examine the 
extent to which political economy variables explain interference in technocratic rules instead 
of only comparing how they relate to differences in outcomes. The deviations from the 
mechanical rule can be interpreted as a direct measure of the Bank and Fund’s discretion in 
assessing the borrowing capacity of a country. In contrast to most of the previous literature, 
we can thus shed light on the internal decision-making processes that lead to the outcomes 
that IFIs produce. 
Second, in contrast to many studies that analyze IMF and World Bank lending, the focus on 
risk ratings minimizes selection bias. Different countries might have different levels of 
demand for Fund and Bank resources. The fact, for instance, that countries that disagree with 
major shareholders on issues of foreign policy are also less likely to have an IMF program 
could be due to the lack of willingness to engage with the Fund, rather than to unfavorable 
treatment from the Fund and Bank. Since the DSF is a standard toolkit of IMF surveillance that 
is regularly applied in all low-income countries and all countries have the same interest in 
obtaining the most favorable risk rating under the DSF (as it would assure better borrowing 
terms, see below), there are no differences on the demand-side in this setting. 
Third, while the analysis of the DSF is particularly well suited to study the decision-making 
process of international financial institutions, examining potential biases in DSF risk ratings is 
also a relevant policy question per se. The debt sustainability analyses—and the final risk 
ratings—provide a unique and relevant source of information for a variety of stakeholders on 
the sustainability of the fiscal stance in LICs, which are typically not covered by the major 
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sovereign credit agencies.76 The risk ratings have financial and macroeconomic consequences, 
as they can directly influence the size and the terms of borrowing of low-income countries.77  
Since most LICs do not have regular access to international capital markets, development 
finance is a major source of their external financing. The DSF risk ratings determine the terms 
under which countries receive financial assistance from multilateral institutions. For instance, 
the World Bank’s International Development Agency (IDA) reduces its allocation to countries 
with weak ratings by up to a fifth and makes the loans-grants mix conditional on the risk 
rating.78 In addition, the World Bank uses the DSF risk ratings to design non-concessional 
borrowing limits for LICs. To test whether the World Bank adheres to these rules in practice, 
we regress a country’s volume of lending received from the World Bank (as a fraction of GDP) 
on its DSF risk rating and a basic set of control variables. We find that “medium risk” and 
“high risk” countries indeed receive significantly less lending; on average and holding other 
factors constant, “high risk” countries receive between 17 and 35 percent less financing than 
“low risk” countries (see Table 2.11 in Appendix 2.A).79 In the same spirit, regional 
development banks and bilateral aid agencies base their grant and lending decisions on DSF 
ratings. For instance, according to the so-called “Lagarde rule” (from when the current IMF 
Managing Director was Minister of Finance in France), the Agence Française de 
Développement only lends to countries at low risk of debt distress and continues to lend for a 
                                                     
76 Our study thus also contributes to the literature on the determinants of credit ratings more broadly. Recent 
contributions have examined bias in sovereign credit ratings assigned by private rating agencies (Bartels and Weder 
di Mauro 2013; Fuchs and Gehring 2017). 
77 We also contribute to the literature that goes beyond the analysis of IMF/World Bank lending activities, where 
the existing evidence on biasedness is much scarcer. Dreher et al. (2008) find that IMF inflation forecasts are 
systematically biased and favor countries that are politically close to the United States. Fratzscher and Reynaud 
(2011) find that countries with more political influence in the IMF and in the UN receive more favorable Public 
Information Notices of Article IV consultations from the Fund. Other than that, there is little systematic evidence 
as to whether political and bureaucratic interests bias Fund and Bank decision-making in areas that are – at least a 
priori – less political and more technocratic in nature. 
78 Being classified as high risk is associated with 100 percent grants, medium risk with 50 percent grants and 50 
percent loans, while low risk is associated with 100 percent loans and zero grants. Grants come with a 20 percent 
reduction in available resources to minimize moral hazard. See: http://ida.worldbank.org/financing/debt-
sustainability-grants (last accessed November 16, 2016). The countries’ preference for higher volumes of World 
Bank lending appears to dominate the relative allocation between grants and loans. One reason could be related to 
a substantial time discount rate that politicians attach to such financing due to political cycles and political 
incentives. Loans are highly concessional and come with very long maturities and grace periods. As of April 2017, 
the regular IDA loan has a 38-year maturity and a 6-year grace period. In this case, a politician could prefer 
borrowing 100 percent rather than receiving 80 percent in grants, and ignore the repayment problem, as it will be 
effective only after 6 years. 
79 These regressions also show that the negative effect of the official DSF rating on World Bank lending holds when 
controlling for the mechanical rating, suggesting that potential biases in the deviations from the mechanical rating 
would directly affect lending. 
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year in case a country is downgraded to moderate risk, while it does not lend at all to high risk 
countries. Finally, risk ratings affect debt conditionality under IMF-supported programs. 
Countries at moderate or high risk of debt distress have different kinds of debt limits, while 
program conditionality in countries at low risk of debt distress normally does not include 
limits on public external borrowing (IMF 2015). 
In recent years, an increasing number of LICs have started gaining market access, mostly 
through syndicated bank loans and Eurobond issuances (Presbitero et al. 2016). For these 
economies, the DSF risk ratings are also a critical source of information for market participants 
and can affect the availability and the terms of commercial lending. A descriptive look at our 
data illustrates this. Out of 14 low-income countries that have issued sovereign bonds since 
2014, ten were classified at a low risk of debt distress, only four had a moderate risk 
(Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Honduras), and no country with a high risk of debt 
distress has been able to issue. The average spread at issuance has been about 140 basis points 
higher for countries at moderate risk than for countries at low risk of debt distress, even taking 
into account the size and maturity of the bonds. Moreover, comparing countries with similar 
Institutional Investor country risk ratings but different DSF risk ratings shows that a worse DSF 
risk rating is indeed reflected in higher sovereign bond spreads. For instance, in 2014 and 2015, 
Ghana had a similar country risk rating as Mongolia, Senegal and Zambia, but it was the only 
country classified at moderate risk of debt distress and faced an average premium ranging 
between 110 and 228 basis points compared to the other three countries at low risk of debt 
distress.80 
A similar picture emerges when considering cross-border bank lending. Over the 2007-2015 
period the financial markets platform Dealogic records 803 syndicated loans to countries with 
an outstanding DSF risk rating, 59.4 percent of which went to countries with a low risk, 34.1 
percent to countries with a moderate risk and only 6.5 percent to countries with a high risk of 
debt distress. This distribution is even more skewed towards low risk countries when 
                                                     
80 More precisely, the country risk ratings by Institutional Investor range between 0 and 100 with 100 indicating the 
least likelihood of default, see http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Research-and-Rankings.html (last accessed 
November 16, 2016). We compare Ghana—at moderate risk—with Mongolia, Senegal and Zambia—at low risk—
over the period 2014-2015. In that period, the four countries had, on average, a very similar Institutional Investor 
country credit rating, but faced different sovereign bond spreads. In particular, the credit rating was 33.6 in Ghana, 
33.2 in Mongolia, 33.3 in Senegal and 35.3 in Zambia, while the average spreads were 670 bps in Ghana, 556 in 
Mongolia, 441 in Senegal and 559 in Zambia. See also chapter 3 for additional information on Institutional Investor 
data. 
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considering loans to the private sector, three quarters of which have had a company in a low 
risk country as borrower. If we look at dynamics over time and focus on countries that have 
seen a worsening of their debt rating, we can see that countries that have been regular 
borrowers (Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, and Sri Lanka, with at least one loan before 
and after a debt sustainability analysis) have on average experienced a reduction in the 
number of syndicated loans when considering a window of one year before and one year after 
the publication of the risk rating.81 
Our results indicate that there is evidence for the presence of systematic biases. First, the debt 
ratings for countries that are politically aligned with the Bank’s and the Fund’s major 
shareholders are more often overridden (and improved) as compared to the result of the strict 
application of the DSF’s mechanical model. The effect is stronger when the mechanical 
assessment is less clear-cut, suggesting that biasedness is more likely when there is more room 
for discretion. Also, the effect is mainly driven by the years in which an election took place in 
the rated country, suggesting that allies of the major shareholders are particularly likely to be 
treated favorably when their governments particularly care about positive assessments.82 
Second, bureaucratic incentives also explain the use of judgment in the DSF. In a large number 
of cases staff make use of the room for discretion in order to avoid deteriorations of the debt 
sustainability rating relative to the previous assessment. This is consistent with the expectation 
that the bureaucracy has an incentive to “keep” the ratings assigned in previous analyses as 
this is more likely to be in line with the established in-house view and avoids potential 
confrontations with senior staff. Finally, we find that some macroeconomic variables are 
associated with the decision to use judgment, suggesting that the DSF is “too simple” and 
Bank and Fund staff have to rely on additional information that is not part of the DSF to assess 
debt sustainability. We show that these results are unlikely to be driven by endogeneity, 
unobserved country-specific heterogeneity, and we rule out many other channels and 
alternative factors that could explain the override of the risk rating. We also corroborate our 
statistical results with the help of anecdotal evidence that we gathered in interviews with 
involved Bank and Fund staff. 
                                                     
81 The relatively small size of cross-border lending to LICs and the fact that we cannot disentangle demand from 
supply effects would call for caution when interpreting these numbers. 
82 This result is consistent with recent findings by Kersting and Kilby (2016), who show that World Bank lending 
accelerates for allies of the United States when domestic elections approach, and interpret this as evidence for the 
World Bank’s engagement in “global electioneering that serves U.S. foreign policy interests.” 
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While we believe that our results document the presence of systemic biases, they are silent 
about the trade-off between rules versus discretion. We point to some of the potential costs of 
the discretionary bias, but we do not assess its benefits. For instance, overridden ratings could 
reduce the rate of false alarms and better reflect ex-post debt sustainability. Because 
endogeneity prevents us from such an assessment—as future debt dynamics critically depend 
on actual risk ratings—we have to leave the analysis of the potential benefits of the room for 
discretion for future research. 
 
2.2 The Debt Sustainability Framework and the Risk Ratings 
The DSF was introduced in 2005 to guide the borrowing decisions of LICs in a way that 
matches their financing needs with their current and prospective repayment ability, taking 
into account each country’s specific circumstances. Under the framework, debt sustainability 
analyses (DSAs) are conducted regularly with the aim of assessing the risk of external debt 
distress and providing policy recommendations that limit the risk of debt distress through 
prudent borrowing and lending strategies.83 All DSAs must be prepared jointly by the World 
Bank and the IMF and submitted to their respective executive boards. Staff of the two 
institutions coordinate closely in preparing the DSAs from the early stages to the final 
approval. They are supposed to agree on the key macroeconomic projections and assumptions 
on new borrowing, with World Bank staff generally taking the lead on growth prospects and 
IMF staff focusing on medium-term macroeconomic projections. As a general rule, one DSA 
should be produced at least once every year (not necessarily at a given point in time for all 
countries), as it is the basis to determine the IDA credit-grant allocation. Exceptions to this 
time schedule may happen under specific circumstances, such as a request for IMF financing 
that involves exceptional access (IMF 2013). To empirically check whether this regular annual 
schedule is adhered to in practice, we look at the number of months between two consecutive 
DSAs for a given country. In only 19 cases two DSAs are separated by less than six months—
possibly because the DSA has been triggered by a specific event. As DSAs appear to generally 
                                                     
83 Since we recognize that the terminology may appear confusing, we would like to point out that “although the 
terms ‘DSF’ and ‘DSA’ are sometimes used interchangeably, they are in fact distinct: the DSF is the framework 
within which a DSA is produced for a particular country” (IMF 2013, 6). 
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follow a regular, pre-determined schedule we can reliably rule out selection bias resulting 
from selection into receiving a rating.84 
The DSA assigns a risk of debt distress (low risk, medium risk, high risk, or in debt distress) 
to a country depending on the evolution of five debt indicators compared to some policy-
dependent thresholds, assuming that breaches of these thresholds would signal the presence 
of debt vulnerabilities. Specifically, the mechanical rule for assigning debt risk ratings is based 
on the projections of five key macroeconomic indicators for the subsequent 20 years: the 
present value (PV) of external debt as a percentage of GDP, exports, and revenue as well as 
the external debt service as a percentage of exports and revenue. For each of these five 
variables there is one baseline scenario and eight stress test projections with alternative 
macroeconomic assumptions for the 20-year period. The projected values are compared to the 
thresholds, that depend on the country’s quality of policies and institutions, as measured by a 
three-step version of the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)—an index of 
institutional quality and macroeconomic stability produced by the World Bank.85 According 
to the mechanical rule, the risk rating ‘moderate risk’ is assigned if one of the stress test 
projections exceeds the corresponding threshold, while the rating ‘high risk’ is assigned if this 
is the case for one of the baseline scenarios (IMF 2013). In sum, these data allow us to 
reconstruct the rating suggested by the mechanical rule and to compare it to the rating actually 
assigned.86 
The actual rating may differ from the mechanical one because of the use of judgment by IMF 
and World Bank staff. One of the distinctive features of the DSF is to explicitly allowing for 
judgment as a source of flexibility to ensure that ratings are not excessively affected by short 
term macroeconomic fluctuations and that they also take into account country-specific 
                                                     
84 To minimize concerns about selection bias, we show that our results are robust to limiting the sample to the DSAs 
that were conducted between 6 and 18 months after the previous one and thus strictly followed the pre-determined 
schedule (see Section 4.4). 
85 These policy-dependent thresholds are based on the estimation of a set of simple probit models on a large sample 
of low and middle-income countries over the 1970-2007 period—one for each debt indicator—where the probability 
of debt distress is a function of the debt indicator, the CPIA indicator as a measure of policies and institutional 
quality, and GDP growth as a proxy for economic shocks. See IMF and World Bank (2012) for additional details. 
86 For an overview of the LIC DSF, see http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/jdsf.htm (last accessed November 
23, 2016). For a more detailed discussion on the underlying method and its application, see IMF (2013) and Berg et 
al. (2014). After its introduction, the DSF has been reviewed three times (2006, 2009 and 2012), but its main structure 
has remained the same. The two most important changes introduced by the 2012 review have been: 1) the revision 
of two of the five debt thresholds (debt over exports and debt service over exports), to take into account remittances 
in the denominator of the ratio for countries highly dependent on remittances, and 2) the introduction of the 
“probability approach,” which uses country-specific information to complement the standard debt sustainability 
assessment in borderline cases. 
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characteristics that are not reflected in the macroeconomic projections (IMF 2009). In 
particular, the guidance notes of the LIC DSF state that “[a]lthough the indicative thresholds play 
a fundamental role in the determination of the risk rating, they should not be interpreted 
mechanistically. The assessment of risk needs to strike a balance between paying due attention to debt 
levels rising toward or above thresholds and using judgment. Thus, a marginal or temporary breach of 
a threshold may not necessarily imply a significant vulnerability. Conversely, a near breach should not 
be dismissed without careful consideration” (IMF 2013). More precisely, the assessment done by 
the country team can deviate from the rule in the presence of minor and temporary breaches 
of the debt thresholds, while protracted (and large) breaches are more worrisome. Also, staff 
should pay attention to the pace of debt accumulation and give the right weight to some of the 
stress scenarios, which—being standardized—in some circumstances may not be very 
realistic. Moreover, careful consideration should be given to the country’s ability to repay 
external debt that is not captured in the framework. For instance, the availability of a large 
pool of international reserves could counteract some negative indication coming from debt 
service ratios. 
 
2.3 Data and Method 
2.3.1 Main Variables and Descriptive Evidence 
Our analysis is based on a unique dataset covering all 377 debt sustainability analyses 
undertaken in low-income countries between December 2006 and January 2015. The dataset 
includes, for each DSA, the five debt ratios in the year of the DSA and their projections for the 
20-year period ahead, as well as all projections for the key macroeconomic variables that are 
used to determine the evolution of the country’s level of debt flows and stocks. These 
projections are the ones used by IMF and World Bank staff in the macroeconomic framework 
produced by the country team at the time when the DSA was produced. Some information on 
the projections over the medium term (but not the yearly data for the entire 20-year period) 
for the key variables are publicly available in the country report and in the associated DSA 
write-up. 
We are interested in the determinants of the decision to make use of the discretion embedded 
in the DSF. In Table 2.1 we take a first, descriptive look at our data on the DSAs by comparing 
mechanical and actual ratings. First, the table shows that in the majority of cases the actual 
79 
rating is equivalent to the mechanical rating. Of the 367 DSAs for which we have all necessary 
data,87 272 end up with the rating that the mechanical rule suggests (~74 percent). Making use 
of the room for discretion in the DSF is the exception rather than the rule. Second, it becomes 
evident that the vast majority of deviations are improvements of the risk rating (i.e., a lower 
risk) with respect to the ones mechanically determined. Almost all of these deviations are one-
notch improvements (i.e., from high risk to medium risk or from medium risk to low risk); 
only one country received a low risk rating when the projections suggested assigning high 
risk. The actual rating is worse than the mechanical rating in only nine cases.88 This first piece 
of evidence would already suggest the possibility that the almost unidirectional use of 
judgment is consistent with the presence of staff incentives to provide a good rating of the 
country they work on, as well as with a positive bias that could be explained by political 
pressures to obtain an improvement in the risk rating. 
Table 2.1 – LIC-DSA Mechanical and Actual Risk Ratings 
  Mechanical risk rating  
  Low Moderate High Total 
Actual risk rating 
Low 81 92.0% 47 30.7% 1 0.8% 129 35.1% 
Moderate 7 8.0% 104 68.0% 38 30.2% 149 40.6% 
High 0 0.0% 2 1.3% 87 69.0% 89 24.3% 
 Total 88 100.0% 153 100.0% 126 100.0% 367 100.0% 
Note: The table shows the absolute frequencies of mechanical and actual DSF risk ratings. The columns distinguish 
between the three categories of the mechanically produced ratings while the rows distinguish between the actual 
ratings countries have received. To the right of the absolute frequencies are relative frequencies that show the 
distribution of actual ratings given the mechanical rating.  
 
Against this backdrop, for the remainder of our analysis we code a binary dependent variable 
that indicates whether the final DSF rating was more favorable than what the mechanical 
rating suggested and examine the determinants of such rating improvements. While we 
consider multiple potential determinants, we are primarily interested in two hypotheses that 
emerge from the political economy literature on international organizations. 
                                                     
87 The last DSF revision introduced remittances-augmented debt thresholds and projections to capture enhanced 
repayment capacity of countries receiving large remittances. Because of incomplete data for the ten DSAs done in 
2014 and 2015 that use these augmented values, we exclude them from the analysis. 
88 We looked at the justification for the ratings of these nine DSAs in detail and found that the analysts in all cases 
referred to country-specific vulnerabilities. Examples include the 2014 DSA for Afghanistan, which concluded that 
risk was high because of “significant vulnerabilities” including the country’s heavy reliance on donor grants, and 
the 2012 DSA for Burkina Faso, which set the risk rating from low to moderate because of vulnerabilities related to 
the country’s gold exports. Because of the small sample size, we do not test for potential biases in these nine 
decisions. 
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First, we test the hypothesis that the use of judgment in debt sustainability ratings is biased in 
favor of countries that are politically affiliated with the Bank’s and the Fund’s major 
shareholders. For such a bias to be present, shareholders do not have to interfere directly with 
the decision-making processes at the staff level where DSAs are produced. The mechanisms 
may be more subtle. Preemptive obedience to the views of the shareholders’ delegates 
(Executive Directors) may play a role as all DSAs have to be approved by the Board of 
Directors. In our background research at the institutions’ headquarters in Washington, staff 
suggested that both the Fund and the Bank have certain “narratives” for most countries and 
treat some countries as role model for others. Internally, DSAs are expected to fit these 
preexisting “stories” for individual countries. Such narratives and role models can originate 
at the political level and trickle down via senior management to the staff level.89 While the 
exact mechanisms remain speculative, it is clear that such favorable treatment of the major 
shareholders’ political allies would constitute a bias that is not reconcilable with a correct 
application of the DSF that is solely based on economic criteria.  
To measure political proximity we use data on voting behavior in the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA). In our baseline, we rely on estimates of the distances between the “ideal 
point” of rated countries and the United States (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017).90 Similar 
to Vreeland and Dreher (2014) we code a country as a “US-friend” if it is in the lowest quintile 
of the distribution of the ideal point distance (meaning that it is among the closest friends of 
the United States), as we expect variation at the upper tail of the political alignment 
distribution to be more likely to make a difference than variation around the mean. As our 
study focuses on LICs, most of which score low on political alignment with the United States, 
we believe that minor differences in political alignment between the United States and the 
rated country are uninformative. By contrast, we expect benefits to materialize only for “close 
friends,” which are the ones that are significantly different from the average LIC. We test the 
robustness of this assumption using alternative cutoff values as well as the mean distance to 
ideal points of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan, the so-
called G5. In Table 2.2 we descriptively compare US-friends to other countries and find that 
                                                     
89 Source: interviews with World Bank and IMF officials (November 2016). 
90 In contrast to other voting affinity scores such as S-scores these ideal points are better at removing noise by using 
information on changes in the UNGA’s agenda (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). The variables are defined as 
ideal point distances, such that a smaller value indicates greater voting affinity. 
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the former are indeed more likely to benefit from the use of judgment in DSAs (42 vs. 29 
percent)—a first indication of bias but nothing close to rigorous econometric evidence. 
Table 2.2 – Overruling and US Friends 
  
US friend   
  
No Yes Total 
Rating improved 
through overruling 
No 158 71.2% 30 57.7% 188 68.6% 
Yes 64 28.8% 22 42.3% 86 31.4% 
 
Total 222 100.0% 52 100.0% 274 100.0% 
Note: The table shows both absolute and relative frequencies of improved ratings given whether the country is 
classified as a US friend or not. Only DSAs with “moderate risk” and “high risk” mechanical ratings are considered 
as only these can be improved. Note that we lose five observations because of missing data on UNGA voting. 
 
Second, we consider the role of bureaucratic incentives. Existing literature and our 
background research at the World Bank and the IMF suggests that there often is a strong 
disincentive for staff to increase a country’s risk of debt distress relative to its previous rating. 
First, as a worse rating implies that lending from the World Bank must be reduced, the 
“pressure to lend” (Kilby 2000, 2009) incentivizes the Bank bureaucracy to “show that its 
customers are solvent.”91 Second, an increase in the DSF risk rating constitutes a break with 
past analyses and suggests that previous projections had to be adjusted. Staff involved in 
producing new DSAs confirmed that they have an incentive to agree with the conclusions 
drawn in previous analyses, as any change requires a stronger justification vis-à-vis 
management than maintaining the status quo. Moreover, some countries function as important 
role models for the institutions and staff may fear that increasing the debt risk ratings for such 
countries may undermine the consistency and credibility of the institutions’ policy analysis 
and advice. To statistically test whether staff use the room for discretion in the DSF to avoid 
increasing countries’ debt risk ratings, we code a binary variable (Risk Increased) that indicates 
that the mechanical rating is worse than the actual rating assigned in the previous DSA (i.e., 
increasing from low risk to moderate/high risk, or from moderate risk to high risk). We look 
at these cases in Table 2.3. It shows that out of the 80 DSAs in which assigning the mechanical 
rating would have meant increasing the country’s risk rating relative to its previous DSA, in 
64 DSAs (80 percent) the mechanical rating was overridden to keep the rating the same as in 
                                                     
91 Source: Interview with World Bank official (November 2016) 
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the previous DSA.92 The descriptive evidence thus strongly supports the hypothesis that the 
IMF and the World Bank make use of judgment in order to make DSF risk ratings more 
persistent at lower risk levels than the strict application of the formal framework would 
suggest.93 
Table 2.3 – Overruling and Avoiding Downgrades 
 
  
Mechanical rating: risk increased 
  
  
No Yes Total 
Mechanical rating 
adjusted downward 
No 177 88.9% 16 20.0% 193 69.2% 
Yes 22 11.1% 64 80.0% 86 30.8% 
 Total 199 100.0% 80 100.0% 279 100.0% 
Note: The table shows both absolute and relative frequencies of improved ratings given whether the mechanical 
rating was worse than the country’s previous DSF risk rating. Only “moderate risk” and “high risk” mechanical 
ratings are considered as only these can be improved. 
 
While this descriptive evidence suggests the presence of both a bureaucratic and a political 
bias, we can neither rule out that this bias is driven by confounding factors, nor can we 
illuminate any underlying channels. In order to do so, we turn to a more rigorous econometric 
analysis. 
2.3.2 Econometric Model 
We run binary response regressions of the variable indicating an improvement of the DSF risk 
rating employing a conditional logit estimator that controls for unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity across regions or countries via fixed effects. We also include year fixed effects 
to absorb the impact of the global business cycle and other global factors that can affect all 
LICs equally. We naturally exclude all observations whose ratings cannot be further improved 
and also control for the mechanical rating as the conditional propensity to override might be 
                                                     
92 When contrasting this with the mirror case, we find that of the 24 cases in which the mechanical rating suggested 
a lower risk than before, eight (33 percent) were overridden to leave the rating unchanged. As this fraction is 
positive yet substantially lower than in the opposite case, this evidence suggests that there is both a conservative 
bias to keep the previous rating and a bias of avoiding to increase risk ratings. 
93 We know the subsequent rating for 50 of the 64 DSAs that were overruled when the mechanical rating suggested 
a deterioration. 21 of these 50 reverted mechanically back to a better rating in the subsequent DSA while for the 
remaining 29 the mechanical rating again suggested a higher risk. Note also that in the data there is no regular 
pattern of how many times a worse mechanical rating is tolerated before a worse official rating is assigned. 
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different for adjustments from high to medium as compared to adjustments from medium risk 
to low risk. Formally we estimate: 
 
Pr(𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 < 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑛|𝛼𝑟/𝑖, 𝛿𝑡 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑛, 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑛) 
 
where subscripts i, t, r, and n denote countries, years, regions and DSAs respectively. M and 
A denote the mechanical and the actual risk rating, 𝛼 and 𝛿 are full sets of region (or country) 
and year fixed effects, and Xitn is a vector of explanatory observable variables that are either 
country-year-specific or DSA-specific.94 The explanatory variables of interest in Xitn are the 
country-year specific measure of political proximity (US friendit) and the DSA-specific variable 
indicating that the mechanical rule suggests assigning a worse rating relative to the previous 
DSA (Mechanical Rating: Risk Increaseditn). The effect of the latter variable can be estimated with 
country fixed effects, since it naturally varies significantly over time. However, given that 
political alignment with the United States is highly persistent over time, we choose region 
fixed effects over country fixed effects in the baseline regression with the US friend variable. 
Moreover, since regional spillovers are a key element of the spread of financial (and sovereign 
debt) crises, controlling for regional effects serves to capture these region-wide unobserved 
effects. We expect the effect of political proximity to the United States in a ten-year panel to be 
driven primarily by cross-country variation, which would be absorbed by country fixed 
effects.95  
To exploit within-country variation over time and to address endogeneity concerns in these 
regressions, we include interaction effects with time-varying variables. First, as theoretical 
considerations suggest that the political bias is stronger when the mechanical rating is less 
clear-cut, we allow the effect to be heterogeneous depending on the DSA-specific, time varying 
number of threshold breaches. Second, we interact the measure of political alignment with 
major shareholders with a variable (Electionit) indicating years in which an election took place 
in the rated country, as we expect governments to be particularly interested in favorable 
                                                     
94 Note that we use the subscript itn because in some, rare cases there are multiple DSAs for the same country within 
one year. Countries i are nested in regions r. 
95 Another advantage of using region fixed effects is that with country fixed effects we lose almost half the sample 
because several countries never receive an improved rating. However, we include country fixed effects in 
additional specifications where we interact the US friend variable with a dummy for the presence of elections.  
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assessments in election years.96 In addition to exploiting within-country variation over time—
allowing us to employ country fixed effects and thus significantly mitigating the concern that 
there could be unobserved country-specific, time-invariant factors affecting the likelihood of 
obtaining better ratings—this approach has a second methodological advantage. Under the 
assumption that the timing of elections is exogenously predetermined, the interaction can be 
interpreted in a causal way. Even if political proximity were endogenous to the decision to 
improve the risk rating after conditioning on all covariates, the main effect of political 
proximity would be biased, but the interaction would still have a causal interpretation 
(Nizalova and Murtazashvili 2016). We consider endogenous election timing in our setting to 
be highly unlikely, as we are not aware of any instances in which an election was rescheduled 
because of an upcoming DSF rating.97 In addition, even if there were unobserved variables 
correlated with both elections and overrides of mechanical DSF ratings—due to anticipation 
effects—such endogeneity would only bias the interaction effect if it was conditional on 
political proximity to the United States.98 In sum, we believe that the identifying assumption 
necessary for a causal interpretation of the interaction is plausible. 
In addition to the explanatory variables of interest, we augment Xitn with the following 
covariates.99 We first add control variables that derive naturally from the DSF’s method. The 
mechanical rating is a function only of threshold breaches and the CPIA. We test whether these 
two variables also affect the decision to override the mechanical rating. According to the DSF 
guidance note (IMF 2013), staff are explicitly supposed to take the number of threshold 
breaches into account: “[l]arge, protracted breaches are more worrisome than small, 
temporary ones. Breaches of multiple thresholds suggest greater vulnerabilities than a single 
breach.” We thus expect more overrides in DSAs with fewer threshold breaches. Specifically, 
we use the number of threshold breaches in the baseline and stress test projections, scale these 
                                                     
96 In an alternative specification we use a variable indicating that an election took place in the six months following 
the publication of a DSA. Arguably, political interests in good ratings are not only generally strong in election years 
but especially strong in the run-up to an election. 
97 In similar settings, Faye and Niehaus (2012) as well as Kersting and Kilby (2016) do not find evidence for 
endogenous election timing with regard to aid inflows. This suggests that endogenous election timing with regard 
to upcoming DSF ratings is also unlikely. 
98 Instead of assuming E(election · ε) = 0 one would then assume E(election · ε) = E(election · ε | US friend). For 
econometric details on this point, see Bun and Harrison (2018) and Appendix S4 in Dreher, Eichenauer, and Gehring 
(2016). 
99 See Appendix 2.B for sources, descriptions and descriptive statistics of all variables. 
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two figures by the number of possible breaches of the baseline test (5 x 20 = 100) and the stress 
tests (8 x 5 x 20 = 800) and add the two fractions up to generate the variable Breaches.100 
Second, we control for the continuous CPIA index, as the DSF’s method emphasizes the 
importance of policies and institutions by making the thresholds contingent on the CPIA, and 
by emphasizing that the “quality of policies and institutions has a large influence on the 
macroeconomic return of public investment” (IMF 2013, 24). We expect that the continuous 
version of the CPIA provides additional information that is not captured by the discrete, three-
step version of the index used for the determination of the debt thresholds. Moreover, Fund 
and World Bank staff may consider the CPIA as a proxy for “other country-specific 
considerations” that should be taken into account when gauging whether a few breaches 
warrant downgrades in risk ratings. 
We add other macroeconomic fundamentals to test if they also influence the use of judgment 
and to rule out that they confound our findings. We focus on variables that the literature 
identifies as typical determinants of sovereign risk ratings (Hill, Brooks, and Faff 2010) and 
control for the logarithm of GDP per capita, GDP growth, and the logarithm of population, as 
larger countries are less sensitive to economic shocks than small ones. In additional regressions 
we also control for the level of total public debt, scaled by gross national income, and for the 
current account balance over GDP. Then, as the guidance note advises to take into account 
whether the country has large foreign exchange reserves when applying judgment (IMF 2013), 
we test if the level of international reserves can contribute to explaining the overrides. In the 
same spirit, we control for natural resource rents to account for the idea that debt sustainability 
could hinge on countries’ future revenues from natural resources, information which cannot 
easily be incorporated in the DSF and which therefore could require the use of judgment.101 In 
a robustness test, we also look at the effect of IMF growth projections, as optimistic growth 
scenarios could not only lower debt ratios but could also motivate an overrule of the 
mechanical risk rating.102  
                                                     
100 Fund staff suggested that the stress test based on the historical scenario (which fixes some key macroeconomic 
variables at their historical averages to compute the 20-years ahead projections) is, in practice, often considered to 
be implausible given that many countries are expected to be on a structurally different growth path compared to 
the mid-1990s and/or early-2000s. To address this concern, we also ran regressions in which we ignore this stress 
test. Our inferences are not affected. 
101 Note that we lag all macroeconomic explanatory variables by one year to make sure that they were observed at 
the time the DSA was produced. 
102 All of these variables are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), with the exceptions 
of growth projections which are taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database (different vintages). 
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As the DSF’s method explicitly leaves room for the application of judgment, it would be in 
accordance with an unbiased application of the DSF’s method if any of these control variables 
were related to the decision to override the mechanical result of the DSF. In general, however, 
we expect the omitted variable bias that is driven by macroeconomic fundamentals to be low, 
given that the projections used to produce the DSAs already incorporate most of this 
information. Any correlations between the macroeconomic fundamentals and the decision to 
manually adjust the risk rating would show that staff rely on information that is not 
incorporated in the mechanical projection models. This would suggest that the DSF’s method 
is “too simple” and would support a refinement of the econometric underpinnings of the DSF 
(Berg et al. 2014). 
 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Macroeconomic Determinants 
Before turning to our main variables of interest, in Table 2.4 we examine the effect of 
macroeconomic fundamentals and variables that are internal to the DSAs. Some of these 
variables could be correlated with overrides if the DSF is applied as intended, given that the 
number of threshold breaches and “country-specific considerations” are supposed to be taken 
into account. These regressions also help us to identify a suitable set of control variables. 
As column 1 shows, the share of breached thresholds is a statistically significant predictor of 
the decision to override the risk rating. As one would expect, the higher this share, the less 
likely it is that the rating is improved. The continuous version of the CPIA also appears to 
influence this decision. Given that the three-step version of the CPIA plays an important role 
in setting the relevant thresholds in the DSF, but forces the framework to ignore some relevant 
information contained in the continuous measure of the CPIA, it is not surprising that Bank 
and Fund staff also rely on the additional information conveyed by the continuous version 
when deciding on whether to improve the rating. We also find that DSAs in which the 
mechanical rule suggests that a "high risk" rating be assigned are more likely to be improved, 
when the other variables are kept fixed. All three DSA-specific variables are statistically 
significant at the one percent level and enter with consistent signs across various specifications 
in Table 2.4 (and Table 2.5). 
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Table 2.4 – DSA-specific Variables and Macroeconomic Fundamentals 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Breaches -0.116*** -0.102*** -0.105*** -0.105*** 
 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) 
CPIA 1.519*** 1.232*** 1.337*** 1.647*** 
 
(0.394) (0.421) (0.450) (0.509) 
Mechanical Rating: High 2.116*** 2.222*** 2.412*** 2.488*** 
 
(0.486) (0.500) (0.524) (0.539) 
GDP per capita (ln, t-1)  1.060*** 1.178*** 0.993*** 
 
 (0.297) (0.322) (0.360) 
GDP growth (t-1)  -0.017 -0.032 -0.050 
 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) 
Population (ln, t-1)  0.407*** 0.461*** 0.380** 
 
 (0.136) (0.152) (0.170) 
Debt/GNI (t-1)   0.004 0.003 
 
  (0.008) (0.010) 
Current Account Balance (% GDP, t-1)   -1.044 -1.355 
 
  (1.900) (1.961) 
Reserves/Debt (t-1)    0.004 
 
   (0.005) 
Natural Resources (% GDP, t-1)    0.023 
 
   (0.015) 
Observations 263 263 255 247 
Pseudo R-squared 0.189 0.242 0.258 0.272 
 
Note: dependent variable indicates an improved debt rating through overruling; conditional logistic 
regressions that control for region fixed effects; reported are the coefficient estimates of the regressions; 
standard errors, robust to clustering at the region level, in parentheses. All regressions include year fixed 
effects. Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
In column 2 we add GDP per capita, GDP growth and population as explanatory variables. 
As one would expect, GDP per capita appears as a strong, robust and statistically significant 
predictor of the outcome variable and enters with the expected sign in Table 2.4 (and Table 
2.5). The statistical evidence for the effect of the growth rate is less robust (but in Table 2.5 has 
the expected, positive sign in the regressions in which it appears as a statistically significant 
predictor of overrides). Country size as measured by logged population is positively 
correlated with rating improvement.103 While this could be interpreted as indicating a bias in 
favor of geopolitically important countries, large countries are more likely to be economically 
                                                     
103 In auxiliary regressions, which are available upon request, we find that the latter effect is driven by the largest 
countries in the sample. 
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diversified and thus less vulnerable to external shocks. Moreover, larger countries could rely 
relatively more on local currency borrowing (Berensmann, Dafe, and Volz 2015), therefore 
being less exposed to the risk of external default. In our view, this finding may thus be 
economically justified and is not necessarily an indication of bias. In column 3, we include two 
additional macroeconomic variables that are typical determinants of sovereign credit risk. The 
current account balance (as a share of GDP) and the external-debt-to-GNI ratio neither enter 
with statistically significant coefficients, nor do they affect the coefficients on the other 
explanatory variables. In column 4 we add the country’s amount of reserves (scaled by country 
debt) and its rents from natural resources (as a share of GDP). Countries with larger amounts 
of reserves and natural resources have the option to use these assets in order to mitigate the 
risk of debt distress. In particular, reserves are highly liquid and can be used to service external 
debt, making some breaches of the debt service indicators less relevant for the DSF risk rating. 
Although the signs on the two variables are, as could be expected, positive, there is no 
statistically significant empirical evidence that suggests that this plays a role for the use of 
judgment in DSAs. 
We conclude that in addition to the variables that are internal to each DSA (number of 
breached thresholds, CPIA, level of the mechanical rating), GDP per capita, and to a lesser 
extent growth and country size, help predicting improvements of the risk rating. Other 
macroeconomic fundamentals do not seem to matter. As the projections and the threshold 
breaches on which the ratings are based include a large amount of country-specific economic 
information, the finding that other macroeconomic fundamentals are not correlated with 
overrides of the mechanical rating is not surprising. Instead, it shows that the method 
underlying the DSF is successful in incorporating a large amount of country-specific 
information that is typically considered to be informative for assessments of debt 
sustainability. The fact that at least the CPIA and GDP per capita robustly predict rating 
overrides indicate that there is room for further improving the DSF. Nevertheless, the results 
presented so far suggest that, to a significant extent, the DSF as well as the room of discretion 
embedded in it are employed as intended. 
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2.4.2 Biases  
In Table 2.5 we augment our baseline model with a set of variables that, if statistically 
associated with overrides of the mechanical DSF ratings, indicate the presence of bias. In these 
regressions our baseline specification builds on the covariates included in column 2 of Table 
2.4, given that these variables allow us to keep the entire sample, while the additional controls 
are not robustly related to the dependent variable.104 
Initially, we examine the role played by politics. In column 1 we add the US friend indicator105 
and find that countries that are politically affiliated with the United States are more likely to 
benefit from the use of judgment in DSAs. In column 2 we allow this effect to be heterogeneous 
depending on the number of threshold breaches and find that the effect is much stronger when 
the projections breach only relatively few thresholds. Figure 2.1 illustrates this result. While 
for US friends the conditional likelihood for receiving an improved rating is more than 80 
percent when less than 2 percent of all projections breach thresholds, the likelihood for other 
countries is around 40 percent. The more breaches that are projected the smaller the difference 
between these two groups of countries. The difference vanishes at around six percent of 
breached thresholds.106 These findings suggest that risk ratings are more likely to reflect 
geopolitical preferences the less clear-cut the mechanical rating is. 
While this distinct pattern gives us confidence that our US friend indicator does not pick up an 
unobserved confounder, we aim to get closer to a causal interpretation of the effect in column 
3. We interact US friend with a variable that indicates whether the DSA was published in an 
election year in the rated country. The results of specification 3 show that the US friends’ 
benefit from the use of judgment is driven by the election years in the sample. Elections in 
other countries are not related to rating improvements. As discussed above, even if we allow  
                                                     
104 All other variables we consider suffer from missing data and thus result in list-wise deletion of the respective 
observations. Given that our baseline regressions include 263 observations, we argue that the bias introduced by 
potentially non-random list-wise deletion of dozens of observations is likely to be more severe than omitting 
covariates that are found to not be robustly correlated with the outcome. In a robustness tests (Table 2.7), we show 
that the results do not depend on this choice. 
105 Note that these variables are lagged by two years instead of one as this avoids losing 37 observations and because 
most votes in the UNGA take place in November and December. As the correlation of the variables indicating ideal 
point distances from the G5 for t-1 and t-2 is r = 0.94 this is unproblematic and in the robustness section we show 
that our results do not depend on this choice. 
106 As the underlying density function of the percentage of breached thresholds shows, there are very few 
observations for this percentage being above ten. The results for these values are thus of no economic significance. 
The reason why the graph for US friends approaches zero for values close to and greater than ten is that there are 
no observations of US friends that receive an upgrading with this number of breaches. The model therefore 
correctly predicts a zero probability of overriding. 
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Table 2.5 – The Role of Political Interests and Bureaucratic Incentives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
US friend (t-2) 0.421*** 2.166*** -0.110  0.280 1.660*** -0.005 -2.905  -4.011 
 (0.122) (0.386) (0.164)  (0.377) (0.415) (0.443) (1.867)  (2.763) 
US friend (t-2) X 
Breaches 
 -0.394***    -0.426**     
 (0.114)    (0.175)     
US friend (t-2) X 
Election 
  2.333***    1.054*** 5.222***  6.665*** 
  (0.565)    (0.355) (1.593)  (2.004) 
Election   -0.406    -0.367 -1.287  -0.980 
   (0.254)    (0.501) (0.788)  (0.711) 
Mechanical Rating: 
Risk Increased 
   4.466*** 4.456*** 4.409*** 4.396***  3.630*** 3.387*** 
   (0.343) (0.341) (0.301) (0.321)  (1.174) (1.008) 
Breaches 
-0.100 -0.088** -0.109 -0.094*** -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.096*** -0.295*** -0.250** -0.344*** 
(0.061) (0.043) (0.068) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.059) (0.102) (0.122) 
CPIA 1.252* 1.231* 1.350* 0.007 0.020 0.096 0.092 17.041*** 14.941 15.314* 
 (0.723) (0.674) (0.727) (0.746) (0.760) (0.683) (0.743) (5.928) (9.384) (7.825) 
Mechanical Rating: 
High 
2.201*** 2.496*** 2.387*** 1.495*** 1.502*** 1.862*** 1.558*** 6.571*** 4.753** 5.712*** 
(0.428) (0.409) (0.466) (0.081) (0.092) (0.314) (0.054) (1.521) (1.857) (2.030) 
GDP per capita 
(ln, t-1) 
1.017*** 0.924*** 1.085*** 0.551*** 0.521*** 0.541** 0.553*** 19.810 19.959 20.603 
(0.109) (0.153) (0.138) (0.207) (0.199) (0.221) (0.198) (14.736) (21.567) (20.867) 
GDP growth (t-1) -0.012 -0.016 -0.016 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.041*** -0.121 -0.082 -0.095 
 (0.026) (0.017) (0.019) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.170) (0.209) (0.220) 
Population (ln, t-1) 0.406*** 0.338*** 0.436*** 0.180* 0.176* 0.158* 0.190** -10.478 -10.971 -12.593 
 (0.053) (0.039) (0.056) (0.102) (0.094) (0.090) (0.092) (35.515) (18.994) (19.460) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Logit conditioned on Region Region Region Region Region Region Region Country Country Country 
Observations 259 259 259 263 259 259 259 132 134 132 
Pseudo R-squared 0.236 0.288 0.256 0.547 0.542 0.565 0.545 0.660 0.742 0.760 
Note: dependent variable indicates an improved debt rating through overruling; conditional logistic regressions that control for region or year fixed effects; reported 
are the coefficient estimates of the regressions; standard errors, robust to clustering at the region/country level, in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<.05, 
*** p<.01 
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the assumption of conditional exogeneity of political proximity to be violated—and thus 
cannot infer that US friends are on average favorably treated—we can still conclude that 
elections cause differences in the favorable use of judgment only for the group of countries 
classified as US friends. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Visualizing the Effect of Political Alignment with the United States 
 
Notes: The line chart shows the estimated probability (and the 90 percent 
confidence intervals) of a risk rating improvement for countries classified as “US 
friends” and for other countries, depending on the percentage of debt thresholds 
breached in the DSA. The line chart is based on the results of a logistic regression 
with region dummies, rather than the ones of the conditional logistic regression, 
as reported in Table 2.5 column 2. The results of these two regressions are almost 
identical except that the standard errors are smaller when the conditional logit 
estimator is used. This is why the graph understates the precision of the 
estimation. All control variables are set at their sample means. The bar chart 
shows the density function of the breached debt thresholds, at different 0.5 
percent bins. 
 
 
Next, we consider the effect of bureaucratic incentives (column 4). As the descriptive evidence 
already suggested, the probability that the mechanical rating is overruled increases 
significantly whenever the projections indicate a deterioration of debt sustainability. The room 
for discretion is used to avoid assigning higher risk ratings relative to the previous assessment. 
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The effect is economically substantial; if debt risk increases, the probability that the rating is 
overruled increases by 45 percentage points.107  
In column 5-7 we jointly test our two main hypotheses by replicating specifications 1-3 and 
adding the Risk Increased indicator. While in column 5 the coefficient on the US friend indicator 
is imprecisely estimated, all the other results, which exploit time variation, are robust to this 
modification. We conclude that – consistent with the “informal governance” model – 
bureaucratic and political biases are two distinct patterns. 
Finally, in column 8-10 we replicate our main results (columns 3, 4, and 7) exploiting the within 
country variation and saturating the model with country fixed effects. While this specification 
is quite demanding, especially in a short panel, and substantially reduces the sample size, our 
results are still valid, so that we can confidently rule out that our main finding are driven by 
unobserved time-invariant country-specific characteristics.108 
 
2.4.3 Alternative Channels 
In Table 2.6 we investigate and rule out further alternative channels that may explain the 
likelihood of obtaining an improved risk rating. According to a strand of the literature on the 
political economy of international organizations, major shareholders influence IOs not only 
for geopolitical reasons but also to pursue their economic interests. The literature highlights 
the particular role that commercial banks play in this context.109 Gould (2003, 2006) argues that 
private financial institutions are able to influence conditionality in favor of “bank-friendly 
conditions” because they often provide necessary supplementary financing for IMF loans to 
borrowing countries. In a similar vein, Oatley and Yackee (2004) find that countries that are 
indebted to US banks receive larger IMF loans. As these loans are often used to repay debts to 
commercial banks (Bird 1996; Broz 2005), this suggests that IMF loans, in part, serve these 
actors’ financial interests. Broz and Hawes (2006) build on these findings to show that private 
creditors influence IMF decisions through the US government. Copelovitch (2010a) further 
qualifies these empirical results by demonstrating that both the size of IMF loans and the 
                                                     
107 Effect size estimated via a linear probability model with country fixed effects based on column 9. 
108 As expected, the controls that do not vary much over time lose their statistical significance in this specification 
that absorbs all time-invariant cross-country variation (e.g., GDP per capita, growth, population, and the US friend 
indicator). 
109 See also Dreher and Richert (2017) as well as Malik and Stone (2017) for the influence that private companies 
have on the World Bank. 
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extent of conditionality are related to the financial exposure that banks from G5 countries have 
in IMF program countries. We follow Copelovitch (2010a) and proxy these economic interests 
with the financial exposure that banks from major shareholder countries have in the rated 
countries. The data we use come from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and include 
all cross-border consolidated claims of BIS reporting banks from the United States.110 Our 
results do not show any statistically significant evidence that bank exposure is related to the 
use of judgment to improve DSF risk ratings (column 1), even though the sign of the 
coefficients on the bank exposure variable and its interaction with the number of breaches are 
consistent with the presence of US economic and financial interests (column 2). 
In the subsequent regressions we examine whether the political bias is in fact a cultural bias. 
In the literature on the political economy of sovereign credit ratings, Fuchs and Gehring (2017) 
have recently shown that the cultural distance between the home country of ratings agencies 
and the rated country affects the assessment of credit risk. Rating agencies perceive countries 
that are more distant in cultural and linguistic terms to be at higher risk than other comparable 
countries. Given that the World Bank’s and the IMF’s headquarters are both based in the 
United States, their staff are familiar with the United States’ culture and language. If familiarity 
in cultural and linguistic terms indeed introduces familiarity bias that leads to a more 
favorable perception of rated countries and if culturally close countries are also politically 
closer to the United States we might misattribute a cultural familiarity bias to a political bias. 
In columns 3 and 4 we thus add a variable measuring a country’s distance-adjusted ethno-
linguistic fractionalization (DELF) relative to the United States to the regressions (Kolo 
2012).111 Again, we find no statistically significant evidence for such a bias and rule out that 
the political bias we identify is in fact driven by cultural and ethno-linguistic familiarity. 
In the literature on the political economy of the IMF it is well-established that countries with 
political ties to the United States are more likely to receive loans from the IMF. The finding 
that “US-friends” are more likely to benefit from the use of judgment in DSAs might thus be 
an artefact of the fact that the same countries are also more likely to be under an IMF 
arrangement. 
                                                     
110 We run the same regressions with data on bank exposure for banks from the European Union and find the same 
results. 
111 While this variable is the best measure we have for the cultural distance between the rated country and the IMF 
and World Bank, we admit that it is a rough proxy as their staff are very international. These results should thus 
be taken with a grain of salt. 
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There are several reasons that explain why countries that receive IMF resources might be 
treated differently in DSAs. In line with the reasoning in Dreher, Marchesi, and Vreeland 
(2008) and Reynaud and Fratzscher (2011), IMF staff might have an interest in ‘defensive 
rating,’ causing them to cast countries that receive IMF resources in a good light. At the same 
time, however, they might want to show that the country is at risk of debt distress to justify 
the existence (and a possible extension) of the program. When we include a variable indicating 
the presence of an IMF program in the year of the DSA, we initially find that such countries 
are less likely to receive improved ratings. As countries under IMF programs, however, see 
their mechanical DSF ratings deteriorate less frequently than countries not receiving Fund 
resources (39 vs. 61 percent), we control for Risk Increased and then find this effect to disappear. 
These findings are consistent with the following interpretation: The Fund adjusts the debt 
sustainability outlook for program countries less frequently than for non-program countries, 
since this would mean contradicting the projections on which the design of their programs 
was based. This is why overrides, on average, are also less frequent. However, if the 
projections are still adjusted under IMF programs, then judgment is used to avoid a 
downgrade: In fact, out of the 32 DSAs which suggested a deterioration of debt sustainability 
while the country was under an IMF program, 28 (87.5 percent) were overruled in order to 
keep the old rating. 
In sum, we interpret this result as further evidence for the bureaucratic bias and—given that 
the coefficient on the US-friend variable is not affected—we can rule out the possibility that 
the political bias is due to the higher propensity to participate in IMF programs. 
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Table 2.6 – Testing for Alternative Channels 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
US friend (t-2) 0.427 1.865*** 0.409** 2.069*** 0.323*** 2.110*** 0.263 1.652*** 
 (0.312) (0.609) (0.190) (0.496) (0.092) (0.383) (0.391) (0.312) 
US friend (t-2)  
x Breaches 
 
-0.356*** 
 
-0.378*** 
 
-0.393*** 
 
-0.433*** 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.128) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.166) 
US banks 
(%GDP, t-1) 
-0.260 10.916 
      
(12.335) (9.708) 
      
US banks  
x Breaches 
 
-1.699 
      
 
(4.336) 
      
DELF to US 
  
-0.096 -0.627 
    
 
  
(1.059) (1.653) 
    
DELF to US  
x Breaches 
   
0.087 
    
   
(0.131) 
    
IMF program 
    
-1.041*** -0.682** -0.209 0.295 
 
    
(0.348) (0.301) (0.538) (0.271) 
IMF program  
x Breaches 
     
-0.065 
 
-0.066 
     
(0.057) 
 
(0.046) 
Mechanical Rating:  
Risk Increased 
      
4.405*** 4.413*** 
      
(0.426) (0.414) 
Controls Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline 
Observations 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 
Pseudo R-squared 0.236 0.294 0.236 0.289 0.258 0.316 0.543 0.574 
Note: dependent variable indicates an improved debt rating through overruling; conditional logistic regressions that control 
for region fixed effects; reported are the coefficient estimates of the regressions; standard errors, robust to clustering at the 
region level, in parentheses. Baseline controls include: Breaches, CPIA, Mechanical Rating: High, GDP per capita (ln, t-1), GDP 
growth (t-1), Population (ln, t-1). All regressions include year fixed effects. Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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2.4.4 Robustness 
In Tables 2.7-2.9 we present a set of robustness exercises. We start by considering a number of 
additional factors that could motivate the use of judgment and possibly bias our estimates of 
the importance of political interests and bureaucratic incentives (Table 2.7).  
First, in columns 1-3 we show that adding the larger vector of covariates (from Table 2.4, 
column 4) does not affect the results, notwithstanding a significant reduction in sample size. 
In addition to the current account balance, the debt-to-GNI ratio, the country’s level of 
international reserves and its rents from natural resources, in these regressions we also 
consider the inflows of official development assistance from the US to rule out that the 
favorable treatment of US allies is due to the larger amount of US aid that such countries 
typically receive. We also add the interaction CPIA x Breaches to control for a potential non-
linearity of the CPIA’s effect depending on the number of threshold breaches. 
Second, we include information on whether the rated country participated in the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and on whether it issued sovereign bonds at the 
time of the assessment. The former could signal a propensity to override the mechanical debt 
rating for reasons that have nothing to do with a political bias but are instead related to a 
benign view of countries which received debt relief, for which the IMF and the World Bank 
may have incentive to show that post-HIPC debt levels are sustainable. With regards to the 
latter, the fact that countries that issue sovereign bonds have easier access to external financing 
could also influence the assessment of debt sustainability and, in particular, the use of 
judgment. In fact, the specific structure of sovereign bonds—with bullet repayment at 
maturity—translates into sharp but temporary spikes in debt service, which could result in 
breaches of the relevant debt thresholds. Nevertheless, staff do not generally consider those 
breaches as relevant for debt sustainability and judgment is often used to overrule the 
mechanical rating. Those two variables, however, are not statistically significant and, more 
importantly, the coefficients on our variables of interest are not affected (columns 4-6).112  
An alternative source of bias could arise from the fact that country teams can easily improve 
the risk rating by modifying the macroeconomic framework to incorporate overly optimistic 
                                                     
112 However, in the first specification, which almost exclusively exploits cross-country variation, the standard error 
increases, resulting in the coefficient on US friend marginally missing statistical significance at the ten percent level 
(p = .105). 
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growth projections. Not controlling for IMF growth projections may bias the estimate of our 
key variables, especially because IMF growth projections could themselves be politically 
biased (Dreher, Marchesi, and Vreeland 2008). To rule out that a bias in growth forecasts drives 
our findings, we add the difference between IMF growth projections and the actual growth 
rate to the baseline regressions.113 Again, our results are robust to this modification (columns 
7-9). One may also argue that ratings could improve because of a political bias in the CPIA. 
However, this is unlikely to be an issue in this context, given that the CPIA scores are 
computed by the World Bank for its aid allocation and—differently from growth projections—
they enter the DSA as an exogenous input, over which the country team producing the DSA 
does not have any control. In any case, if there were a political bias in the IMF growth 
projections and in the CPIA, these biases would work against our results, so that our estimates 
can be safely considered a lower bound. 
Finally, in columns 10-12 we remove all control variables except the DSA-specific variables 
and region and year fixed effects to compare how much the covariates affect the coefficient of 
interest. Following the method proposed by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), we can then 
calculate “selection ratios” that indicate how much of the effect is explained by selection on 
observables. Comparing the “full” specifications (columns 1-3) to the specifications that only 
include the core covariates (columns 10-12, same sample) we find the selection ratios to be 5.4 
for the simple effect of the US friend indicator, 4.3 for the level effect (and 30.2 for the 
interaction effect) when allowing for non-linearity in threshold breaches, and 10.1 for the effect 
in election years. This suggests that selection on unobservables in the first two specifications 
would have to be more than four times larger than selection on observables for the effects to 
be zero. Given that we already control for a large number of potential confounders, we think 
that it is unlikely that selection on unobservables drives this entire effect. The coefficient on 
the variable indicating US-friends with domestic elections is only marginally affected by the 
inclusion of covariates; the finding that selection on unobservables would have to be more 
than ten times as large as selection on observables to wash away this effect is consistent with 
our assumption that this interaction term is conditionally exogenous. 
                                                     
113 We can compute this difference only over a one-year horizon, because of data availability (extending the horizon 
would implicate a dramatic reduction in sample size, as we would have to focus only on “old” DSAs). However, 
we argue that if there is a strategic manipulation of growth projections, this should be already reflected in the first 
year.  
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In sum, these findings are in line with our expectation that the endogeneity bias potentially 
induced by omitted variables is not substantial in this setting. After all, the DSF projections 
already include most of the relevant country-specific information, explaining why many 
macroeconomic fundamentals we observe do not substantially affect the decision to overrule. 
Furthermore, both the fact that the non-linearity of the effect with respect to the number of 
breaches behaves as theory predicts, and the evidence that the effect is driven by election 
years—whose timing is exogenously predetermined—make us confident that our results are 
not due to endogeneity. 
As discussed in the introduction, the timing of DSAs is also generally exogenous and follows 
an annual cycle. However, under specific circumstances, DSAs can be triggered by requests 
for exceptional IMF financing. While these cases are relatively rare in our sample, in Table 2.8 
we test the robustness of our findings by excluding the DSAs not undertaken between six and 
18 months after the previous one and thus potentially outside the regular, pre-determined 
schedule. Results are again confirmed (columns 1-3). In column 4, we recode the election 
dummy to consider exclusively those elections that took place within the six months following 
the publication of a DSA. We hypothesize that political interests in good ratings should be 
especially strong in the run-up to an election. It supports this hypothesis that with this more 
restrictive definition of the election dummy, we find an even stronger positive association 
between the US friend indicator and the likelihood of obtaining an improved risk rating in 
election periods.114  
Finally, Table 2.9 reports the results of additional robustness exercises that use alternative 
definitions of the variable indicating political proximity to the major shareholders of the Bank 
and the Fund. First, we set alternative cutoff values to be classified as a “US friend” (top 25 
percent and top 15 percent instead of top 20 percent). Second, we take a one-year lag instead 
of a two-year lag, at the cost of reducing the sample size. Third, we consider the mean of ideal 
point distances to all G5 countries instead of only the United States. Our main findings are 
robust to all these modifications.  
 
                                                     
114 In this specification, countries not classified as US friends appear to have a slightly lower probability to benefit 
from improved risk ratings in the run-up to an election. This could be considered weak evidence for attempts to 
politically weaken incumbent governments that are not politically aligned with the United States (Kersting and 
Kilby 2016). 
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Table 2.7 – Robustness: Additional Control Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
US friend (t-2) 0.559*** 1.885*** 0.117 0.416 2.194*** -0.152 0.302* 1.951*** -0.325 0.686*** 2.463*** 0.244  
(0.097) (0.258) (0.232) (0.257) (0.593) (0.292) (0.162) (0.560) (0.235) (0.150) (0.199) (0.173) 
US friend (t-2) x breaches  -0.380***   -0.386***   -0.378***   -0.393***   
 (0.144)   (0.120)   (0.135)   (0.110)  
US friend (t-2) x election   2.320***   2.400***   2.597***   2.091***  
  (0.730)   (0.651)   (0.854)   (0.744) 
Election   -0.190   -0.393   -0.377   -0.199  
  (0.458)   (0.241)   (0.236)   (0.339) 
Current Account Balance 
(% GDP, t-1) 
-1.683 -0.829 -1.530          
(1.383) (1.809) (1.367)          
Debt/GNI (t-1) 0.006 0.006* 0.006*           
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)          
Reserves/Debt (t-1) 0.006 0.005 0.006           
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005)          
Natural Resources 
(% GDP, t-1) 
0.015 0.008 0.012          
(0.016) (0.013) (0.017)          
US aid 
(% GDP, t-1) 
-3.931 -3.384 -3.934          
(3.287) (3.247) (3.160)          
CPIA X Breaches 0.132** 0.130 0.135**          
(0.066) (0.089) (0.068)          
HIPC (DP)    -0.526 -0.655 -0.492       
    (0.746) (0.794) (0.702)       
Sovereign Bonds    -0.931 -0.524 -1.121       
    (0.872) (1.045) (0.813)       
Error in IMF Growth 
Forecasts 
      0.007 0.012 0.014    
      (0.035) (0.042) (0.037)    
Additional 
Controls 
Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline 
DSA-
specific 
DSA-
specific 
DSA-
specific 
Number of Observations 244 244 244 259 259 259 251 251 251 244 244 244 
Pseudo R-squared 0.301 0.334 0.317 0.244 0.293 0.265 0.242 0.287 0.267 0.198 0.253 0.216 
Note: dependent variable indicates an improved debt rating through overruling; conditional logistic regressions that control for region fixed effects; reported are the 
coefficient estimates of the regressions; standard errors, robust to clustering at the region level, in parentheses. Baseline controls include: Breaches, CPIA, Mechanical 
Rating: High, GDP per capita (ln, t-1), GDP growth (t-1), Population (ln, t-1). DSA-specific controls include: Breaches, CPIA, Mechanical Rating: High. All regressions 
include year fixed effects. Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 2.8 – Robustness: Different Samples and Timing of Elections 
 
 
only regularly timed DSAs 
(between 6 and 18 months after previous) 
only elections in 
6 months following DSA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
US friend (t-2) 0.718*** 2.297*** 0.169 -0.049 
 (0.128) (0.363) (0.150) (0.153) 
US friend (t-2) X breaches  -0.357***   
 
 (0.065)   
US friend (t-2) X election   2.710***  
 
  (0.621)  
Election   -0.141  
 
  (0.322)  
US friend (t-2) x Election 
(in 6 months following DSA) 
   3.298*** 
   (0.899) 
Election (in 6 months following DSA) 
   -0.559* 
   (0.321) 
Controls Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline 
Number of Observations 200 200 200 259 
Pseudo R-squared 0.275 0.315 0.299 0.264 
Note: dependent variable indicates an improved debt rating through overruling; conditional logistic regressions 
that control for region fixed effects; reported are the coefficient estimates of the regressions; standard errors, 
robust to clustering at the region levels, in parentheses. Baseline controls include: Breaches, CPIA, Mechanical 
Rating: High, GDP per capita (ln, t-1), GDP growth (t-1), Population (ln, t-1). All regressions include year fixed 
effects. Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 2.9 – Robustness: Alternative Definitions of the Political Proximity Variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
US friend (top25%) 0.488* 1.829*** 0.105 
         
 
(0.257) (0.582) (0.266) 
         
US friend (top25%) x 
Breaches 
 
-0.318** 
          
 
(0.144) 
          
US friend (top25%) x 
Election 
  
1.878** 
         
  
(0.909) 
         
US friend (top15%) 
   
0.522*** 2.379** -0.218 
      
    
(0.154) (0.970) (0.307) 
      
US friend (top15%) x 
Breaches 
    
-0.370 
       
    
(0.229) 
       
US friend (top15%) x 
Election 
     
2.560*** 
      
     
(0.972) 
      
US friend (t-1) 
      
0.763*** 2.139*** 0.125 
   
       
(0.293) (0.588) (0.371) 
   
US friend (t-1) x 
Breaches 
       
-0.302* 
    
       
(0.168) 
    
US friend (t-1) x 
Election 
        
2.091** 
   
        
(0.880) 
   
G5 friend (t-2) 
         
0.698*** 2.521*** 0.266           
(0.115) (0.425) (0.163) 
G5 friend (t-2) x 
Breaches 
          
-0.403*** 
 
          
(0.156) 
 
G5 friend (t-2) x 
Election 
           
2.057***            
(0.680) 
Controls Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline 
Observations 259 259 259 259 259 259 229 229 229 259 259 259 
Pseudo R-squared 0.237 0.288 0.252 0.236 0.274 0.256 0.309 0.344 0.328 0.240 0.297 0.256 
Note: dependent variable indicates an improved debt rating through overruling; conditional logistic regressions that control for region fixed effects; reported are the 
coefficient estimates of the regressions; standard errors, robust to clustering at the region level, in parentheses. Baseline controls include: Breaches, CPIA, Mechanical 
Rating: High, GDP per capita (ln, t-1), GDP growth (t-1), Population (ln, t-1). All regressions include year fixed effects. Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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2.4.5 Extension: Testing Manipulation of Projections: Density Discontinuity 
The projections of debt levels underlying the DSF are based on a standardized econometric 
framework. Nevertheless, IMF and World Bank economists have several degrees of freedom 
as to how this framework is applied: minor changes in assumptions concerning, e.g., the 
expected growth rate, can substantially affect the number of threshold breaches. During our 
background research, staff thus suggested that biases could not only be present in decisions to 
override the mechanical rating, but also in the projections underlying the mechanical rating. 
We argue that if such manipulation took place it would be reasonable to expect bunching of 
projections just below the relevant threshold. In other words, the density of a variable  
Δ = p – t, 
measuring the difference between projections p and relevant thresholds t would be low for 
values just above zero and high for values just below zero. 
To test this hypothesis we rely on manipulation testing in a regression discontinuity design – 
an idea introduced by McCrary (2008). We employ a nonparametric test for a discontinuity in 
the density of Δ at the threshold (in our case zero). Specifically, we use the manipulation test 
developed by Cattaneo et al. (2016a, 2016b), which is based on a local polynomial density 
estimator that does not require pre-binning the data (see also Calonico et al., 2014). This choice 
allows us to take a purely data-driven approach to estimating the density near the cutoff and 
to test hypotheses regarding the density’s discontinuity. 
Table 2.10 – Manipulation Test 
Projection  Observations 
(left and right of cutoff) 
Bandwith values 
(left and right of cutoff) 
p-value 
PV of debt / GDP  910; 130 6.642; 8.337 .364 
PV of debt / Exports  872; 168 30.894; 33.529 .088* 
PV of debt / Revenue  1027; 13 † 30.413; 35.868 .056* 
Debt Service / Exports  993; 47 3.302; 3.708 .410 
Debt Service / Revenue  1030; 10 † 3.354; 3.897 .018** 
Notes: regression discontinuity manipulation test using local polynomial density estimation; 
p-value corresponds to a test of the null hypothesis that the density is not discontinuous; 
† test reports a warning that the bandwidth may be too low because of too few observations (Nright < 
20); 
significance levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05 
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We run this test for each of the five baseline projections (Table 2.10). In the sample of US-
friends the hypothesis that the density is continuous at the cutoff can be rejected for two of the 
five projection sets at the 10 percent level and for one set at the 5 percent level. For two of these 
three sets of projections with potential discontinuities (PV of debt over revenue and debt service 
over revenue), however, the density estimator for values exceeding the threshold is based on 
very few observations, leading to potentially unreliable results. For the projections of PV of 
debt over exports, however, the test suggests a discontinuity of the variable’s density at the 
relevant threshold. Interestingly, this indicator is the one that exceeds the threshold most often 
and seems to have the strongest informative content among the five, since it signaled the risk 
of debt distress in about 80 percent of all high-risk cases. 
Figure 2.2 – Testing Manipulation of Projections 
 
Note: The graph is a histogram of a variable that measures the difference between 
the projected value of the debt indicator “present value of debt over exports” and 
the respectively relevant threshold. It visualizes the discontinuity of the density 
around 0 that the manipulation test (Table 2.10) reports. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the histogram of Δ for PV of debt over exports, whose particular shape around 
zero is consistent with the hypothesis of bunching just below the relevant thresholds. 
Nevertheless, we find the evidence too weak to reliably exclude the possibility that this 
distribution of projections around the thresholds came about by chance. In sum, as we can 
only reject the null hypothesis at the 10 percent level for one of the five tests, we do not 
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interpret this as definitive evidence for manipulation of projections. With reference to our 
main research question, however, we note that the size of the biases we find is, if anything, a 
lower bound as there is both anecdotal and weak statistical evidence that these biases also 
affect the estimation of projections and not only the decision to override the mechanical rating. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Political interests and bureaucratic incentives influence the decision-making of international 
financial institutions. While our findings confirm previous research that has documented such 
biases, our approach and data allow us to reveal evidence on the specifics of how these biases 
operate. Our results suggest that the room for discretion embedded in the technocratic rules that 
aim to ensure objectivity enables political interests and bureaucratic incentives to influence 
(and bias) the decision-making of IFIs. We find that the influence of political interests is 
stronger when formal rules are less clear-cut. This evidence supports scholars claiming that 
“informal governance” and “unwritten rules” in international organizations enable powerful 
stakeholders to intervene in their decision-making (Kilby 2013a; Koremenos 2013; Stone 2011). 
In the particular empirical setting we consider, we find that the assessments under the World 
Bank’s and the IMF’s Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income countries—the only tool 
that provides these countries with such debt risk ratings—are not free of bias. Both the 
geopolitical interests of the organizations’ major shareholders and bureaucratic incentives 
appear to be reflected in the ratings. These countries, however, have a strong and legitimate 
interest in unbiased and objective assessments of their debt sustainability.  
These biased ratings might misguide the lending decisions of various—public and private—
creditors and could thus entail adverse economic effects. The use of discretion may also, 
however, reduce the number of false alarms. Assessing the actual presence and extent of 
positive and negative economic effects is complicated by a number of identification challenges. 
First and foremost, the fact that the rating per se affects future economic and financing 
conditions makes future debt sustainability endogenous. Absent such an assessment and a 
discussion of the potential benefits of the use of discretion, our results point to some potential 
costs of discretion, but do not provide a normative statement of the trade-off between rules 
and discretion. We leave this exercise for future research. 
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2.6 Appendices to Chapter 2 
2.6.1 Appendix 2.A: Relevance of the DSF 
Table 2.11 – Effect of DSF Risk Ratings on World Bank Lending 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Moderate Risk -0.010* -0.015*** -0.020***  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
High Risk -0.011 -0.023*** -0.023**  
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) 
GDP/capita (ln) 
 -0.007 -0.005  
 (0.004) (0.004) 
GDP growth 
 -0.002** -0.002**  
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Population (ln) 
 -0.005*** -0.005**  
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Mechanical Rating: Moderate Risk 
  0.012  
  (0.007) 
Mechanical Rating: High Risk 
  0.004  
  (0.010) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 347 344 341 
R-squared 0.155 0.226 0.238 
Notes: OLS fixed effects regressions, dependent variable is World Bank lending (%GDP) in 
year t+1; robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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2.6.2 Appendix 2.B: Variables 
Table 2.12 – Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max Source and Description 
Breaches 367 7.79 12.83 0 85.56 IMF DSF Dataset; 
percentage of breached debt thresholds 
CPIA 364 3.37 0.43 2.43 4.36 IMF DSF Dataset; 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
Current Account Balance 
(%GDP, t-1) 
370 -0.09 0.12 -0.55 0.43 IMF (2016d); 
balance on current account (%GDP) 
Debt/GNI (t-1) 353 41.91 34.23 4.29 457.8 World Bank (World Bank 2016b); 
external debt stocks (% of GNI) 
DELF to US 370 0.8 0.15 0.52 1 Kolo (2012); 
distance adjusted ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (DELF) 
DSF rating improved 367 0.23 0.42 0 1 IMF DSF Dataset; 
indicator = 1 if mechanical risk rating is higher than official rating 
Election 370 0.23 0.42 0 1 Beck et al. (2001), updated with information on election dates from 
Wikipedia; indicator = 1 if legislative or executive election took place in 
year t 
Election (6 months later) 370 0.15 0.36 0 1 Beck et al. (2001), updated with information on election dates from 
Wikipedia; indicator = 1 if legislative or executive election took place in 
the six months following the publication of the DSA 
Error in IMF Growth 
Forecasts 
358 0.39 3.93 -9.17 34.33 IMF (2016d) different vintages; 
Growth rate projection for year t done in year t-1, minus actual GDP 
growth in year t 
GDP growth (t-1) 368 4.84 4.85 -37.01 21.02 World Bank (World Bank 2016b); 
growth of GDP 
GDP per capita (ln, t-1) 366 7.02 0.82 5.37 8.99 World Bank (World Bank 2016b); 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 2005 US$:  
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Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max Source and description  
HIPC (DP) 370 0.54 0.5 0 1 IMF DSF Dataset; 
indicator = 1 if country participated in the heavily indebted poor 
countries initiative and reached at least the “decision point” 
IMF program  370 0.53 0.5 0 1 IMF (2016b); 
indicator = 1 if IMF program in place in year t for at least 1 month 
Mechanical Rating: High 367 0.34 0.48 0 1 IMF DSF Dataset; 
indicator = 1 if mechanical risk rating is “high”  
Mechanical Rating: Risk 
Increased 
369 0.22 0.41 0 1 IMF DSF Dataset; 
indicator = 1 if mechanical risk rating higher than mechanical risk rating 
in country’s previous DSA 
Natural Resources 
(%GDP, t-1) 
359 13.41 14.16 0.03 67.52 World Bank (World Bank 2016b); 
total rents from natural resources (% of GDP) 
Population (ln, t-1) 370 15.52 1.92 9.2 18.99 World Bank (World Bank 2016b);  
natural logarithm of total population 
Reserves/Debt (t-1) 352 60.27 50.28 3.39 431.49 World Bank (World Bank 2016b); 
total reserves in % of total external debt 
Sovereign Bonds 370 0.06 0.25 0 1 Bloomberg; 
indicator = 1 if country issued sovereign bonds 
US aid (%GDP, t-1) 369 0.02 0.09 0 0.8 USAID (2016); 
total US foreign (economic and military) assistance (%GDP) 
US friend (t-2) 274 0.19 0.39 0 1 Bailey et al. (2017); 
indicator = 1 if UNGA voting ideal point distance to the United States is 
in the bottom quintile of the distribution in the sample 
US banks (%GDP, t-1) 366 0.02 0.08 0 0.82 BIS (2016); 
foreign claims by BIS reporting US banks (%GDP), immediate borrower 
basis 
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3.1 Introduction 
In the early 2000s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was widely considered to be in 
terminal decline (Dieter 2006). The demand for its loan programs at a record low, the IMF 
reduced the size of its staff and focused on its “surveillance” activities (Reinhart and Trebesch 
2015). The 2008 global financial crisis and the ensuing sovereign debt crises, however, re-
established the crucial role that the IMF plays for the global economy. With the IMF’s financial 
commitments reaching new all-time highs in 2010, pressing questions about the role and 
effectiveness of the “most powerful international institution in history” (Stone 2002, 1) re-
emerge.  
We take this resurgence of the IMF’s lending activities as a motivation to re-evaluate how 
successful the IMF is in achieving one of its core mandates, namely to help countries overcome 
balance-of-payments problems. As these problems usually manifest themselves in both the 
government and private companies facing severe limitations in access to foreign capital, we 
focus on restoring market and investor confidence as a key outcome to evaluate the IMF’s 
success. We consider this an urgent task for economists not only because of the IMF’s 
widespread engagement (see Figure 3.1) but also because the IMF’s effectiveness in this regard 
has recently been questioned in policy circles. Out of fear of a “stigma” associated with the use 
of Fund resources triggering adverse market reactions, countries are often hesitant to enter 
IMF programs and question their benefits (Andone and Scheubel 2017; IMF 2017). Probably 
not least due to the alleged decline of the IMF – but also because of the empirical challenges 
associated with assessing its effectiveness – economists so far have no clear answer to this. 
We begin our analysis of this question by illustrating the problem of endogenous selection into 
IMF programs. To measure market confidence in a country’s creditworthiness, we use a large 
monthly panel data set of sovereign credit ratings from different US and Non-US agencies as 
well as assessments from professional investors. Combined with start dates of IMF programs, 
these data unambiguously indicate that countries typically sign IMF agreements while their 
creditworthiness is in severe decline. The fact that countries tend to experience economic crises 
and negative trends in their main economic fundamentals when IMF programs begin, results 
in a substantial negative selection effect that biases downwards any estimates of the IMF’s 
effect on creditworthiness (and related measures) that do not adequately account for this. 
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Figure 3.1 – IMF Lending, 1973-2013 
 
Note: Number in parentheses indicates share of years with an active IMF program in the 1973-2013 period. 
Source: Dreher (2006, updated) 
 
We apply multiple empirical approaches to circumvent this endogeneity problem. Our main 
identification strategy is based on an instrumental variable (IV) that combines temporal 
variation in the IMF’s liquidity with cross-sectional variation in a country’s prior probability 
of participating in an IMF program (see chapter 4). The IMF’s liquidity varies primarily 
because of an institutional rule that requires the IMF to review the financial contributions of 
its members (“quotas”) every five years and as a consequence of large individual loan 
repayments. For identification, we exploit the finding that the IMF tends to expand its regular 
clientele in years in which its liquidity is higher, so that countries with an initially lower 
participation probability are more likely to receive a program in these years.  
Using annualized panel data for a maximum of 100 countries over the 1987-2013 period, we 
find that the simple correlation of IMF programs with sovereign ratings is strongly negative. 
As one would expect in the presence of a downward bias, the OLS coefficient, while remaining 
negative, moves increasingly close to zero when conditioning step-by-step on country and 
year fixed effects as well as lagged macroeconomic and political controls. We then show that 
the remaining small, negative relationship turns statistically insignificant (and positive) when 
switching to the IV approach. This pattern emerges irrespective of whether we focus on ratings 
issued by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s or Fitch, from non-US rating agencies based in Europe 
and Asia or when employing assessments by Institutional Investors, which are based on surveys 
among professional investors and analysts at banks, money management and securities 
companies. 
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When turning to the mechanisms, we find that the absence of a significant aggregate effect 
masks important underlying dynamics. Our evidence suggests that the economic adjustments 
under IMF programs substantially reduce economic growth in the short run. Given that both 
official rating agency methods and empirical evidence show that ratings are directly 
(positively) influenced by GDP and growth, these contractionary effects would usually result 
in lower credit ratings. The fact that they are not affected suggests that IMF programs have a 
positive signaling effect. This signal (“seal of approval”) creates positive expectations about the 
country’s future policy path and “cushions” the drop in creditworthiness that countries 
undergoing such contractionary adjustments would usually suffer from. 
We corroborate this result in three ways: First, specifications that ignore “bad control” 
problems reveal that when controlling for GDP dynamics, the conditional effect of IMF 
programs becomes substantially positive and statistically significant; IMF-induced GDP 
contractions, on the other hand, do not seem to significantly affect credit ratings. Second, we 
use the data on credit ratings at a monthly frequency and information on the exact date of IMF 
agreements, and isolate variation within individual country-year observations with the help 
of country-times-year fixed effects. Event-based specifications then show that ratings 
deteriorate before IMF agreements, but begin to improve in the month after the programs start. 
We argue that these immediate improvements cannot plausibly be attributed to the success of 
economic adjustments and political reforms but only to a positive signaling effect. Third, we 
conduct a systematic text analysis of statements about the IMF’s influence on sovereign credit 
ratings available on the news database Dow Jones Factiva. Out of 117 statements from rating 
agencies that mention the IMF, 84 indicate a positive influence of an active IMF program on 
their assessment while only one mentions a negative influence. A majority of these statements 
refer to the anticipated positive effects on investor confidence of policy reforms implemented 
as part of the programs.  
In the remainder of this paper, we first examine theoretical expectations regarding potential 
mechanisms based on the existing literature in section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents our 
identification strategies and data. We report and discuss the empirical results in section 3.4. 
Section 3.5 concludes this chapter. 
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3.2 Potential Channels and Existing Literature 
To increase creditworthiness, IMF programs need to increase investors’ confidence in the 
”ability and willingness of an issuer […] to meet its financial obligations in full and on time” 
(Standard and Poor’s 2016; see also Panizza et al. 2009; Tomz and Wright 2007). We argue that 
it is helpful to differentiate between two main channels. First, we define adjustment effects as 
effects on ratings that are consequences of short-term changes in the country’s economic and 
political fundamentals under IMF programs. Second, we consider signaling effects as changes 
in ratings caused by the signals about the country’s expected future policy path that the 
presence of an IMF program sends to credit rating agencies and investors. As we build on this 
conceptual separation when empirically analyzing the channels driving the effects we find, 
we discuss theoretical considerations and existing evidence on both channels in the following. 
3.2.1 Adjustment Effects 
Consider adjustment effects first. A sovereign’s creditworthiness as measured by credit ratings 
is most strongly influenced by the country’s economic and political fundamentals. In the 
empirical literature on the determinants of ratings, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, 
GDP growth, inflation, and external debt are found to be robust predictors (Afonso 2003; 
Cantor and Packer 1996; Fuchs and Gehring 2017; Hill, Brooks, and Faff 2010). Several political 
indicators like the political regime type, partisanship, and the rule of law have also been found 
to correlate with rating outcomes (Archer, Biglaiser, and DeRouen 2007). Together, these 
variables explain a large share of the variance in sovereign ratings. These results in the 
scholarly literature are in line with official rating manuals, which agencies publish to comply 
with regulatory standards. 
The previous literature on the IMF examines several of these key determinants of 
creditworthiness as the outcomes of IMF programs (for reviews of this literature see Dreher 
and Lang 2016; Steinwand and Stone 2008). To the extent that IMF programs affect such 
outcomes, they influence creditworthiness via the adjustment channel. In terms of economic 
fundamentals, the focus of many such studies has been on economic growth. While some 
studies find a positive (Bas and Stone 2014) or insignificant (Atoyan and Conway 2006) 
relationship between IMF programs and growth, the majority of empirical studies suggest 
negative immediate effects (Barro and Lee 2005; Dreher 2006b; Easterly 2005; Marchesi and 
Sirtori 2011; Przeworkski and Vreeland 2000). Beyond growth, monetary stability, debt 
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management and the containment of external arrears are key goals of IMF programs 
(Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016). IMF programs are associated to reduced inflation and 
monetary growth, less risk of currency crises and banking crises, and improved market 
performance of banks (Dreher and Walter 2010; Papi, Presbitero, and Zazzaro 2015; Steinwand 
and Stone 2008). 
In addition to these economic effects, IMF programs also appear to affect political outcomes. 
Several scholars link IMF programs to political instability and suggest that they increase the 
risk of civil war onset (Hartzell et al. 2010), coup d’états (Casper 2017), and government crises 
(Dreher and Gassebener 2012). One explanation for these politically destabilizing effects of 
IMF programs is that the burdens of economic adjustments under IMF programs are often 
distributed unequally (chapter 4; Vreeland 2002). 
In sum, the existing evidence suggests some positive adjustment effects regarding financial 
and monetary indicators, but mostly negative adjustments regarding reduced growth and 
political instability. It is thus an open empirical question as to whether the immediate 
implementation of adjustment policies resulting from IMF interventions leads to 
improvements or deteriorations in creditworthiness. Before we turn to testing this empirically, 
we distinguish these adjustment effects from signaling effects. 
3.2.2 Signaling Effects 
Sovereign credit ratings, as assessments of a future default probability, are based not only on 
information about a country’s current economic and political performance, but also on 
expectations of the country’s future development (Fuchs and Gehring 2017). As economic 
indicators like GDP and inflation are imperfect and noisy measures, it is rational for investors 
and rating agencies to use other signals to infer information and adapt their assessment. Any 
signal that gives an indication about the country’s future policy path will influence this 
expectation. IMF programs can plausibly serve as such a signal. 
On the one hand, they could function as a “seal of approval” (Polak 1991). The Fund itself 
claims that “IMF resources provide a cushion that eases the adjustment policies and reforms 
that a country must make to correct its balance of payments problem” (IMF 2016a, emphasis 
added). Accordingly, the provided liquidity is intended to enable a period of IMF-approved 
adjustments. In addition, the Fund can “lend credibility” (Stone 2002) to the announced 
reforms, and function as a commitment device to overcome time consistency problems (Dreher 
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2009a).115 To the extent that the IMF agrees to arrangements only if it approves of the country’s 
policy agenda, its engagement also indicates reform quality (Dreher 2009a; Marchesi and 
Thomas 1999). For these reasons, the Fund’s engagement can positively affect expectations 
about the reforms’ effects on sustainability and macroeconomic performance (Edwards 2006; 
Mody and Saravia 2006; Corsetti et al. 2006; Morris and Shin 2006). 116  
On the other hand, IMF programs may convey negative information (Andone and Scheubel 
2017; Bas and Stone 2014; Ito 2012). If IMF programs are perceived as indicating that the 
country’s financial problems are more severe than official indicators suggest, they can act as a 
negative signal. The IMF (2014a) itself, for instance, is worried that countries under its loan 
programs carry a “stigma” (see also Reinhart and Trebesch 2015). Our background research 
and interviews at the IMF’s headquarters with IMF staff revealed that in the recent past several 
countries indeed hesitated to sign Fund agreements out of fear of such a stigma.117 In a recent 
statement on lending reforms the IMF (2017) states: “[a] key objective of the lending reform is 
to reduce the perceived stigma of borrowing from the IMF.” 
3.2.3 Issues with the Existing Evidence 
Existing empirical studies linking IMF programs with creditworthiness have produced 
inconsistent results. We argue that issues with the proxies used as outcome variables and with 
accounting for selection bias are likely to be behind this inconsistency.118  
A first set of studies examines the IMF’s effect on inflow of different kinds of capital, mostly 
foreign direct investment (FDI). In an early review, Bird and Rowlands (2002) conclude that 
the empirical literature suggests that IMF programs reduce countries’ access to capital markets. 
In the following, some studies found a negative effect (Bird and Rowlands 2009; Edwards 2006; 
Jensen 2004), insignificant results (Rowlands 2001) or evidence for a (conditionally) positive 
                                                     
115 This conjecture is in line with the literature on the effects of membership in international organizations more 
broadly (Dreher and Lang 2016). Membership in international organizations can improve borrowing conditions 
and increase inflows of foreign capital (Dreher, Mikosch, and Voigt 2015; Dreher and Voigt 2011; Gray 2009; 2013). 
116 An additional signaling effect of IMF programs discussed in the literature is the creditor moral hazard problem. 
The IMF could lead creditors to increase investments in government bonds of program countries because they 
anticipate IMF bailouts. Dreher’s (2004, 20) literature survey concludes that there is “considerable evidence in favor 
of the hypothesis that the safety net provided by the IMF creates significant moral hazard with investors.” We are 
not separately examining this aspect, as we are only interested in whether the IMF helps countries to restore 
creditworthiness, one way or the other. 
117 Multiple conversations with several IMF employees in the period between November 2016 and November 2017. 
118 Steinwand and Stone (2008) and Bauer et al. (2012) reach the same conclusion in their literature reviews. We refer 
the reader to these studies for a more detailed overview of this literature. 
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effect on FDI inflows (Bauer, Cruz, and Graham 2012; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2010; Woo 2013). 
Jorra (2012) uses an indicator for sovereign default and finds an increased probability of 
default as a consequence of IMF lending. Another set of studies examines the IMF’s effect on 
government bond spreads. Among these, Mody and Saravia (2006) and Eichengreen, Kletzer, 
and Mody (2006) find lower bond spreads in IMF program countries.119 Chapman et al. (2015) 
report that implementing an IMF program is associated with higher bond spreads, but find 
that the size of the IMF loan, the extent of conditionality, and the political proximity of the 
program country to the United States all lead to important heterogeneities.  
We argue that all of these measures come with important problems that can be avoided when 
using sovereign credit ratings as a proxy for creditworthiness. Compared to FDI, ratings are a 
more direct and precise proxy for creditworthiness. FDI flows are an indirect consequence of 
creditworthiness but are influenced by many other factors like economic openness and, in 
addition, capture only a fraction of total capital inflows. Compared to using defaults, which 
are very rare events, as a proxy, ratings provide a more fine-grained assessment and go 
beyond capturing only the extreme end of the wide spectrum of balance of payment problems. 
Compared to bond spreads, credit ratings are available for a larger set of countries and remain 
a reliable measure in times of crisis. Ratings provide a continuous measure of creditworthiness 
that, unlike bond spreads, is not directly influenced by changes in general market conditions 
such as shifts in demand for different asset classes (e.g., fixed income vs. equity) and risk 
categories (e.g., flight into quality), and bond supply effects. If governments under IMF 
programs adjust the supply of government bonds or when central banks acquire them, bond 
spreads convey a biased and inaccurate picture of how investors perceive the creditworthiness 
of a country. In addition, the liquidity of trading, which is crucial for the informational value 
of the market price, is often low for countries in crises. In sum, bond spreads are the least 
informative at the time when we are most interested in the information they convey. Ratings, 
on the other hand, are at all times easily comparable across countries and over time as they 
proxy for the same latent variable in each case. To the best of our knowledge, in this literature 
only Cho (2014) uses a measure that is related to credit ratings, and finds that assessments by 
                                                     
119 A different but related series of studies has looked at how government bond spreads react to IMF signals 
regarding the likelihood of future bailouts (see footnote 116). Some studies find evidence for such “creditor moral 
hazard” caused by the IMF (Dell’Ariccia, Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer 2006; Lee and Shin 2008). Other studies 
provide evidence against the argument (e.g., Noy 2008). 
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Institutional Investor correlate positively with IMF programs in countries with left-wing 
governments.  
The second shortcoming in the literature summarized above is that most studies do not 
establish causality in a convincing way. As selection into IMF programs is clearly not random, 
endogeneity severely biases the estimates of analyses that do not account for this. Mody and 
Saravia (2006, 852), the most cited study in this field, state that due to the difficulty of modeling 
selection into IMF programs and finding a suitable instrument, “explicit consideration of the 
selection bias problem is not undertaken.” While Jorra (2012) uses an instrument, its 
underlying assumption that IMF programs are the only plausible channel that link a country’s 
political proximity to the United States and default events is unlikely to hold: A country’s 
economic condition is plausibly related to the political preferences of the country’s 
government via more direct channels.120 Chapman et al. (2015) provide instruments for the 
extent of IMF conditionality and IMF loan size, but do not instrument the presence of an IMF 
program. 
Most other studies in this literature address endogeneity by controlling for a range of 
observable factors. As we explain in more detail in the next section, this is unlikely to remove 
the entire bias and, in addition, often creates a bad control problem. In sum, the astonishing 
differences in empirical results are potentially also attributable to the lack of plausible 
identification strategies. The empirical approach we present in the following aims to augment 
the literature in these respects. 
 
3.3 Data and Identification 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable: Sovereign Credit Ratings 
Our main proxy to measure the creditworthiness of a country is its sovereign’s long-term 
foreign-currency rating. In addition to their aforementioned advantages over other measures 
used in the previous literature, sovereign ratings possess several additional features that make 
them good proxies for sovereign creditworthiness: First, Reinhart (2002) shows that ratings 
predict defaults. This makes them an informative measure of creditworthiness for countries 
                                                     
120 See chapter 4 for a detailed evaluation of different empirical strategies that have been used in the literature on 
the IMF’s effects and the need for a new instrument. When we use political proximity to the United States as an IV 
in our sample we do not find the IV to be sufficiently relevant in the first stage. 
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with severe payment problems, an important feature for our research question. Second, 
previous studies have related ratings to changes in government bond spreads (Afonso, 
Furceri, and Gomes 2012). They thus indicate the terms at which a country can access 
international capital markets. Third, many investors, in particular pension funds but also 
insurances and to some degree banks, are bound by internal regulations that restrict 
investments to investment-grade bonds. In addition to the information effect that bond 
assessments convey to investors, this “hard-wiring” is another reason why rating changes 
directly affect refinancing costs of governments. Fourth, ratings serve as a de-facto ceiling for 
the credit rating of private companies from the respective country (Borensztein, Cowan, and 
Valenzuela 2013), and hence also capture the private sector’s ease of access to foreign capital. 
The main criteria applied to assess sovereign bonds are to a large degree comparable across 
agencies, but there are some differences (Fuchs and Gehring 2017). While our main estimations 
rely on ratings from Standard and Poor’s (S&P), which offers the broadest country coverage 
over the longest period, we also use ratings from Moody’s and Fitch to show that the existing 
differences across agencies do not drive the results.121 Since the three major rating agencies are 
based in the US, and cultural distance between an agency and the sovereign it assesses can 
influence ratings (Fuchs and Gehring 2017), we also consider ratings from agencies based 
elsewhere: The variable Ratings(Non-US) captures the average of all major agencies outside 
the United States.122 This included the Japanese agencies Japan Credit Rating (JCR) and Rating 
and Investment Information (R&I), as well as the German agency Feri, the Canadian Dominion 
Bond Rating Services (DBRS) and Capital Intelligence (CI) from Cyprus. 
We use hand-collected information on sovereign ratings by most agencies from Bloomberg 
(see Appendix 3.A, as well as Fuchs and Gehring, 2017 for details). Ratings published by Feri 
and Fitch are directly from the agencies. To analyze the dynamics around IMF program starts 
we use data at a monthly frequency. Our panel regressions at the yearly level use ratings at 
the end of the year. All ratings are translated to a 21-point scale, assigning the highest value 
for a “AAA” rating, while “C” and below translates into a value of one (see Appendix 3.B). 
                                                     
121 S&P covers most high and middle-income countries. The IMF itself – jointly with the World Bank – rates the risk 
of debt distress under the so-called Debt Sustainability Framework (see chapter 2). 
122 Fitch Rating is dual-headquartered in London, UK and New York, USA.  
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3.3.2 Treatment Variable 
The explanatory variable of interest (or “treatment” variable), IMFprogram, is an indicator that 
takes the value of one if country i was under an IMF program for at least five months in year 
t (as in Dreher 2006). Following the previous literature, our definition encompasses all IMF 
programs under any of the following facilities: Stand-By-Arrangements (SBA), the Extended 
Fund Facility (EFF), the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), or the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF). In alternative specifications, we also use the variable IMFapproval, 
which indicates only the year in which an IMF program was initially approved. To corroborate 
our arguments concerning biasing factors and channels, we also use an alternative monthly 
dataset in which we use information on the exact date an IMF program was approved. The 
latter we coded based on the IMF’s Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA) database (IMF 
2016c). 
3.3.3 Endogenous Selection into IMF Programs 
We want to know whether the presence of an IMF program in year t in country i affects the 
country’s credit rating at the end of year t. The fundamental methodological issue with this 
question is that selection into IMF programs is obviously not random. On the contrary, 
“treated” countries typically experience an economic crisis when entering into a program, and 
the more severe the crisis is, the more likely it is that a country is under an IMF program. As a 
consequence, simple comparisons between treated and non-treated country-year observations 
will not yield causal effects but capture the negative bias resulting from omitted variables and 
reverse causality. The deteriorating economic conditions that make a country more likely to 
enter an IMF program negatively affect a country’s creditworthiness, and a country with lower 
creditworthiness is thus more likely to turn to the IMF. In the following, we show why 
controlling for selection-on-observables is insufficient and propose an alternative strategy. 
To begin with, we use our monthly data on sovereign credit ratings and on the exact date that 
countries enter into an IMF arrangement to illustrate the problem graphically. Figure 3.2 plots 
the average behavior of credit ratings around IMFapprovals. Specifically, on the y-axis the 
figure depicts the unweighted average of the month-specific deviations from each country’s 
mean credit rating in the 1990–2013 period over all countries that received an IMF program at 
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least once in this period.123 For all countries, “month” on the x-axis is set to zero for the month 
in which the country’s first IMF program in the observation period started. 
Figure 3.2 – Rating Dynamics Around Starts of IMF Programs 
 
Note: The figure plots the unweighted mean across countries of the month-specific 
deviation from each country’s average S&P credit rating in the 1990-2013 period on the 
y-axis. The number of months around the start of the country’s first IMF program of this 
period is on the x-axis. Sample restricted to countries with at least one IMF program. 
 
Several important observations are evident. First, credit ratings appear to capture balance-of-
payment crises well. As one would expect, countries enter into IMF agreements several 
months after economic crises hit and creditworthiness collapses. On average, countries’ credit 
ratings deteriorate by about three notches in the approximately one and a half years preceding 
the IMF program’s beginning. Second, IMF programs start at a low point, but creditworthiness 
continues to fall for several months thereafter. After about a year, ratings seem to begin 
recovering. Third, this recovery process is on average rather slow: It takes several years until 
creditworthiness is restored to pre-crisis levels. The figure also illustrates the problem of 
endogenous selection into the treatment. Credit ratings are at a low level and in an ongoing 
process of decline during the early months of IMF programs for reasons at least partly 
unrelated to the IMF program itself. Given that the average IMF program in our sample lasts 
for about four years (with a large variance), any simple regression of credit ratings on a 
                                                     
123 Examining the deviation from the country mean is equivalent to using country fixed effects in a panel regression. 
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variable indicating the start or the presence of an IMF program is biased by the fact that IMF 
programs typically start when ratings are already low and in further decline. 
A basic model designed to estimate the effect of IMFprogram on Rating based on controlling 
for selection-on-observables looks like the following: 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡∗= β 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑿′𝑖,𝑡−1γ + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (1) 
In a regression equation of this type 𝑿′𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of country-year specific observable control 
variables and 𝛿𝑖  and 𝜃𝑡 stand for country fixed effects and year fixed effects, which control for 
unobserved time-invariant country characteristics and for global shocks that affect all 
countries equally. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the i.i.d. error term and t* indicates the value at the end of year t. 
Formally, our expectations regarding endogeneity in this setting can be written as: 
𝐸 (𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡  𝜀𝑖,𝑡) < 𝐸 (𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  | 𝛿𝑖 , 𝜃𝑡) <  𝐸 (𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  | 𝑿
′, 𝛿𝑖 , 𝜃𝑡) < 0  (2) 
It is natural to expect that fixed effects reduce the negative bias in this estimation: Global 
business cycles could affect both creditworthiness and the demand for IMF programs and, 
more importantly, typical IMF program countries tend to have time-invariant characteristics 
that make them economically weaker, and thus less creditworthy, than the countries that do 
not tend to receive such programs. Furthermore, it is plausible that country-year specific 
control variables further reduce this bias because they make treatment and control groups 
comparable in terms of observables. Nevertheless, such an empirical strategy is insufficient 
and problematic for at least three reasons. 
First, the available cross-country panel data on macroeconomic and political fundamentals are 
unlikely to capture all information that ratings agencies, national policy-makers, and IMF staff 
had available at the specific time decisions about creditworthiness and IMF participation were 
made. This includes information on country-specific economic vulnerabilities or political 
events that rating agencies consider when assessing creditworthiness and that decision-
makers in the IMF and in national governments take into account when deciding on starting 
or continuing IMF programs. Because many of these vulnerabilities and events are context-
specific not all of them are comprehensively reflected in the macroeconomic and political 
cross-country data that are available for a large panel of countries.  
Second, even if all relevant economic and political fundamentals could be observed and 
measured at the country-year level, this would not necessarily solve the problem. Most of 
these indicators are available only at the yearly level and ignore the crucial dynamics within a 
year. Economic and political fundamentals in countries that enter IMF programs are likely to 
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deteriorate quicker during the year. Figure 3.2, which is based on monthly data, illustrates 
this. A focus on country-year specific means of observable controls would not be able to 
control for this unobserved heterogeneity between treatment and control groups. 
Third, many of the control variables that in this particular setting are needed to increase the 
comparability of treatment and control groups are “bad controls” because they are themselves 
plausible outcomes of the treatment. As discussed above, the literature suggests that ratings 
are a function of many of the same economic and political fundamentals that the IMF directly 
affects. If, for instance, IMF programs increased growth and rating agencies improved their 
credit assessment because of this, holding growth constant would prevent the regression from 
attributing the positive effect of the IMF on creditworthiness via the growth channel.124 
Usually, it mitigates this problem to lag these variables by one or two periods, but IMF 
programs last for multiple years and there is also persistence in both ratings and 
fundamentals. Lagging the values can thus mitigate but not entirely solve the problem in this 
setting.125 
In sum, estimation strategies that rely on controlling for selection on observables cannot 
adequately address the question at hand. Ideally, we would want a mechanism that randomly 
assigns countries that are on comparable trajectories to an IMF program. We approach such 
an ideal assignment mechanism by employing an instrumental variable (IV) that changes the 
likelihood that a particular country receives a program based on factors that are exogenous to 
the trajectory of this particular country. This leads to an assignment into treatment that is as-
good-as-random. 
 
                                                     
124 To see this, make the uncontroversial assumption that γ > 0 in equation (1) if 𝑿′ is a “positive” economic 
fundamental like GDP growth. If, for instance, IMF programs indeed increase growth and, thus, 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚, 𝑋) > 0, the OLS estimator becomes ?̂? = 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔,   𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚)
− 𝛾
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚,   𝑋)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚)
 , such that 
the second expression is negative and reduces ?̂?. Hence, if we want ?̂? to capture the effect of IMFprogram on Rating 
that includes the effect that operates via changes in economic fundamentals we must not control for 𝑿′. 
125 Additionally, holding 𝑿′ constant if IMF programs have an effect on the intermediate outcome 𝑿′creates the 
problem that treatment and control groups will differ in potential outcomes. The coefficient of the treatment will 
compare units that are identical in 𝑿′ but differ in IMFprogram. If, however, the treatment affects 𝑿′, then potential 
outcomes of these units will automatically differ and this coefficient will not estimate a causal effect. For more 
details on this point see chapter 9 in Gelman and Hill (2007) or chapter 3.2.3 in Angrist and Pischke (2008). 
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3.3.4 Identification 
Our instrumental variable strategy combines spatial and temporal variation via an interaction 
term. The IV is based on Lang (chapter 4) and is defined as: 
𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  ×  𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡)  (3) 
IMFprobability is a country’s probability of having participated in an IMF program in the past, 
defined as the share of past years that a country was under an IMF program.126 IMFliquidity 
denotes the IMF’s time-varying liquidity ratio, defined as the organization’s liquid resources 
divided by its liquid liabilities. It is a measure of the amount of liquid resources the Fund has 
available for its loan programs in a given year. The data are taken from individual IMF Annual 
Reports (1973-2013) and from the IMF International Financial Statistics. Chapter 4 provides 
further details. 
To see how the instrument works, note first that variables indicating past IMF participation, 
like IMFprobability, are strong predictors of present participation in IMF programs (Berger, de 
Haan, and Sturm 2005; Bird, Hussain, and Joyce 2004). Based on this observation, the IV 
exploits the fact that the influence of prior IMFprobability on IMFprogram participation differs 
conditional on the IMF’s liquidity ratio. More specifically, a country’s IMF participation 
history is a weaker predictor of IMFprogram in years in which the IMF’s liquidity is high. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates this relationship by plotting the marginal effects of IMFprobability on 
IMFprogram conditional on the level of IMFliquidity.  
Our interpretation of this finding is as follows. In years with relatively low levels of IMF 
liquidity, IMF programs tend to go to countries that routinely receive these programs. During 
these times, IMFprobability is thus a strong predictor of IMFprogram. In years in which the 
IMF’s liquidity is high, however, the Fund can be more generous and has an incentive to look 
for additional program countries beyond its more regular clientele. In line with the public 
choice literature on international organizations (see Dreher and Lang 2016 for an overview), 
Fund staff face bureaucratic incentives to expand its field of activities. The incentives and the 
financial opportunities to do so are particularly strong when liquidity is high.127 This is likely 
                                                     
126 We start the count of years of past IMF participation in 1973 and thus 15 years before our observation period 
starts. This ensures that the variable does not fluctuate strongly from one year to the next in the early years of the 
sample. As we calculate the probability based on values from before year t, the variable is predetermined at time t. 
127 This literature argues that international bureaucrats face incentives to increase their budgets, remits, staff, 
relevance, and political influence and thereby contribute to the expansion of IOs in size, power and responsibilities 
in an increasing number of policy areas and countries. These arguments in the scholarly literature are in line with 
anecdotal evidence we gathered in personal conversations with IMF staff: Inside the IMF, there is a certain concern 
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to be the explanation for why in these years, the IMF is more likely to give loans to countries 
that are otherwise less frequently under an IMF program. As a consequence, the relationship 
between past participation and present participation becomes weaker in years with a higher 
IMF liquidity ratio, as we see in Figure 3.3. 
Figure 3.3 – Illustrating the First-Stage Effect 
  
Note: The figure plots the marginal effects of IMFprobability on 
IMFprogram for varying levels of IMFliquidity. It corresponds to the first-
stage regression of our baseline IV regression, as reported in column 6 
of Table 3.1. For more details see the main text (as well as chapter 4). 
 
Our identifying assumption is that this mechanism affects loan allocation at the level of the 
IMF, but that the isolated interaction effect (conditional on its constituent terms) is orthogonal 
to other economic developments at the country-year-level. To see why we consider this 
assumption to be plausible, note first that this identification strategy follows a difference-in-
differences logic as in Werker, Ahmed, and Cohen (2009) and Nunn and Qian (2014). As the 
constituent terms forming the interaction term are controlled for, we need to assume that the 
interaction term is exogenous conditional on the level of the constituent terms: 
 
𝐸(𝜀𝑖,𝑡  𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡|𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  , 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡) = 0   (4) 
                                                     
to lose relevance when there are only few active IMF programs. Several staff stated that the frequent re-
configuration and re-labelling of Fund facilities, especially in more recent years, is, amongst others, an attempt to 
make them more attractive and to increase demand for IMF programs (conversations in Washington, D.C., between 
November 2016 and November 2017). 
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For the exclusion restriction to be violated, unobserved variables would have to be correlated 
with the IMF’s liquidity and affect creditworthiness differently in countries with different IMF 
participation histories. This complex relationship is highly unlikely because, for one thing, the 
main sources of variation in the IMF’s liquidity ratio are very distant to events in individual 
country-years. For another thing, even if unobserved country-specific determinants of 
creditworthiness were correlated with the overall IMF liquidity ratio, then their effect on 
country-year specific creditworthiness would, in addition, have to vary depending on the 
country-year specific level of IMFprobability. 
Skeptical readers may worry that the IMF’s liquidity correlates with global economic trends 
that, in turn, could affect creditworthiness differently depending on a country’s history of 
participation in IMF programs. We offer both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 
to counter such worries. Theoretically, a systematic correlation between the IMF’s liquidity 
and such global economic trends is unlikely because the main source of variation in the IMF’s 
liquidity is an institutional rule in the IMF’s Articles of Agreement that requires the Fund to 
review the quota subscriptions of its members every five years. Following quota reviews that 
propose increases, members commit more resources leading to an increase in the Fund’s liquid 
resources. The timing of the subsequent spikes in liquidity, which emerge several years after 
the review, is thus plausibly exogenous to creditworthiness dynamics in individual countries.  
The second source of variation in the liquidity ratio is repayments of extraordinarily large, 
individual loans. While the vast majority of individual repayments are too small to 
significantly affect the IMF’s overall liquidity, some repayments of large loans of economically 
large countries can make a noticeable difference. However, the timing of these transactions is 
agreed upon years in advance. We consider it implausible that the predetermined repayment 
schedule the Fund develops with a small number of economically large program countries is 
associated with individual future creditworthiness dynamics in other countries. Yet, even if 
such a relationship existed and the IMF’s liquidity ratio was, thus, indeed correlated with 
global economic developments that affect country-year-specific assessments of 
creditworthiness, then the identifying assumption would only be violated if these global 
developments affected creditworthiness assessments differently in countries with different 
IMF participation histories. In our view, such a heterogeneity is highly unlikely.128 
                                                     
128  For the sake of completeness, note that there are two additional minor sources of variation in the IMF’s liquidity 
ratio. Liquid resources can also vary if the Fund changes the basket of currencies that it considers “usable.” The 
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Figure 3.4 – The IMF’s Liquidity Ratio 
 
 
Empirically, we investigate correlations between the IMF’s liquidity (plotted in Figure 3.4) and 
global economic trends. As expected there is no substantial correlation between the liquidity 
ratio and global GDP growth (r = -.14) or the number of systemic banking crises (r = -.03). To 
rule out that these global trends do not interact with a country’s IMF participation history in 
a way that threatens the exclusion restriction along the lines discussed above, we interact them 
with IMFprobability and add these interactions as control variables in robustness tests. In 
addition, we examine whether there are particular credit rating trends in sets of countries with 
different levels of IMFprobability that might be correlated with time trends in IMFliquidity. 
Christian and Barrett (2017) show that the findings by Nunn and Qian (2014) could be driven 
by a spurious correlation between the time-varying constituent term of their interacted IV and 
a simple time trend in their outcome variable for a set of countries with a specific level of their 
probability measure. This is why we plot credit rating averages for countries with different 
levels of IMFprobability over time in Appendix 3.F (Figure 3.7). We find no evidence for any 
non-parallel trends that could threaten our exclusion restriction.129 In additional robustness 
                                                     
liquid liabilities’ second source of variation is the Fund’s borrowing from its members. While total borrowing by 
the Fund is zero in many years, its average share of the liquid liabilities is approximately 15 percent. 
129 As Christian and Barrett (2017) show, a problem in Nunn and Qian (2014) arises from the fact that the time series 
of the time-varying constituent term of their interacted IV is remarkably similar to a simple inverse-U shaped trend 
and does not vary strongly from one period to the next. As IMFliquidity exhibits no obvious similarity to any such 
simple trend and is subject to several idiosyncratic shocks, it is less likely to be correlated with a similar trend in 
the outcome variable. In addition, to increase the confidence that our first stage does not pick up an artefact, we 
run placebo regressions in which we randomize the time-varying constituent term of our instrument, IMFliquidity. 
We run 1000 iterations of such regressions based on a randomized order of the actual values of IMFliquidity, and 
find that the resulting first-stage IV coefficients are normally distributed around zero, and that the coefficient’s t-
statistics are all smaller than in the first-stage regression based on the actual IMFliquidity. This increases our 
confidence in the mechanism driving the first-stage and suggests that it is unlikely that the IV picks up an artefact. 
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tests, which are reported below, we also use alternative definitions of all key variables and 
exclude observations that could threaten the exclusion restriction. Our finding that none of 
these tests changes the econometric results increases our confidence in the identification 
strategy. 
Equipped with this IV we run 2SLS panel regressions over an unbalanced sample of 100 
countries in the 1988–2013 period. This gives us the first-stage equation: 
 
𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛿𝑖  +  𝜏𝑡  +  𝑢𝑖,𝑡   (5) 
 
along with the corresponding second-stage equation: 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡∗ = 𝛽1𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚̂ 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖  + 𝜏𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (6) 
 
Note again that as we assume the excludability of the interaction term conditional on its two 
levels and, thus, control for IMFprobability in both stages while year fixed effects absorb the 
level effect of IMFliquidity. This assumption yields 
 
𝐸(𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚̂ 𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  |𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜏𝑡) = 0   (7). 
 
Under the assumption that the exclusion restriction holds, the exogenous variation in 
𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚̂  induced by the instrument ensures that selection on unobserved variables (𝜀𝑖,𝑡) 
does not bias the coefficient of interest. 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Baseline 
We begin by looking at the simple correlation between the treatment variable, IMFprogram, 
and the S&P rating as the outcome. Column 1 in Table 3.1 shows that the correlation is negative 
with a large coefficient of -6.256. The subsequent specifications support the conjecture of a 
large downward bias in the coefficient when not accounting for endogenous selection into IMF 
programs. Conditioning on country fixed effects in column 2, plausibly eliminating an 
important part of this bias, drastically decreases the point estimate in absolute terms to -1.422. 
This shows that the unconditional correlation in column 1 largely picks up time-invariant 
differences between countries. Unobserved global time trends that affect both credit ratings 
and countries’ likelihood of receiving an IMF loan, in contrast, play no major role for 
endogeneity bias in this setting. We net these out by additionally including year fixed effects 
in column 3 and find that the coefficient of interest changes only marginally. 
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Before adding control variables, we restrain the sample to those countries for which all control 
variables are available in column 4. This barely affects the coefficient, showing that sample 
selection depending on the availability of control variables is not a concern. The fifth 
specification then adds a comprehensive set of country-year specific economic and political 
controls, all lagged by one year (following Fuchs and Gehring, see Appendix 3.D for details). 
The aim is to condition on the initial state in which countries enter into a year under an IMF 
program and further reduce the (negative) selection bias. Consistent with this expectation, the 
coefficient of interest decreases in absolute terms, but remains negative at -0.347 and 
statistically significant at the five percent level. Thus, when approaching the selection problem 
via conditioning on observables, we would still conclude that IMF programs have an 
economically small, yet statistically significant, negative effect on creditworthiness. 
Nevertheless, as we argue above, this coefficient is likely biased because of this approach’s 
inability to address selection on unobservables like dynamics during the year and because of 
the potential bad control problem it creates.  
The next step implements our instrumental variable approach. The first stage, reported in the 
bottom panel of the table, shows that the interaction term is negative and statistically 
significant at the one percent level. This indicates that in high liquidity years, the potential 
program country’s participation history in IMF programs is indeed a less important predictor 
of receiving a program. The IV passes the underidentification test with a p-value of less than 
0.001, and the Kleibergen-Paap (K-P) F-statistic testing for weak identification is about 35 and 
thus well above the rule of thumb of 10, as well as above the more conservative threshold of 
16.66 proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). 
The second stage of this regression shows that the coefficient of interest now turns positive 
with values of 0.404 and 0.197, depending on whether we choose the whole sample or the one 
for which all controls are available. Both coefficients are not significant at conventional levels 
with p-values of 0.648 and 0.819. In sum, the point estimates moved exactly as one would 
expect in the presence of negative selection bias, which was only partly captured by fixed 
effects and conditioning on observables. Overall, we thus find no evidence for a negative IMF 
program effect on a country’s creditworthiness; if anything, the point estimates indicate a 
small but positive relationship. To make sure that our strategy is valid and to shed light on the 
underlying channels, we corroborate this result with alternative specifications and methods in 
the subsequent sections.
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Table 3.1 – Baseline 
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
IMF program  -6.256 -1.422 -1.311 -1.235 -0.347 0.404 0.197 
  [0.525] [0.282] [0.300] [0.311] [0.168] [0.885] [0.860] 
  {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.039} {0.648} {0.819} 
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No No No No Yes No No 
Observations 2047 2047 2047 1347 1347 2045 1347 
Adjusted R-squared  0.206 0.082 0.116 0.137 0.456   
First Stage Results 
 
 
 
     
IMF liquidity x IMF probability      -0.458 -0.505 
       [0.076] [0.068] 
       {0.000} {0.000} 
IMF probability       3.721 4.446 
       [0.581] [0.509] 
 
     {0.000} {0.000} 
Kleibergen-Paap (K-P) underidentification LM-statistic      16.091 20.447 
K-P underidentification p-value      0.000 0.000 
K-P weak identification F-statistic      35.923 54.720 
Notes: The dependent variable is the country’s long-term foreign-currency rating by Standard and Poor’s. Standard errors clustered at the country level are displayed in brackets, p-
values in curly brackets. Appendix D provides a comprehensive list of all economic and political controls added in column 5. 
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3.4.2 Other Rating Agencies and Institutional Investor Assessments 
As a first step, we use alternative outcome variables. Analysts at S&P might have a particular 
view on the effect of IMF programs that is not generally shared by other analysts and investors. 
This is why in this section we substitute the S&P ratings with ratings from other agencies and 
with assessments from professional investors. First, we take the ratings by Moody’s and Fitch, 
the other two major agencies of the “Big Three.” Although the credit rating of these three 
agencies are highly correlated, there are some differences (especially in times of crisis) and we 
want to be sure that these are not driving our results. Second, as cultural proximity of analysts 
to rated countries has been shown to affect country ratings (Fuchs and Gehring 2017), we also 
look at non-US rating agencies as their analysts come from a different cultural background. 
Analysts at the US-based “Big Three” and at the IMF often have similar educational or 
professional backgrounds (or have worked for the respective other institution), and might thus 
share a common ideological mindset that need not represent general investor sentiment.  
Third, even though we argue that sovereign credit ratings are the most useful measure of a 
country’s creditworthiness for our research question, it would be reassuring if the results hold 
for alternative measures. While ratings are hard-wired into investment decisions, regulations 
and company charters, they are officially marketed as mere opinions. Investors with “skin in 
the game” could deviate from them in cases where they are not bound by regulation. As credit 
agencies have been blamed for being either too harsh or too reluctant to change ratings in crisis 
periods, investors might come to different assessments. This is why we digitize and use 
assessments collected by Institutional Investor as an alternative measure of creditworthiness. 
These are based on surveys among investors and analysts at banks, money management and 
securities companies, and should also not be affected by bond supply side shocks. We 
managed to collect data from 1987 onwards covering up to 181 countries (see Appendix 3.C).  
Table 3.4 presents the regressions that use these four different measures as outcome variables. 
Panel A of the table replicates the OLS specification with controls (as in column 5 of Table 3.3) 
and Panel B replicates the baseline IV regression (as in column 6 of Table 3.3). In all four OLS 
specifications, the coefficients of interest are negative and statistically significant. The point 
estimates for Fitch is comparable to S&P, the ones for Moody’s and the non-US agencies are a 
bit more negative. For interpreting the regression results of Institutional Investor assessments 
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note that these ratings range from 0 to 100 rather than from 0 to 21. When adjusting for these 
different scales, the magnitude of the coefficient in this regression (-2.57) is thus similar to the 
coefficients for rating agencies and lies between the results for S&P and Moody’s. As before, 
the conditional correlation between IMF programs and measures of sovereign 
creditworthiness is significantly negative. When turning to the IV approach, the estimates 
again turn positive and statistically insignificant. This result emerges in all four specifications. 
Hence, irrespective of how we measure sovereign creditworthiness, we observe the same 
pattern as before: The negative association between IMF programs and creditworthiness 
disappears when applying an approach that is able to control for selection on unobservables. 
Contrary to widespread views in parts of the existing correlational literature and especially in 
policy circles, we find no evidence for a negative effect on creditworthiness or a “stigma” 
associated with IMF programs. 
Table 3.2 – Other Assessments of Creditworthiness 
 
Dependent variable is 
rating/assessment by: 
Moody‘s Fitch 
Non-US 
Agencies 
Institutional 
Investor 
 Panel A: OLS regressions with controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IMF program  -0.849 -0.348 -0.810 -2.570 
 [0.227] [0.217] [0.302] [0.599] 
 {0.000} {0.109} {0.007} {0.000} 
     
 Panel B: IV regressions without controls 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IMF program 1.539 0.494 0.320 0.063 
 [1.357] [1.256] [0.908] [4.182] 
 {0.257} {0.694} {0.724} {0.988} 
First stage diagnostics:     
K-P underid. LM 12.588 14.771 14.032 24.923 
K-P underid. p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
K-P weak id. F 31.067 26.761 38.026 40.899 
     
Observations 1210 1127 855 1912 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country level are displayed in brackets, p-values in curly brackets. Appendix 
3.D lists a comprehensive list of all economic and political controls.  
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3.4.3 Robustness 
Before we turn to alternative empirical methods and to examining channels, we further 
examine the robustness of this baseline result. First, we want to address potential concerns 
regarding any of the two constituent terms forming our interaction instrument and aim to 
enhance the plausibility of the exclusion restriction. Second, we test whether our findings are 
driven by certain time periods or particular countries. Third, we apply an alternative definition 
of our treatment variable. In addition to these robustness exercises focusing on the baseline 
analysis, we also apply an alternative identification strategy that exploits variation at the 
monthly level. We report the results of these analyses in Appendix 3.F and describe them 
below. 
With regard to the first component of the instrumental variable, IMFprobability, we take as an 
alternative a time-invariant, country-specific measure instead of the cumulative, time-variant 
probability. This makes IMFprobability multicollinear with the year fixed effects. Taking all 
observations in the sample period into account considers observations from periods t+1, t+2, 
… to compute the probability in t, and thus uses information from the future to explain the 
present. Although we regard this as conceptually problematic, column 1 in Table 3.4 shows 
that the estimates are virtually unchanged by this modification. The interaction term in the 
first stage is of almost the exact same size, showing that the relationship we exploit for 
identification does not depend on how a country’s probability of participating in IMF 
programs is defined. The significance of the IV, the K-P F-statistic, and the second stage point 
estimate are also very similar, as compared to the baseline. 
Regarding the second component of the instrument, some readers might, as discussed above, 
question the exogeneity of the IMF’s liquidity ratio. Even though individual countries in 
general are unable to significantly influence the IMF’s liquidity, a few countries in the sample 
repaid extraordinarily large tranches of extraordinarily large IMF loans in some years. While 
the repayment schedule of Fund resources is usually developed years in advance, we still want 
to exclude the possibility that such events could lead to a correlation between the liquidity and 
country-year specific economic fundamentals unrelated to the presence of an IMF program. 
While this would only threaten the exclusion restriction if this relationship depended on the 
country’s level of IMFprobability we still want to be cautious and exclude the country-year 
observations that could significantly influence the IMF’s liquidity. Column 2 excludes the top 
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five percent of country-year observations with the largest “repurchases” of IMF loans and 
column 3 excludes all observations from countries in which such relatively large repurchases 
have taken place. Neither of these regressions yields substantially different results, indicating 
that individual repurchases in general – including the extraordinarily large ones – do not 
threaten the exclusion restriction.130 
Even if we accept the IMF’s liquidity as being plausibly exogenous, the exclusion restriction 
would be violated if other global trends correlate with it and also affect countries’ 
creditworthiness with different past probabilities of receiving a program in a heterogeneous 
way. We consider such a relationship unlikely in particular because we find no time trends in 
credit ratings across countries with different levels of IMF probabilities that are correlated with 
the IMF’s liquidity.131 There is also no evidence of a correlation between relevant global trends 
such as global growth rates or the number of crises and the IMF liquidity ratio. To nevertheless 
examine this potential threat further, we interact global GDP growth and the number of 
banking crises with the country-specific probability and include these terms as control 
variables in column 4. The fact that neither the relevance of the IV in the first stage nor the F-
statistics are affected, provides support for our approach. The result that the point estimate in 
the second stage barely changes further indicates that violations of the exclusion restriction 
are unlikely. 
In regards to the second concern that certain countries or periods could drive the results, 
column 5 omits the years following the global financial crisis (GFC) and column 6 excludes all 
countries that were members of the Eurozone in year t. Arguably, the IMF programs that were 
implemented in Eurozone countries in the aftermath of the GFC were atypical. First, the IMF 
designed them jointly with European Union (EU) institutions. Second, default risks in 
Eurozone countries are potentially assessed differently than in other countries because signals 
from EU institutions and other EU member states will be taken into account. As columns 5 
and 6 show, these restrictions to our sample do not significantly affect our results. The 
coefficient on IMFprogram is again positive and statistically insignificant. 
Next, we redefine our treatment variable and use the binary variable IMFapproval as an 
alternative in column 7. This variable indicates only the year in which an agreement with the 
                                                     
130 Using only the amount of liquid resources (and thus only the numerator of the liquidity ratio) as the second 
component of the IV instrument also yields a very similar result. 
131 See: the above discussion in section 3.3.4; Figure 3.7 in Appendix 3.F; Christian and Barrett (2017). 
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IMF was reached and is set to zero for all other years, including the years during which an 
IMF program was still in place. Again, we observe a significantly negative OLS coefficient (not 
shown), which turns positive and insignificant when accounting for endogeneity via our IV 
strategy (column 7). This is important in two ways. First, it is reassuring that our instrumental 
variable approach also works for the approval of programs. Second, this allows us to compare 
the IV-based country-year level results more directly with the following results. These are 
based on an alternative dataset and an alternative identification strategy.  
3.4.4 An Alternative Identification Strategy 
So far, we have used data at the yearly level, because information on the IMF’s liquidity ratio, 
which was needed for the construction of the IV, is only available on an annual basis. For both 
credit ratings and IMF programs, however, we were able to collect data at a finer-grained level. 
The variation of these higher-frequency data allows us to apply an alternative method, which 
– like our IV approach – is able to control for selection on unobservables. The identifying 
assumption it is based on, however, is completely different. 
In these regressions, which are based on data at the monthly level, our dependent variable is 
the S&P rating at the end of month m. The treatment variable is the country-month specific 
variable IMFagreementi, m, indicating the month in which an IMF program was agreed upon. 
We employ an event-time specification and add IMFagreementi, m, as well as 11 lags (indicated 
by l) and leads (indicated by -l) of it. The monthly frequency of these data allows us to include 
month fixed effects (𝜇𝑚) and, crucially, country-times-year fixed effects (denoted as 𝜃𝑖,𝑡  ). This 
means that in the most conservative specification based on these data we estimate: 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑚 = ∑ 𝛽r 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑚−𝑙
11
𝑟=−11
+ 𝜃𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜇𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑚         (8) 
Conceptually, the demeaning implemented by this fixed effect estimator is equivalent to 
controlling for all potentially biasing factors at the country-year level. The only variation that 
remains are the dynamics within country-years and we thus compare ratings in different 
months within the same country-year observation. Accordingly, the coefficients 𝛽𝑟 estimate 
the extent to which the rating in the months around the start of an IMF program deviated from 
the mean rating of country i in year t. 
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Figure 3.5 – Event-based Identification 
 
Note: The figure plots the coefficients of different lags and leads of IMF agreement in a 
regression of monthly S&P ratings. See regression equation 8. 
 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the results of this regression by plotting all coefficients 𝛽𝑟 and smoothed 
confidence intervals.132 We discuss these coefficients in ‘chronological’ order. First, in the 
period between eleven months and four months before the start of an IMF program no 
significant deviation from the country-year mean rating is visible. Then, starting three months 
before the agreement, a negative pre-trend is visible. It is interesting that this negative pre-
trend is statistically significant even though all variation between treated and non-treated 
country-years is eliminated: Countries whose creditworthiness collapses during the year are 
thus more likely to receive an IMF program within the next three months. This is consistent 
with our conjecture that, even if all country-year specific characteristics are held constant, the 
mean trajectory of treated countries still exhibits certain dynamics around the treatment start 
that make the treatment more likely but are not caused by the treatment itself.  
                                                     
132 The regression output is reported in Table 3.8 in Appendix 3.G. In this table, before we turn to the results of the 
regression specified in equation 8, we first run the regression with alternative, less conservative sets of fixed effects. 
These results show that the point estimates become more positive, the more biasing variation we reduce by adding 
more fixed effects. Note that the idea behind plotting smoothed confidence intervals is to visualize statistical 
uncertainty without setting arbitrary thresholds for p-values. (This is analogous to our choice in the main tables to 
not report statistical significance by means of ‘significance stars’ for certain p-value thresholds, but by directly 
reporting p-values.)  
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Nevertheless, the regression yields an interesting pattern at the time of the treatment start. The 
most negative point estimate for 𝛽𝑟 appears in the month in which the IMF agreement is 
approved (i.e., for l = 0). As soon as the program starts, the point estimates increase (for l > 0) 
and increasingly move to zero. The trend of decreasing credit ratings goes into reverse exactly 
when the IMF program starts.133 Eight months after program approval (l = 8) the negative 
deviation from the mean rating of the year is no longer statistically significant. 
What does this pattern tell us? First, the negative pre-trend shows that the timing of IMF 
agreements within a given country-year observation is not random; IMF programs typically 
start at a low point. Second, while this negative pre-trend negatively biases the absolute values 
of the coefficient estimates for the variables indicating the (post-)treatment period, they start 
increasing in relative terms as soon as the IMF program starts. Even though IMF programs are 
thus endogenously timed in spite of all country-year-specific variation being netted out, it 
would be an improbable coincidence to observe that the trend reversal happens exactly after 
the treatment starts if the treatment itself did not have any impact. As in the IV regressions, 
the evidence is thus not consistent with a “stigma” effect. On the contrary, these specifications 
suggest that IMF programs succeed in “cushioning” against further deteriorations in 
sovereign creditworthiness. As changes in economic and political fundamentals (adjustment 
effects) do not take effect within a month, the trend reversal can be best thought of as a 
signaling effect attributed to the IMF intervention. To investigate this further, we look at the 
differentiation between signals and adjustments in more detail in the subsequent section. 
3.4.5 Channels: Adjustment and Signaling 
Our theoretical considerations distinguished two ways of how IMF interventions can influence 
creditworthiness. First, as IMF programs often lead to far-reaching economic reforms they can 
influence a country’s creditworthiness via the implementation of immediate adjustments. In 
the previous literature discussed above, IMF programs were found to improve certain 
economic fundamentals but were also repeatedly associated with political instability and 
lower growth rates. Second, an IMF program is also a signal that affects expectations. 
Independent of its actual economic effects, the mere presence of the IMF conveys information 
about the country’s future policy path to those assessing its creditworthiness. 
                                                     
133 Note that our background research suggests that agencies take on average one month to update their ratings. 
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To shed light on these different channels, we investigate the short-term adjustment effects of 
an IMF program on the most important economic factors determining creditworthiness in our 
sample.134 We focus on GDP per capita, the growth rate of GDP, inflation, the change in 
government debt and the current account balance, as in the rating literature these are cited as 
the most important predictors of sovereign credit ratings (Archer, Biglaiser, and DeRouen 
2007; Cantor and Packer 1996; Hill, Brooks, and Faff 2010). We can replicate the explanatory 
power of these variables in our sample. We find significant associations with S&P ratings for 
all variables except the change in government debt. In a simple OLS regression of S&P ratings 
the five variables explain 75 percent of the variance. In an analogous fixed-effects regression 
the within-R2 equals .31 while the overall-R2 equals .74. Interestingly, most of the variation is 
explained by the variables indicating level and growth rate of GDP: These two variables alone 
explain 71 percent of the variation in an OLS rating regression and 27 percent of the within-
country variation in a fixed-effects regression. Having established the important role these 
variables play for assessments of creditworthiness, we turn to analyzing how IMF programs 
affect them. 
Table 3.6 shows the results based on the baseline IV specification when the outcome variable 
is substituted with these variables. For inflation, changes in government spending, and the 
current account balance, the estimates are statistically insignificant. There is, however, a 
negative effect on growth rates of GDP in the short-run. In this sample IMF programs induce 
growth rates that are about four percentage points lower compared to the counterfactual.135 In 
the average IMF program country (where growth rates fluctuate more than in countries that 
never receive IMF programs) this is equivalent to about one standard deviation. It is thus a 
large, albeit not unrealistically large effect considering previous results in the literature on this 
relationship (Barro and Lee 2005, Dreher 2006) and considering also the substantial extent of 
budget cuts, tax increases and other measures with potentially short-run contractionary 
consequences that IMF programs typically entail. Many program countries feature a large 
                                                     
134 Thoroughly studying the long-term effects of IMF programs on other outcomes is beyond the scope of this paper 
and deserves more attention in future research. Arguably more complex models might be needed to fully 
understand these dynamics, but we want to highlight the causal direction in the short-run and some important 
channels. Also note as another caveat that these outcomes are not independent of each other. 
135 Note that IMF programs last for multiple years, and thus most of the country-year observations with an active 
program are years in which IMF programs were already active in the year(s) before. The estimates, thus, also 
includes lagged effects of previous program years. 
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public sector, whose size IMF conditions often reduce (Rickard and Caraway 2018). IMF staff 
recently argued that the IMF underestimated the size of the fiscal multiplier in past crises and 
thus projected smaller negative effects of fiscal austerity on GDP than those that eventually 
materialized (Blanchard and Leigh 2013). Many program countries also rely on debt-financed 
growth in the years before they start IMF programs, and cannot maintain such growth under 
a program as the IMF often sets limits on new debt (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016). 
 
Table 3.3 – Channels 
Dependent Variable: 
GDP  
Growth 
Inflation  
Change in Public 
Debt 
Current Account 
Balance 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
IMF program -4.187 0.067 1.776 4.187 
  [1.292] [0.044] [2.265] [3.432] 
  {0.001} {0.129} {0.433} {0.223} 
Observations 2032 1796 1840 1808 
K-P underid. LM 16.098 15.983 16.397 16.637 
K-P underid. p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
K-P weak id. F 35.898 35.383 37.598 38.032 
Note: Results are based on the baseline IV regression (Table 3.3, column 6), but with other dependent 
variables. Standard errors clustered at the country level in brackets, p-values in curly brackets. 
 
 
To sum up, the economic adjustments that crisis countries under IMF programs typically 
implement lead to lower growth and no significant improvements in the other major 
predictors of creditworthiness. As credit ratings are a direct function of changes in GDP (as is 
stated in the official manuals of all agencies), rating agencies would normally respond to such 
sharp growth reductions by lowering their assessments of creditworthiness.136 Against this 
backdrop, it is remarkable that the coefficient on IMF programs in a regression of 
creditworthiness is not negative. This suggsts that IMF programs not only cause negative 
economic adjustments that would usually lead to declining creditworthiness, but also convey 
a positive signaling effect that prevents this decline leading to a net neutral effect. The IMF’s 
                                                     
136 According to the manual published by Standard & Poor’s a credit rating can be best understood as a scoring 
model. There is an economic and a political dimension, which are each composed of different factors. For each 
factor the country gets assigned a grade, and the factors are summed up to a grade for the given dimension. 
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presence in a program country when its growth declines appears to have a reassuring effect. 
In line with the view that IMF programs signal the quality of a country’s policy reforms to 
investors, our results suggest that this “seal of approval” helps program countries to maintain 
their level of creditworthiness even if economic adjustments cause substantial growth 
reductions. 
It is econometrically difficult to estimate the exact size and significance of this positive 
signaling effect. Ideally, we would want to estimate the effect of IMF programs while holding 
GDP growth (and other economic fundamentals) constant. So far, we have not controlled for 
growth because of its role as a “bad control.” The results in Table 3.3 support this choice: IMF 
programs reduce GDP growth and growth itself is a strong predictor of ratings. GDP growth 
is thus an intermediate outcome and adding it is likely to bias the estimated coefficient for the 
variable indicating the presence of an IMF program. Such a regression amounts to a 
comparison between treated and untreated observations for which growth is fixed. As the 
treatment itself changes growth, the compared observations will necessarily differ in terms of 
potential outcomes and we can thus not be sure that this regression estimates a causal effect 
of IMF programs.137 
With this caveat in mind, we turn to Table 3.4. In column 1 we report the results of the baseline 
IV regression when GDP per capita and GDP contraction138 are added as control variables. In 
column 2 we add the full set of control variables described above. In both specifications, the 
coefficients on IMFprogram indeed turn more positive with point estimates of 1.675 and 1.987 
and become statistically significant with p-values of 0.052 and 0.009 respectively.139 While for 
the reasons outlined we cannot claim that these findings indicate causality, they are consistent 
with interpreting the previous results as an indication for a positive signaling effect of IMF 
programs: When GDP levels and growth rates are held constant, the instrumented IMF 
program indicator is positively and significantly associated with creditworthiness.  
 
                                                     
137 See the identification section, Gelman and Hill (2007) as well as Angrist and Pischke (2008) for discussions of the 
bad control problem. 
138 We use the variable GDP contraction, defined as the additive inverse of GDP growth, to simplify the interpretation 
of results in this table. 
139 It is interesting that the large set of other control variables, which could also be channels, affect the coefficient 
only marginally once the GDP variables are included. This supports the view that the changes in GDP are the 
decisive underlying channel. 
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Table 3.4 – Adjustment vs. Signaling 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IMF program 1.675 1.987     
 [0.862] [0.764]     
 {0.052} {0.009}     
GDP contraction -0.115 -0.118 -0.090 -0.095   
 [0.028] [0.026] [0.020] [0.021] 
  
 {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} 
  
GDP contraction, 
IMF induced 
    0.070 0.012 
    [0.211] [0.148] 
     {0.740} {0.934} 
GDP contraction, 
residual of IMF induced 
     -0.121 
     [0.022] 
     {0.000} 
GDP per capita (ln) 6.790 4.154 6.274 4.386   
 [1.225] [0.886] [1.001] [0.788] 
  
 {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} 
  
Country and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional Controls No Yes No Yes No No 
Observations 2016 1362 2132 1365 2032 2034 
Adjusted R-squared   0.264 0.495   
K-P underid. LM 13.314 13.199   7.775 7.775 
K-P underid. p 0.000 0.000   0.005 0.005 
K-P weak id. F 26.698 24.368   11.888 11.888 
Estimation by IV IV OLS OLS IV IV 
Notes: The dependent variable is the country’s long-term foreign-currency rating by S&P. In columns 
1-2, IMF program is instrumented by IV; in column 5-6, GDP contraction is instrumented by IV. 
Standard errors clustered at the country level are displayed in brackets, p-values in curly brackets. 
Appendix 3.D lists all economic and political controls used for columns 2 and 4. 
 
To increase the plausibility of this interpretation we offer another alternative test in columns 
3-6. In column 3 we first replicate that GDP levels and growth rates are significantly and 
positively associated with ratings. This does not change if additional controls are added in 
column 4. For the next step, we exploit our above findings. As in the IV regressions both the 
first stage effect and the effect of IMF programs on growth are highly significant, we use the 
IV as an instrument for GDP contractions. We thus have a source of variation in GDP growth 
that is due to the presence of an IMF program and can test how such IMF-induced variation 
in growth affects ratings. Finding no effect would support our interpretation. We report the 
result of this regression in column 5 and find that the first stage diagnostics surpass critical 
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values and that there is, indeed, no statistically significant effect on ratings in the second stage. 
In column 6 we additionally include the first stage residuals; they capture the variation in GDP 
contractions that is not explained by the IV and thus not induced by the exogenous variation in 
IMF programs we exploit for identification. We find that these residuals are associated to 
significantly lower ratings; the part of the variation in GDP contraction that is induced by 
variation in the IV is not. To be sure, this also does not prove the existence of a positive 
signaling effect, but it shows the following: While GDP dynamics directly map onto ratings in 
normal times, the GDP contractions induced by IMF programs have no such effect on ratings. 
In our view, the most plausible explanation for this finding is that IMF programs come with a 
positive signaling effect. 
In sum, several pieces of econometric evidence suggest that the overall null effect of IMF 
programs on creditworthiness is a combination of a negative adjustment effect and a positive 
signaling effect. First, IMF programs reduce contemporary growth rates, which are usually 
strong predictors of ratings. As the net effect of IMF programs on ratings is slightly positive 
and statistically indistinguishable from zero, IMF programs must have an additional, positive 
effect on the creditworthiness assessment of investors and rating agencies. Second, the finding 
that IMF-induced changes in growth rates leave ratings unaffected is consistent with this 
interpretation. As long as growth reductions occur under an IMF program, rating agencies do 
not consider them as a reason for concern. Third, the positive signaling effect becomes visible 
in a specification in which GDP is held constant. While a “bad control” bias cannot be ruled 
out in this specification, the positive and statistically significant coefficient it yields is in line 
with a positive signaling effect. Finally, in the event-time specification based on monthly data 
and country-times-year fixed effects a clear trend reversal of credit ratings is visible at the exact 
time of the program start. This provides further support for the idea that assessments of 
creditworthiness respond positively to signals sent when countries enter IMF programs. These 
signals ‘cushion’ the negative adjustment effects. 
Even though all of these pieces of evidence provide empirical support for a positive signaling 
effect, none of these estimates is a perfect test of this hypothesis. Because we acknowledge the 
limits of econometric estimates in this context, we test whether qualitative evidence can shed 
some more light on the signaling mechanism. 
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3.4.6 Qualitative Evidence 
The econometric results of the previous section suggest that IMF programs send a positive 
signal to the agencies assessing a country’s creditworthiness. To see whether this is reflected 
in the agencies’ reasoning, we evaluate rating statements that are issued when a rating or its 
outlook are changed. We use the Dow Jones Factiva database for this qualitative assessment. 
Initially, we study these statements in an exploratory way. (See Appendix 3.H for details and 
a list of exemplary statements.) It becomes evident that rating agencies indeed often link the 
IMF’s presence to positive expectations. We find many statements in which they state that they 
expect that the IMF program will help the country in the near future. Examples include 
statements like: “[w]e think the new IMF program [….] will help in addressing fiscal and 
external imbalances“ (S&P on Ghana in 2015), or “the International Monetary Fund program 
will serve as a policy anchor for fiscal consolidation” (S&P on Albania in 2014). 
Furthermore, we noticed that several of these statements emphasize the IMF’s role in helping 
countries to overcome short-term liquidity problems; others emphasize the increased 
likelihood of successful reform implementation. For example, with regard to Sri Lanka, 
Moody’s stated in 2016: “the IMF program will alleviate Sri Lanka's external liquidity 
pressures.” For Egypt the same agency in the same year expected the IMF program to “support 
the implementation of fiscal and economic reforms.” We find many more such examples in 
which the liquidity aspect and/or the reform aspect of IMF programs is emphasized. 
Based on this initial inspection, we then conduct a more systematic analysis. We extract all 
available articles on Factiva using all combinations of the search terms “IMF/International 
Monetary Fund,” “rating,” “program,” “reform,” in English or German and in the industry 
category “Rating Agency.” We then use a Python script to extract the paragraphs before and 
after statements mention the IMF. This approach yields 117 statements. Two research 
assistants then coded these statements following a pre-defined codebook (see Appendix 3.I for 
details). The aim of this coding was, first, to distinguish negative, neutral/mixed and positive 
associations between IMF programs and changes in credit ratings. Second, it also aimed to 
differentiate between texts mentioning the liquidity aspect of IMF programs, the reform 
aspect, or both. The codebook was designed to be conservative in the sense of biasing against 
findings in support of our priors resulting from the econometric analysis: in case of doubt 
about the association between IMF programs and the rating, the statement was categorized as 
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“no clear association with rating.” If it was not obvious whether the statement relates to 
liquidity or reform aspects of IMF programs, it was put in a residual category. 
Figure 3.6 – Text Analysis of Rating Statements 
 
Figure 3.6 graphically illustrates the results of this exercise. The first and most noticeable 
finding is that the vast majority of statements attribute a positive effect to IMF programs. Of 
117 statements, only one statement notes that the IMF’s presence negatively influences the 
rating. For 32 statements it was not possible to conclusively determine whether the agency 
considered the IMF program to have a positive or a negative effect on the rating. The second 
finding is that rating agencies often link the reforms expected to materialize under IMF 
programs to positive trends in credit ratings. There thus seems to be more to IMF programs 
for credit agencies than just the temporary increase in liquidity they come with. It is also 
apparent that the statements about “reforms” or “reforms and liquidity” are with very few 
exceptions positive. Statements concerning liquidity are slightly more mixed, and the residual 
category, quite naturally, captures a number of neutral statements in which no clear 
association could be noted. The expectation of successful reforms thus appears to be a 
significant part of the IMF’s positive signaling effect on creditworthiness assessments. 
Overall, the text analysis is in line with the results of the econometric analysis and exemplary 
statements like the following illustrate the effect we find: “We view the risk of another default 
in the next two to three years as diminished due to the Ukrainian authorities’ commitment to 
the reforms set out in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) program.” S&P made this 
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statement in October 2015 during a period of substantial GDP contraction under multiple 
consecutive IMF programs in Ukraine: The country’s growth rate stood at -6.6 percent in 2014 
and at -9.8 percent in 2015. Nevertheless, S&P improved its credit rating because it expected 
reforms under IMF programs to enhance sovereign creditworthiness. 
Our results in their entirety suggest that this piece of anecdotal evidence is accurately 
representative of a general pattern: IMF programs, rather than coming with a stigma, arouse 
expectations of successful reform implementation and thereby send a positive signal that, 
despite substantial economic contractions under IMF programs, cushions assessments of 
sovereign creditworthiness. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
As the international lender of last resort, the IMF’s main objective is to help countries resolve 
their balance-of-payments problems. Its loan programs need to restore the creditworthiness of 
countries with severely limited access to external financial resources. In light of the IMF’s 
resurgence as the most important multilateral actor in the global financial system, this study 
re-investigates the IMF’s effectiveness in achieving this key goal with new data and new 
identification strategies. Our results highlight the econometric difficulties associated to 
examining the IMF’s effectiveness, and suggest that these difficulties are likely reasons for 
mixed results in much of the previous literature. Not accounting for the omitted variable bias 
due to endogenous selection into IMF programs of countries with already deteriorating 
economic and political conditions overstates negative consequences. This has contributed to a 
situation where potential program countries fear a stigma associated with participation in IMF 
programs. 
Our results provide evidence against this view and paint an alternative, more nuanced picture. 
The presence of the IMF does not negatively affect the creditworthiness of the program 
country. While adjustments under IMF programs are often contractionary, the programs’ 
positive signal prevents creditworthiness assessments from deteriorating. IMF programs, 
thus, provide a cushion that allows program countries a transition period in which they can 
implement potentially contractionary reforms without having to fear further rating 
downgrades. 
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While the results of our various empirical analyses are clear-cut as far as this specific 
relationship is concerned, they remain silent about the long-term benefits of reforms under 
IMF programs. First, the successful implementation of reforms that provide a sustainable 
solution to the country’s underlying problems comes with many obstacles along the way. The 
fact that the IMF’s engagement sends a positive signal to financial market participants can 
provide countries with important time and maneuvering room to overcome crises. This, 
however, is only a precondition, not a guarantee for success. 
Second, our results cannot determine the extent to which the adjustments under IMF programs 
we observe are necessary and adequate for such long-term success. Not all IMF programs are 
identical in terms of the policy conditions they come with (Stone 2008), and some adjustment 
policies might be more effective, and less painful, than others. We consider it an important 
task for future research to shed more light on this by differentiating harmful conditions from 
beneficial ones. While the endogeneity of conditions would present yet another 
methodological challenge, such work could help improve the design of future IMF programs. 
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3.6 Appendices to Chapter 3 
3.6.1 Appendix 3.A: Construction of the Sovereign Ratings Database 
The description of how the sovereign rating database was constructed is in most parts identical 
to the part in the online appendix of Fuchs and Gehring (2017), but reprinted here for the 
reader’s convenience. Fuchs and Gehring also provide more details about the ratings and the 
individual agencies. 
Data on sovereign ratings assigned by CI, Dagong, DBRS, JCR, Moody’s, R&I, and S&P have 
been obtained from Bloomberg. Hence, everybody with access to Bloomberg can replicate the 
dataset easily. We downloaded the data in late September 2012 in the Princeton University 
Library and updated all information on June 28, 2013.140 
The approach was the following: 
(1) To access the data, we logged on to a Bloomberg terminal and typed “CSDR.” The variables 
selected are Foreign Long Term for CI, FC LT Sovereign Ratings for Dagong, Foreign Currency LT 
Debt for DBRS, JCR, Moody’s and S&P, and Foreign Curr Issuer Rtg for R&I. We followed 
Bloomberg and collected Moody’s foreign currency issuer rating if Moody’s had not assigned 
a foreign-currency debt rating to a country. We took screenshots for each page displaying 
sovereign ratings. 
(2) Using these screenshots, two student assistants entered the letter-ratings into a database. 
The double-coding was used to identify and correct typing errors. 
(3) The three-letter ratings were translated to numerical values according to the 21-point scale 
presented in Appendix 3.B. 
(4) We checked the data for potential errors, for example by examining rating changes by more 
than two steps. Two obvious mistakes in the R&I data from Bloomberg have been corrected 
after e-mail correspondence with the agency’s chief analyst: (i) India received a “BBB+” rating 
on 15 June 1998, and a “BBB” rating on 18 November 1998, 20 December 1999, and 30 January 
2001, (ii) Ukraine received an “BB-” rating on 18 July 1998, a “B” rating on 28 August 1998, 
and a “B-” rating on 28 September 1999. 
  
                                                     
140 The ratings from Feri and Fitch have been obtained from the companies directly. 
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3.6.2 Appendix 3.B: Translation of Sovereign Ratings into Numerical Values  
Table 3.5 – Translation of Sovereign Ratings into Numerical Values  
CI Dagong DBRS Feri Fitch Moody’s JCR R&I S&P Numerical 
scale 
CYP 
(KWT) 
CHN CAN DEU 
USA 
(FRA) 
USA JPN JPN USA 
AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA Aaa AAA AAA AAA 21 
AA+ AA+ AAH AA+ AA+ Aa1 AA+ AA+ AA+ 20 
AA AA AA AA AA Aa2 AA AA AA 19 
AA- AA- AAL AA- AA- Aa3 AA- AA- AA- 18 
A+ A+ AH A+ A+ A1 A+ A+ A+ 17 
A A A A A A2 A A A 16 
A- A- AL A- A- A3 A- A- A- 15 
BBB+ BBB+ BBBH BBB+ BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ 14 
BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB Baa2 BBB BBB BBB 13 
BBB- BBB- BBBL BBB- BBB- Baa3 BBB- BBB- BBB- 12 
BB+ BB+ BBH BB+ BB+ Ba1 BB+ BB+ BB+ 11 
BB BB BB BB BB Ba2 BB BB BB 10 
BB- BB- BBL BB- BB- Ba3 BB- BB- BB- 9 
B+ B+ BH B+ B+ B1 B+ B+ B+ 8 
B B B B B B2 B B B 7 
B- B- BL B- B- B3 B- B- B- 6 
CCC+ CCC+ CCCH CCC+ CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ 5 
CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC Caa2 CCC CCC CCC 4 
CCC- CCC- CCCL CCC- CCC- Caa3 CCC- CCC- CCC- 3 
CC CC CC CC CC Ca CC CC CC 2 
C C C  C C C  C 1 
DDD    DDD  DDD  SD 1 
DD    DD  DD   1 
D D D D D  D D D 1 
    RD  RD   1 
Sources: Rating scales from company webpages, except DBRS and Feri. DBRS and Feri scales were 
obtained from the agencies via personal e-mail communication. 
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3.6.3 Appendix 3.C: Institutional Investor Data 
We use data from Institutional Investor as an alternative assessment of a country’s 
creditworthiness. Regarding the methodology, the company states that “Institutional 
Investor’s Country Credit ratings are based on information provided by senior economists and 
sovereign-risk analysts at leading global banks and money management and securities firms. 
The respondents have graded each country on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing the 
least likelihood of default. We weighted participants' responses according to their institutions’ 
global exposure. Names of respondents are kept strictly confidential.” 
The access to the individual reports is easy for subscribers, or to those with access to a data 
provider like “EBSCOhost.” To access the data, a reader interested in replication or extending 
this study can go to http://www.institutionalinvestor.com, select “Research + Rankings” and 
then “Country Credit”. For most years there exist two reports, one for March and one for 
September. 
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For older ratings, the reports look as follows: 
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For the newer years, the accessible files look like the following example. 
  
In each year, we use the country assessments as of September. Only in three years we had to 
revert to using the assessment as of March as the September value was not available. We then 
import the values into STATA, merge them with country codes and add them to the rest of 
our data. The ratings range is between 0 and 100, with 100 expressing the highest confidence 
on behalf of the experts. 
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3.6.4 Appendix 3.D: Control Variables  
As discussed in the main text, we add an extensive set of control variables to some – but not 
the main – regressions. For this control vector, we build on and combine the sets of explanatory 
variables employed in Cantor and Packer (1996), Archer et al. (2007) and Hill et al. (2010) to 
control for the country-specific economic and political factors that should capture countries’ 
ability and willingness to repay their debts. 
We therefore add the following variables: the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, the annual 
GDP growth rate and its square, the inflation rate, the rents from natural resources (over GDP), 
the log of population, the debt to GDP ratio, the annual change in government debt (over 
GDP), trade (over GDP), the current account balance (over GDP), external debt (over GDP), 
the two variables indicating whether the country defaulted ever or within the previous five 
years, the quality of the rule of law, the degree of democracy (Polity IV), whether an election 
took place, the number of the government’s years in office, the ruling party’s political 
ideology, whether the country was affected by an internal or an external conflict, whether the 
military played an active role in politics, and an indicator for membership in the Eurozone 
(see also Fuchs and Gehring 2017). 
We also include variables that the literature identified as correlates of IMF programs. Some of 
them are part of the above list. The variables we include in addition are the occurrence of a 
systemic banking crisis, the exposure of foreign banks to the country, investment (over GDP), 
and the similarity of voting with the United States in the United Nations General Assembly 
(Copelovitch 2010a; Moser and Sturm 2011; Sturm, Berger, and de Haan 2005). These variables 
are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), the IMF (Laeven and 
Valencia 2012), the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001), the Polity IV Project 
(Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011), and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the Bank 
for International Settlement (BIS), and Bailey et al. (2017). 
Descriptive statistics for all these control variables can be found below, in Appendix 3.E. 
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3.6.5 Appendix 3.E: Variables 
Table 3.6 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Rating S&P 1350 13.58 4.99 1.00 21.00 
Rating Moody's 1142 14.13 4.98 1.00 21.00 
Rating Fitch 1077 14.15 4.98 1.00 21.00 
Rating Non-US 847 15.49 4.31 4.00 21.00 
Institutional Investor 1335 59.09 21.55 10.50 96.40 
IMF program 1350 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00 
IMF agreement 1350 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 
IMF probability 1350 0.21 0.23 0.00 0.89 
GDP/capita (ln) 1349 8.80 1.37 5.69 11.38 
GDP growth 1350 3.89 3.75 -17.95 17.51 
Inflation 1349 0.06 0.07 -0.05 0.95 
Natural resource rents (% GDP) 1350 7.27 12.03 0.00 64.80 
Population (ln) 1350 16.62 1.61 12.96 21.02 
Debt (% GDP) 1349 48.45 30.41 0.00 238.03 
Change in Government Debt (% GDP) 1349 3.16 10.74 -115.42 102.29 
Default history (indicator) 1350 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Default in last 5 years (indicator) 1350 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Trade openness 1339 88.00 57.78 14.93 562.06 
Current Account Balance (% GDP) 1345 -0.26 8.25 -44.21 44.62 
External Debt (% GDP) 1349 21.90 28.31 0.00 189.48 
Law and Order 1350 4.14 1.29 1.00 6.00 
Democracy (Polity IV) 1348 6.16 5.57 -10.00 10.00 
Election 1350 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Honeymoon 1349 5.78 6.80 1.00 46.00 
Left government 1350 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Absence of Internal Conflict (ICRG) 1350 9.72 1.62 3.42 12.00 
Absence of External Conflict (ICRG) 1350 10.36 1.22 5.17 12.00 
Absence of military in politics 1350 4.45 1.44 0.00 6.00 
Euro area (indicator) 1350 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Investment (% GDP) 1347 24.01 6.37 8.27 58.15 
Systemic Banking Crisis 1261 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Foreign bank exposure 1350 217.92 625.79 0.008 6491.18 
UNGA voting 1350 0.20 0.91 -1.66 2.89 
Global GDP growth* 1350 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.08 
*Interacted with IMF Probability in the regressions. 
Note: Based on the sample used for specification 7 in Table 3.3.
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3.6.6 Appendix 3.F: Results of Robustness Regressions Described in Section 3.4.3 
Table 3.7 – Various Robustness Tests 
 
constant 
probability 
excluding large 
repurchases 
excluding 
countries with 
largest 
repurchases 
controlling for 
global trends 
interacted with 
IMF probability 
excluding 
GFC 
excluding 
Eurozone 
IMF 
agreements 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
IMF program/ 
IMF agreement 
0.228 0.338 0.404 0.648 0.368 1.085 2.205 
[0.766] [0.844] [0.774] [0.834] [0.871] [0.907] [1.838] 
 {0.766} {0.689} {0.602} {0.437} {0.673} {0.232} {0.230} 
Country and Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2045 2004 1812 1767 1326 1840 1840 
K-P underid. (LM) 17.412 15.569 12.077 16.114 17.573 15.866 16.453 
K-P underid. (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
K-P weak id. (F) 36.810 36.301 32.441 40.727 34.260 36.002 36.379 
First stage        
IMF probability  3.604 3.933 3.358 3.947 3.415 0.534 
  [0.567] [0.681] [0.616] [0.645] [0.571] [0.295] 
  {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.070} 
IMF probability x 
IMF liquidity 
-0.513 -0.472 -0.514 -0.480 -0.466 -0.455 -0.224 
[0.085] [0.078] [0.090] [0.075] [0.080] [0.076] [0.037] 
 {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} 
Notes: The dependent variable is a country rating from S&P measured on a 21-point scale. Standard errors clustered at the country level are displayed in 
brackets, p-values in curly brackets. The sample contains up to 100 countries and covers the 1992 to 2013 period. Estimations were conducted using the 
xtivreg2 command in Stata. Crisis refers to the years 2009-2013. All regressions include country and year fixed effects, as well as the economic and political 
control variables in t-1. 
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Figure 3.7 – Spurious Correlations between Ratings and IMF Liquidity? 
 
Note: The figure plots the year-specific cross-country averages of S&P ratings for three sets of 
countries with different levels of IMFprobability. For the top line all countries that never received 
an IMF program are included for calculating these averages. For the middle line all countries 
whose IMFprobability is in the bottom half of this variable’s distribution are included. For the 
bottom line all countries whose IMFprobability is in the upper half of this variable’s distribution 
are included. The dashed line plots the IMFliquidity time series for comparison. 
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3.6.7 Appendix 3.G: Event-Based Identification 
Table 3.8 – Regression Results of the Event-based Identification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IMF start (t+11) -4.289*** -0.324* 0.021 0.019 
IMF start (t+10) -4.372*** -0.433** -0.014 -0.014 
IMF start (t+9) -4.335*** -0.457** 0.004 0.010 
IMF start (t+8) -4.338*** -0.449** -0.007 -0.006 
IMF start (t+7) -4.459*** -0.516** -0.055 -0.047 
IMF start (t+6) -4.516*** -0.528** -0.088 -0.079 
IMF start (t+5) -4.565*** -0.576*** -0.092 -0.078 
IMF start (t+4) -4.560*** -0.593*** -0.013 -0.001 
IMF start (t+3) -4.738*** -0.713*** -0.172* -0.166* 
IMF start (t+2) -4.839*** -0.745*** -0.236*** -0.216** 
IMF start (t+1) -5.003*** -0.883*** -0.392*** -0.369*** 
IMF start -5.023*** -0.933*** -0.470*** -0.447*** 
IMF start (t-1) -5.067*** -0.970*** -0.415*** -0.395*** 
IMF start (t-2) -5.102*** -1.023*** -0.275*** -0.268*** 
IMF start (t-3) -5.070*** -1.017*** -0.313*** -0.311*** 
IMF start (t-4) -4.927*** -0.987*** -0.322*** -0.322*** 
IMF start (t-5) -4.945*** -1.007*** -0.260*** -0.255*** 
IMF start (t-6) -4.916*** -1.000*** -0.277*** -0.264*** 
IMF start (t-7) -4.789*** -0.910*** -0.181*** -0.163** 
IMF start (t-8) -4.747*** -0.925*** -0.119 -0.099 
IMF start (t-9) -4.675*** -0.870*** -0.018 0.008 
IMF start (t-10) -4.686*** -0.915*** -0.042 -0.014 
IMF start (t-11) -4.664*** -0.892*** -0.027 -0.004 
Constant 14.084*** 
   
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year FE No No Yes Yes 
Month FE No No No Yes 
Observations 25625 25625 25574 25574 
Adjusted R-squared 0.077 0.917 0.995 0.995 
 
Notes: OLS-FE regressions. The dependent variable is the S&P rating at the end of month t; standard errors not 
shown. Figure 3.5 is based on the regression in column 4. Significance levels * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < 0.01 
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3.6.8 Appendix 3.H: Exploratory Analysis of Statements by Rating Agencies 
In a first step, we conduct an exploratory analysis about the availability of statements on 
Factiva, a commercial database for press articles as well as corporate and business information 
owned by Dow Jones & Company, and the LexisNexis search engine. We searched for articles 
containing statements of rating agencies concerning the up- or downgrading of sovereigns 
based on the (potential) interference of the IMF, using the following search terms 
independently or in combination with each other: IMF, Sovereign, Rating Agency, Rating, 
Development. The statements listed below contain decisions of the three major rating agencies 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch. Overall, the exploratory search process yielded 
statements for 14 different countries (in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe) in the years between 
1999 and 2016. In the following, we list statements starting with decisions from Standard & 
Poor’s, the agency of primary interest, followed by the ones from Moody’s and those from 
Fitch. Countries are ordered alphabetically and ascending in years. 
Based on this exploratory analysis, which makes no claim of being exhaustive, we designed 
our systematic text analysis described in more detail after the following statements. 
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Standard and Poor’s: 
Albania, 2014 
“We revised the outlook to stable because we think that the recently concluded International 
Monetary Fund programme will serve as a policy anchor for fiscal consolidation and support the 
sustainability of Albania’s high government debt,” S&P’s said.” 
Source: Balkan Insights, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/standard-and-poor-s-
upgrade-albania-s-rating 
 
Angola, 2011 
“Standard & Poor's (S&P) has raised Angola's sovereign risk rating to BB-, citing […] the IMF-
recommended fiscal and monetary reforms, which are expected to help mitigate the downside risks 
to over-dependence on the hydrocarbon sector.” 
Source: IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, accessed via Factiva, 08.06.2017 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2016 
“The IMF arrangement will also provide the fiscal space for needed reforms and infrastructure 
investments. […] it will anchor fiscal discipline for the authorities and aim to improve revenue 
collection and the efficiency of government spending.” 
Source: S&P, http://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-
/view/type/HTML/id/1707896 
 
Ghana, 2015 
“We think the new International Monetary Fund (IMF) program [….] will help in addressing fiscal 
and external imbalances […]” 
Source: S&P according to African Markets, https://www.african-markets.com/en/news/west-
africa/ghana/s-p-ghana-b-b-ratings-affirmed-on-new-imf-program-outlook-remains-stable 
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Sri Lanka, 2009 
“[…] (S&P) revised the outlook on its "B" long-term foreign currency rating for Sri Lanka to 
positive yesterday. The move reflects the country's improved external liquidity position owing 
to the new International Monetary Fund (IMF) standby loan agreement of US$2.6 billion. […]. 
The stringent macro-economic consolidation conditions attached to the programme should force the 
government to reduce its fiscal deficit […]. The central bank's commitment under the programme to a 
strict monetary policy including a reduction of advances to the government and a flexible exchange rate 
should also have a positive effect on Sri Lanka's medium-term sovereign risk.” 
Source: IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, accessed via Factiva, 08.06.2017 
 
Ukraine, 2015 
“We view the risk of another default in the next two to three years as diminished due to the 
Ukrainian authorities’ commitment to the reforms set out in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
program,” S&P analysts including Frank Gill said in the report.” 
Source: Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-19/ukraine-rating-
raised-to-b-by-s-p-on-debt-exchange-reform-plan 
 
 
Moody’s: 
Indonesia, 2002 
“Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook […] to positive from stable. The rating agency 
cited Indonesia's recent Paris Club memorandum of understanding and the country's improved 
relationships with other foreign creditors, including the IMF, as bettering the country's liquidity 
position in the coming two years. […] Going forward, upward movement in the ratings will 
depend on, among other things, continued political stability, progress in disposing of IBRA 
assets, fiscal performance, and the ability of the government to continue to meet the targets under its 
IMF program and maintain good relations with foreign creditors generally. Moody's said that 
the positive outlook reflects progress made so far, but that continued reforms were necessary to 
lift Indonesia's economic performance and improve investor confidence.” 
Source: Moody's Investor Service Press Release, accessed via Factiva, 08.06.2017 
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Pakistan, 2015  
“Credit rating agency Moody’s has changed the outlook on Pakistan's sovereign rating to 
Positive from Stable, affirming the rating itself at Caa1 […]. The decision to change the outlook 
was prompted by Pakistan's improving liquidity position, the government's continued efforts 
towards fiscal consolidation, and the steady progress with structural reforms under the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)'s programme. Pakistan's external liquidity position has improved 
substantially in the past 12 months […], supported by the narrowing current-account deficit, 
ongoing disbursements from the IMF, […]. Meanwhile, fiscal discipline has also improved, as 
budget deficit and the government domestic borrowing have been gradually reduced. On the 
structural reforms front, the agency pointed to the country's successful completion of a number of IMF 
structural benchmarks, including those on the fiscal and debt management front and energy sector 
reforms.” 
Source: IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, accessed via Factiva, 08.06.2017 
 
Egypt, 2016 
“Importantly, the rating agency views the staff-level agreement with the IMF which was 
announced on 11 August 2016 as credit-positive, because it will help alleviate some of Egypt's 
external liquidity pressures. Under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Egypt would gain access 
to about $12 billion of external funding through the IMF. The agreement is subject to approval 
by the IMF's Executive Board, which Moody's expects within 6-8 weeks. In Moody's view, the 
agreement reached with the IMF is also important because it will unlock external funding from 
other multilateral and bilateral sources, and support the implementation of fiscal and 
economic reforms. These include the long-delayed introduction of a value-added tax and 
moves to a more flexible exchange rate regime.” 
Source: Moody’s, https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-affirms-Egypts-B3-rating-
outlook-stable--PR_352656 
  
160 
Rwanda, 2016 
“Moody's assigned Rwanda first-time local and foreign-currency issuer ratings of B2 last 
week, and gave the country a Stable outlook. […] In Moody's view, a Stable outlook for 
Rwanda’s sovereign credit is justified given access to USD204 million from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) under the country's 18-month Standard Credit Facility (SCF) arrangement. 
Additionally, it sees the government's policy implementation track record as strong, and 
expects improvements in both its fiscal and external positions to materialise over the medium term.” 
Source: IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, accessed via Factiva, 08.06.2017 
 
Sri Lanka, 2016 
“Therefore, in Moody's view, while the IMF program will alleviate Sri Lanka's external liquidity 
pressures, a more durable improvement in the macro-economic and balance of payments 
pressures will depend on the extent to which authorities can durably reverse the ongoing fiscal 
deterioration while improving Sri Lanka's international competitiveness and attractiveness to 
foreign investors. The study underpins Moody's view that effective policy implementation 
determines the extent to which a country reaps the benefits of an IMF program.“ 
Source: Moody’s, https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Sri-Lankas-benefits-from-its-
IMF-program-depend-on--PR_350166 
 
Ukraine, 2015 
“The decision to upgrade the sovereign rating of Ukraine's government to Caa3 is based on 
the following key drivers: […] 2. Progress in political and economic reform under the auspices of the 
IMF-led programme, supporting a rebalancing of the economy and a meaningful reduction in public 
and external financial deficits.” 
Source: Moody’s, https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-upgrades-Ukraines-sovereign-
rating-to-Caa3-outlook-stable--PR_336283 
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Fitch: 
Benin, 2004 
“Fitch stated that successive IMF reform programmes have led to macro-economic stabilisation, 
including a reduction in the budget deficit and a stabilisation of the government's debt burden through 
tight fiscal policies.” 
Source: World Markets Research Centre Daily Analysis, accessed via Factiva, 08.06.2017 
 
Ghana, 2005 
“Fitch Ratings has upgraded Ghana's long-term foreign and local currency rating […] The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank supported Poverty Reduction Strategy will be 
supported with higher aid funding, which should improve public investment, counteract a 
projected current-account deterioration and improve international reserves.” 
Source: World Markets Research Centre Daily Analysis, accessed via Factiva, 08.06.2017 
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3.6.9 Appendix 3.I: Systematic Analysis of Statements by Rating Agencies 
Based on the exploratory analysis, we selected FACTIVA as the more suitable database for a systematic 
analysis. In particular the feature to select an industry class improved the matching rate between search 
terms and statements significantly. Our final systematic approach was to 
1.) Open the database and login (library access or account is required). 
2.) Issue search queries:  
 “program” within three words distance to “IMF or International Monetary Fund”, Industry: 
Rating Agency, Language: English or German 
 “liquidity” within three words distance to “IMF or International Monetary Fund”, Industry: 
Rating Agency, Language: English or German 
 “reform” within three words distance to “IMF or International Monetary Fund”, Industry: 
Rating Agency, Language: English or German 
 “program,” “IMF or International Monetary Fund” and “rating” within a ten word corridor, 
Industry: All, Language: English or German 
3.) Manually skim over all statements and delete obviously false matches.  
4.) Pool all remaining text in one text file.  
5.) Relevant text is often embedded in larger bodies of text irrelevant to our purpose. Thus, we run 
a python script (see below) that searches the text for “IMF” or “International Monetary Fund” 
and extracts ten lines of text buffer prior and subsequent to a hit. Moreover, we used 
regularities in text structure to extract the according publisher and date. Selecting the size of 
the buffer one faces a trade-off between reducing the volume of text and cutting potentially 
relevant information. A ten line buffer is a conservative choice towards minimizing the loss of 
information.  
6.) Because these are still relatively large chunks of texts, we manually read the remaining texts 
and delete irrelevant relevant parts, and then copy the rest of the text and additional 
information (name of rating agency and country) to excel. If duplicates appear they are deleted. 
This left us with 126 statements. 
 
We then developed the following codebook. Two student assistants were equipped with this codebook 
and went through all statements. In case of deviations in opinion, we always choose the choice biasing 
against our priors, i.e. the effects we hypothesize. Accordingly, in case of deviating opinions statements 
are grouped as “liquidity and reforms” instead of “reforms only” and are grouped as 
“mixed/neutral/negative” based on the more negative of two assessments.  
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Positive-Negative Dimension: 
 
Positive = 1 iff the statement in question includes remarks which indicate that the IMF is seen in a 
positive light by the rating agency. Assumes background knowledge about basic economic processes 
and implications of measures for economy. 
 Indicators for IMF being seen in positive light by rating agency:  
o Citing actual or possible implementation or continuation of an IMF program or measure or 
actual or possible positive developments due to an IMF program or measure as a reason for an 
actual or possible positive rating. Conversely, citing actual or possible lack of implementation 
or discontinuation of an IMF program or measure as a reason for an actual or possible negative 
rating. 
 Example for actual continuation of program as reason for actual positive rating: 
ID5: “The ratings firm cited the country's improved performance under the 
European Union-International Monetary Fund program, falling near-term liquidity 
risk and a better fiscal track record for its upgrade” 
 Example for possible discontinuation of/ compliance problems with program as 
reason for possible negative rating: ID10: “Greece's ratings could also be lowered 
for reasons unrelated to the proposed ESM, if the Greek government's ability to 
comply with the program is undermined by domestic political opposition or 
materially weakens for other reasons, increasing the likelihood of failure to fully 
comply with the IMF/EU program.” 
 Example for possible discontinuation of program as reason for actual negative 
rating: ID69: “The outlook is negative, reflecting what we view as ongoing social 
and political risks associated with deleveraging efforts by Portugal's highly indebted 
private and public sectors, as well as financing uncertainties related to Portugal's 
exit from the EU/IMF program, expected in May 2014. We believe this is 
symptomatic of diminishing political backing for further fiscal and structural 
reforms. The Constitutional Court's deliberations over further fiscal measures could 
coincide with Portugal's planned EU/IMF program exit in the second quarter of 
2014.”  
 Example for actual implementation of program as reason for possible positive 
rating: ID20: “Turkey's economy has been improving and a continuation of the 
current positive trend could lead to higher credit ratings for the country, according 
to the general manager of Moody's Interbank Credit Service's regional Middle East 
office. [...] "We see lower inflation, the fiscal deficit relatively under control and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) targets seem to be achievable," he said. The IMF 
is helping Turkey through a stabilization package that sets macroeconomic targets 
and provides aid in return. [...] In Turkey, programs have been suggested by the IMF 
that are aimed at lifting its economy out of the debt trap and making it into a debt 
paying machine. "The IMF provides financing to Turkey through a macro-economic 
stabilization program. The program calls for the government to take certain actions 
to correct the macro-economic imbalances. These imbalances include various fiscal 
and economic reforms that would lead to improvement in the macro-economic 
conditions.” 
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o Citing actual or possible implementation or continuation of an IMF program or measure as a 
factor for actual or possible positive economic developments in the country. Conversely, citing 
actual or possible lack of implementation or discontinuation of an IMF program or measure as a 
factor for actual or possible negative economic developments the country. 
 Example for actual implementation/ compliance with program as factor for actual 
positive developments: ID121: “As a result of the Chuan's cabinet's decisive policy 
to comply with the IMF program together with the disbursement of US$10.282 
billion as of March 30, 1998 out of the IMF rescue package for US$17.2 billion, the 
present market situation is relatively stable and the market confidence seems to be 
recovered to some extent. (…)" 
o Use of terms such as “successful completion” when talking about an IMF-program or measure. 
 Example: ID79: “Such political developments allowed to strengthen the fiscal 
management stability. The Latvian government also in late 2011 successfully 
completed the international assistance program with the European Commission and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), said the agency.” 
 
Negative = 1 iff the statement in question includes remarks which indicate that the IMF is seen in a 
negative light by the rating agency. Assumes background knowledge about basic economic processes 
and implications of measures for economy 
 Indicators for IMF being seen in negative light by rating agency: 
o Citing application for or implementation of IMF program or measures as a reason for an actual or 
possible downgrading 
 No examples 
o Citing application or implementation of IMF program or measures as a reason to keep outlook at 
negative 
 Example: ID74 “Moody's Investors Service has today confirmed Egypt's B2 
government bond ratings and maintained the rating outlook at negative. […] The 
key drivers of today's confirmation of Egypt's B2 sovereign rating and negative 
outlook are: [...]4) The formal request by the new Egyptian government for IMF 
support” 
 
Positive =0 and Negative =0 iff the statement in question neither includes remarks which indicate that the 
IMF is seen in a positive nor remarks which indicate that the IMF is seen in a negative light by the rating 
agency, or status of remark (positive/negative) is unclear. 
o Purely descriptive statements about IMF without evaluative content 
 Example: ID59 “Pakistan is also moving forward on structural reforms under its 
program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These reforms focus 
primarily on fiscal consolidation, debt management, and addressing structural 
constraints in the energy sector.” 
o Statements with not enough context to conclude status (e.g. because it is unclear if rating has changed in 
any way) 
 Example ID93: ““However, policy adjustments and financial support under an 18-
month IMF program agreed in April 2009 support a stable rating outlook," says 
Byrne.” 
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Liquidity-Reform Dimension: 
 
Liquidity Only = 1 iff the only feature addressed by the rating agency in their remarks in connection with 
the IMF is the liquidity of the country that is being rated (regardless of whether IMF is seen as donor or 
whether there might be consequences for liquidity resulting from e.g. implementation of IMF-
program).141 
 Verbal indicators taken to address liquidity in statements about IMF: 
o “financial assistance” 
o “public wages (lowered)” 
o “program to relieve the financial burden” 
o “(future) disbursements” 
o “financial support from the IMF”, etc. 
 Example: ID8 “(…) In our view, such improvements could be brought about by a positive 
conclusion to the negotiations with Gazprom on Ukraine's gas contract and/or a 
resumption of disbursements under Ukraine's IMF program," the press release reads.” 
 
Reform Only = 1 iff the only feature addressed by the rating agency in their remarks in connection with 
the IMF are reforms for the country that is being rated (regardless of whether IMF is seen as the one 
demanding reforms or the source of further IMF-unrelated reforms)142. 
 Verbal indicators taken to address reform in statements about IMF: 
o “technical assistance” 
o “(…) bolstering its institutional framework” 
o “policy measures” 
o “IMF assisted economic reform program”, etc. 
 Example: ID3 “(…) Moody's report explains that the Solomon Islands successfully 
graduated from an IMF program in 2016, with progress in bolstering its institutional 
framework.” 
 
Reform and Liquidity = 1 iff the rating agency addresses both reforms and liquidity in their remarks in 
connection with the IMF (regardless of whether IMF is seen as the one demanding the reforms or the 
source of further IMF-unrelated reforms and regardless of whether IMF is seen as donor or whether 
there might be consequences for liquidity resulting from e.g. implementation of IMF-program). 
 Example: ID2 “(…) The new IMF credit facilities (an Extended Credit Facility and an 
Extended Fund Facility (ECF/EFF)) approved in November unleashed official lending 
that had been withheld for more than a year. The second driver for stabilizing the outlook 
relates to the adoption of key structural reforms both in connection with the IMF program 
and in technical consultation with the IMF and other multilateral lenders and donors. 
(…)” 
 
                                                     
141 If there are consequences resulting from IMF-related liquidity, then statement is coded as 1. However, if 
statement only addresses circumstances or conditions which led to IMF-measures with regard to liquidity, 
statement is coded as 0. 
142 If there are consequences resulting from IMF-related reforms, then statement is coded as 1. However, if statement 
only addresses circumstances or conditions which led to IMF-measures with regard to reform, statement is coded 
as 0. 
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Liquidity Only= 0, Reform Only = 0 and Reform and Liquidity = 0 iff either the rating agency neither 
addresses liquidity, nor reform nor both in their remarks about the IMF, or status of statement is unclear. 
o Use of the expressions “IMF program” or “IMF agreements” (or synonymous expressions) with no 
further specification with regard to what the program or agreement is about 
 Example: ID13 “(…) Under this scenario, the government can get the International 
Monetary Fund's program "back on track" and there is a strong prospect of positive 
ratings action, said Edward Parker, a senior Fitch analyst.” 
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4 The Economics of the Democratic Deficit: The 
Effect of IMF Programs on Inequality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This paper is single-authored. An earlier version of it is available as Heidelberg University Discussion Paper 617 
(2016). 
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4.1 Introduction 
International organizations (IOs) have become powerful political actors. In the increasingly 
globalized world, these specialized multilateral institutions often can address the growing 
amount of cross-border interdependencies more effectively than states individually (Keohane 
1984). A main point of criticism on IOs, however, is the prominent claim that they suffer from 
a ‘democratic deficit.’ In the literature “[t]he main problem […] of the democratic deficit is 
generally understood to be the relative lack of accountability of IOs to the individuals whose 
lives they directly affect” (Grigorescu 2013, 177). 
The public and academic debate on the democratic deficit has often focused on the extent to 
which decision-making in IOs deviates from idealistic standards of democracy. The concept 
has thus primarily been used in a normative context in order to critique IOs on the basis of 
democratic ideals originally developed for nation-states. The fact that states and IOs cannot 
easily be compared against the same standards posed a problem for positive approaches to 
the topic.143 More recently, however, the academic debate shifted to the question of how IOs 
interact with domestic democracy. Some scholars argue that if IOs are less responsive to voter 
preferences than democratic governments, their interference with domestic decision-making 
processes “involves the risk of making democracies less representative;” others disagree and 
point to the “democracy-enhancing potential” of IOs.144 While this way of approaching the 
topic helps to derive testable hypotheses, both sides of the debate acknowledge that empirical 
evidence illuminating this controversy from a positive perspective remains scarce.145 This 
study explicitly aims to provide such empirical evidence. 
To do so, it focuses on the International Monetary Fund, an IO that is both particularly 
powerful and often criticized for being ‘democratically deficient.’146 In the context of the IMF, 
the idea that IOs may undermine domestic democracy leads to a hypothesis that can be tested 
with the help of statistical techniques that enable inferences based on plausible 
                                                     
143 See Moravcsik (2002) for a critique of the normative debate on the democratic deficit along these lines. See Grant 
and Keohane (2005) on the challenges involved in transferring standards of democratic accountability from nation-
states to IOs. 
144 For the prominent debate in the journal International Organization see Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik (2009) 
and the rejoinders by Gartzke and Naoi (2011) and Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik (2011). 
145 In fact, Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik (2011, 600) state: “we recommend empirical analysis precisely to 
explain variation in democratic consequences of multilateralism.” Similarly, Gartzke and Naoi (2011, 596) note that 
“scholars should focus on how domestic politics and institutions ‘filter’ the distributional effects of policies adopted 
by multilateral organizations.” This paper is a direct response to their calls. 
146 Stone (2002, 1) calls the IMF “the most powerful international institution in history.” Stiglitz (2000, 4) criticizes 
the IMF for “undermin[ing] the democratic process by imposing policies.” 
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counterfactuals. I hypothesize that the influence of the IMF on domestic politics results in 
distributional outcomes that are observably different to the outcomes democracies would 
produce in the absence of such an influence. Potential differences in such distributional 
outcomes can then be interpreted as evidence for the idea that the IMF is capable of 
temporarily undermining the responsiveness of democratic governments to the distributional 
preferences of their citizens. 
The considered outcome is the distribution of income within national societies. As an 
egalitarian distribution of political power is at the core of the concept of democracy, standard 
theoretical concepts suggest that ceteris paribus a more democratic form of governance is 
typically associated with a more equal distribution of economic goods. To the extent that the 
lending activities of the IMF have a distributional dimension, the relative lack of democratic 
control over these by citizens in program countries means that citizens lack mechanisms to 
guide and constrain (re)distributional policies according to their preferences. If the argument 
holds, the effect, I argue, should be driven particularly by democratic program countries: it is 
only in such countries that the interference of a democratically deficient IO in national policy-
making can limit the functioning of existing domestic accountability mechanisms. Recent 
efforts to ‘democratize’ IO decision-making processes, which scholars have noted in recent 
years, could, in turn, mitigate this effect (Grigorescu 2015). 
The most direct channel through which the IMF can affect economic outcomes in member 
countries is conditionality in loan programs. These policy reforms that the IMF demands in 
exchange for its loans aim to resolve balance-of-payment crises and correct underlying 
macroeconomic and structural problems. In practice, this often translates into conditions with 
potentially adverse distributional implications, such as cuts to public spending, labor market 
reforms as well as trade and capital account liberalization (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 
2016; Stone 2008). 
At the core of this study is an empirical setting that makes it possible to construct a plausible 
counterfactual. The key methodological challenge is to address endogeneity since IMF 
programs are not randomly assigned but usually take place in countries with current economic 
crises. Extant approaches addressing this problem either control only for observables or rely 
on problematic instrumental variables (IVs) that are likely to be related to the outcome through 
channels other than IMF programs and thus violate the exclusion restriction. To fill this gap, I 
employ a novel identification strategy for IMF programs inspired by recent methodological 
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innovations (Nunn and Qian 2014; Werker, Ahmed, and Cohen 2009). I exploit exogenous 
variation over time in the IMF’s liquidity and interact this variable with a country’s probability 
of participating in IMF programs, thereby introducing variation across countries. When 
controlling for the levels of the interacted variables, this interaction is, arguably, excludable to 
country-specific variables such as income inequality and thus allows me to determine the 
causal effect of IMF programs. As the exclusion restriction of this new IV holds not only for 
inequality but also for other economic and political outcomes on the country-level, the 
methodological section of this paper can be considered as an attempt to provide the literature 
with a tool to investigate the causal effects of IMF programs at large.147 
Foreshadowing the main results, I find strong statistical evidence in support of the hypotheses. 
IMF programs increase inequality in democracies but have no such effect in non-democracies. 
In democracies, the effect is statistically significant, robust to a battery of additional tests and 
substantial in magnitude. On average, the rise in inequality induced by IMF programs is 
equivalent to a lump-sum transfer of four to eight percent of the poorer half’s mean income 
by each person in the poorer half to each person in the richer half. Examining potential 
channels, I analyze IMF conditions and find evidence suggesting that inequality rises faster in 
program countries that face more extensive conditionality and that austerity and labor market 
reforms are among the policy conditions driving the main result. In light of these results, the 
study adds not only to the democratic deficit controversy and the causal identification of IMF 
program effects, but also to research stressing interaction effects between IMF programs and 
domestic politics (Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012; Nooruddin and Simmons 2006), and to 
the growing literature on the causes behind the continuing trend of rising inequality within 
many countries. 
 
4.2 The Argument 
4.2.1 The IMF and the Democratic Deficit 
While the concept of the democratic deficit relates to IOs in a general sense, the focus of this 
study is on a single organization to make both the theoretical argument and the empirical 
                                                     
147 Since this paper was published as a working paper in 2016, one study adopted its identification strategy (Nelson 
and Wallace 2016), one study applied a closely related strategy (Foster et al. 2018) for studying the IMF’s effects, 
and two studies applied a related strategy based on using the World Bank’s liquidity to studying the World Bank’s 
effects (Dreher et al. 2017; Gehring, Kaplan, and Wong 2018). 
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analysis as concise as possible. The prime reason for the focus on the IMF, and more 
specifically on its loan programs, is that this setting arguably constitutes the easiest case for 
testing the theoretical predictions.148 First, the IMF is sometimes considered “the most 
powerful international institution in history”(Stone 2002, 1). It has vast financial resources at 
its disposal and its loan arrangements can use conditionality as a potent instrument to affect 
economic policies in program countries. The fact that almost all developing countries have 
received IMF programs since the early 1970s additionally underlines the organization’s global 
relevance. Second, in the literature, the concept of the democratic deficit has been repeatedly 
applied to the IMF (Nye 2001; Stiglitz 2000). More generally, IMF decision-making has been 
subject to a considerable amount of research, making the organization one of the best-
researched IOs to date. As I will argue, in this vast literature there is ample evidence indicating 
that the IMF is a prime example of an IO with a democratic deficit.149 
To do so, an analytical framework considering IOs as a set of “nested principal-agent 
relationships” helps to structure the argument (Nielson and Tierney 2003, 250; see also Vaubel 
2006). From this perspective, the IMF is part of a delegation chain starting with voters in 
member countries (the ‘ultimate principal’), running via national governments and their 
representatives in the IMF’s executive board, and ending with the IMF’s staff. The problem for 
the ultimate principal arises because there may be ‘agency slack’ at each point in the delegation 
chain resulting from divergent preferences between agents and their ‘proximate principals’ as 
well as limits to the accountability of the former to the latter. Such limits to accountability 
result primarily from high costs of information and control, and the fact that agents can exploit 
preference heterogeneity among multiple and collective principals to pursue their own 
interests (Hawkins et al. 2006; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Vaubel 2006). The literature on IMF 
decision-making has mainly focused on the ‘agency slack’ that is due to the influence of 
individual major shareholder governments (see also chapter 1) and the IMF’s staff (see also 
chapter 2): 
                                                     
148 Of course this also means that the findings are not automatically valid with regards to other IOs. Future research 
could apply variants of the argument to other IOs. 
149 For reviews of this literature see Dreher and Lang (2016) as well as Steinwand and Stone (2008). 
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Major Shareholders 
Systematic empirical evidence for the disproportional influence that the United States and 
other major shareholders150 exert on IMF decision-making abounds. It has repeatedly been 
shown that countries receive favorable treatment from the Fund if they are politically close or 
(economically) important to the United States. Such countries receive more IMF programs, 
larger loans, less stringent conditionality as well as more positively biased growth forecasts 
and debt sustainability ratings (Broz and Hawes 2006; Copelovitch 2010a; Dreher, Marchesi, 
and Vreeland 2008; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009a, 2015; Gould 2003; Reynaud and 
Vauday 2009; Stone 2008; Thacker 1999; see also chapters 1 and 2). Theoretical models 
accounting for these empirical findings suggest that the governments of major shareholders 
intervene in the IMF’s decision making process when their strategic interests are at stake 
(Stone 2008; 2011; 2013). While these governments also have the largest formal voting power 
in the Executive Board, scholars underline that much of their considerable impact on IMF 
policies runs through so-called “informal governance.” The governments of the countries that 
typically receive IMF programs tend to lack both significant formal voting power and such 
informal channels of influence.151 
In sum, this part of the literature suggest that the IMF is not unaccountable, but that its 
accountability to citizens in typical program countries is limited by the fact that their 
governments’ influence on the organization is weak relative to that of the major shareholders. 
In the words of Grant and Keohane, “[t]he problem is not a lack of accountability as much as 
the fact that the principal lines of accountability run to powerful states” (Grant and Keohane 
2005, 37). While citizens of these powerful countries can have an indirect impact on IMF policy 
via their governments, the influence of citizens whose countries receive IMF programs, and 
are thus directly affected, is relatively limited. 
The Bureaucracy 
Another line of research on IMF decision-making has examined the extent to which the 
particular interests of the bureaucracy are reflected in the Fund’s policy decisions. According 
                                                     
150 The other “G5” countries: United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan (Copelovitch 2010a). 
151 An example is the fact that the vast majority of typical program countries has no individual representatives in 
the Board as minor shareholders are grouped and represented by joint Directors. In the World Bank, the IMF’s 
similarly structured sister organization, countries with a Director have been shown to exploit informal channels to 
receive favorable treatment from the organization (Kaja and Werker 2010). For other examples see Stone (2008). 
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to public choice theory, IMF staff face bureaucratic incentives, making the maximization of 
power, budget, and prestige key determinants of the IMF’s bureaucratic decision-making 
(Vaubel 1986). Several studies have observed such behavior within the IMF and argue that its 
officials are able to push for longer programs, larger loans and more far-reaching 
conditionality than what is economically optimal (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Bird and 
Willett 2004; Copelovitch 2010a; Vaubel 1996; chapter 2) The expansion of the IMF’s 
responsibilities and budget over time through “mission creep” is also linked to the 
bureaucracy’s power and rent-seeking motives (Dreher and Lang 2016; Reinhart and Trebesch 
2015). Other scholars show that the staff’s ideological beliefs and policy preferences are also 
directly reflected in the organization’s policy decisions (Barro and Lee 2005; Chwieroth 2013; 
Nelson 2014). These findings support the view that the ultimate principal’s opportunity to 
hold IMF staff to account is severely limited. The high information asymmetry between the 
two actors resulting from high information costs, language barriers, distance, complexity, and 
limited transparency of IMF decision-making is considered to be a major obstacle for such 
accountability (Vaubel 2006).  
In sum, from the perspective of the ultimate principal there is agency slack at least at two 
points in the IMF’s delegation chain concerning the design of IMF programs. Both major 
shareholder governments and staff are able to influence this design according to their 
particular interests. The former are able to exploit their influence on the organization to further 
their own political and economic interests, while the latter can shape the IMF’s policy decision 
in accordance with their material interests and ideological preferences. Both sets of particular 
interests are in many cases unlikely to align with the preferences of the ultimate principal. The 
‘relative lack of accountability’ of IMF decision making to individuals affected by it thus makes 
it likely that the IMF’s policy output will diverge from the policy preferences of citizens in 
typical program countries. 
I argue that this may have distributional implications. If IMF programs have a distributional 
dimension, the influence of individual major shareholder governments and the bureaucracy 
on their design runs the risk of producing distributional outcomes that do not match the 
distributional preferences of citizens in program countries. The policy areas addressed by 
conditionality in IMF programs that according to economic research are likely to have a 
distributional dimension are thus the focus of the subsequent section. 
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4.2.2 IMF Conditionality and Inequality  
Trade and Capital Account Liberalization 
First, one of the key policy areas that conditionality in IMF programs has often addressed is 
the liberalization of trade and capital flows across borders and the promotion of economic 
globalization more broadly (Woods 2006). A recent analysis shows that since the late 1980s 
more than 70% of IMF arrangements set conditions for the external sector, including the 
liberalization of trade and the capital account (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016). Multiple 
studies find effects of IMF programs on capital account liberalization152 while some – albeit not 
all – find direct positive effects on inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI).153 
These policy conditions are partly reflective of the preferences of the Fund’s major 
shareholders and its staff. The former have an economic interest in the liberalization of trade 
and capital flows in developing countries. IMF programs were often followed by U.S. and 
European firms acquiring and investing in local companies; this was facilitated by IMF 
conditions stipulating liberalization in economies that were previously relatively shielded 
from international markets and foreign capital (Klein 2008; Stiglitz 2002). In addition to many 
anecdotes, quantitative evidence shows that following IMF programs countries receive more 
FDI from the United States (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2010). At the same time such liberalization 
policies also reflect staff preferences. Scholars have, for instance, argued that the IMF’s strong 
emphasis on capital account liberalization was in part driven by bureaucratic competition 
between the IMF, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the 
European Commission. In line with public choice reasoning, each organization aimed to 
control this issue area (Steinwand and Stone 2008). 
The distributional consequences of these various dimensions of economic globalization have 
been subject to a large amount of research. Studies employing composite measures of 
globalization have repeatedly found inequality-increasing effects (Bergh and Nilsson 2010; 
Dreher and Gaston 2008; Lang and Tavares 2018). Recent studies focusing on more narrow 
measures of capital account openness and financial liberalization also find adverse 
distributional consequences of such policies (Bumann and Lensink 2016; Furceri and Loungani 
                                                     
152 See Chwieroth (2007b; 2010) and Mukherjee and Singer (2010) but note that they point to important 
heterogeneities. 
153 See Bauer, Cruz, and Graham (2012) and literature cited therein. 
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2018; de Haan and Sturm 2016; Jaumotte, Lall, and Papageorgiou 2013).154 Likewise, FDI 
inflows have been linked to increasing inequality (Feenstra and Hanson 1996; Jaumotte, Lall, 
and Papageorgiou 2013). The empirical evidence on the effect of trade liberalization on 
inequality is more mixed yet positive for at least some country groups (Goldberg and Pavcnik 
2007). In sum, the ‘globalizing’ effect of IMF programs is a potential channel through which 
income inequality may be affected. 
Public Spending 
Second, many IMF programs include conditions on fiscal issues that aim to limit or reduce 
government expenditure. According to Stone’s analysis of conditionality data for the 1992-
2002 period, “there is almost always some limit on public debt or government spending” 
(Stone 2008, 600). Gould (2006, 90) finds that in the 1983-1990 and the 1991-2000 period 91 
percent and 100 percent respectively of IMF programs included fiscal targets. Hence, IMF 
programs are often considered tantamount to austerity. 
One reason why IMF programs limit public spending is that they usually put a strong focus 
on the timely repayment of debt to creditors. Gould (2003, 2006) documents that many IMF 
programs include “bank-friendly conditions” that give priority to the repayment of principal 
and interest to commercial banks. Building on this finding, research has repeatedly supported 
the notion that governments of major shareholders use their influence on the institution to 
prevent financial losses for creditors from their country (Broz and Hawes 2006; Copelovitch 
2010a; 2010b). While major Fund shareholders face few incentives to push for increasing public 
spending, conditions that prioritize debt repayment limit the amount of resources available 
for other public expenses. Other scholars link the policy preferences expressed in conditions 
that stipulate smaller governments (and liberalization) to the beliefs and political views of the 
IMF bureaucracy and its tendency to favor market-liberal ideas over government intervention 
in market processes and outcomes. They argue that its staff’s educational background 
promotes confidence in market-oriented policies and conclude that “the institution’s 
ideational culture is dominated by a set of ‘neoliberal’ economic beliefs” (Barnett and 
Finnemore 1999; Nelson 2014, 304; Woods 2006). Quantitative studies show that the share of 
“neoliberal” bureaucrats within the organization is positively associated with increases of 
                                                     
154 Note, however, that there is no consensus in this literature and that important heterogeneities exist. De Haan 
and Sturm (2016) provide a comprehensive literature review. 
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capital account openness in IMF program countries (Chwieroth 2007a; 2007b; 2010)  and that 
IMF program design depends on the degree to which IMF staff and program country officials 
share “neoliberal” beliefs (Nelson 2014).  
The resulting effects of IMF programs on public spending have been subject to multiple 
studies. Nooruddin and Simmons (2006) find a significantly negative effect on social spending 
in democracies. While two studies by IMF staff find a positive effect, Stubbs, Kentikelenis, and 
King could not replicate this using the same data (Clements, Gupta, and Nozaki 2013; IMF 
2003; Stubbs, Kentikelenis, and King 2016). Instead, the latter find positive effects on health 
expenditure only in Sub-Saharan Africa, and negative effects in other regions. Other studies 
provide support for the hypothesis that IMF programs reduce public spending by 
documenting negative effects on public wages (Nooruddin and Vreeland 2010; Rickard and 
Caraway 2018).  
The reduction of government expenditure can increase inequality in net incomes either via 
reducing the amount of redistribution through progressive taxes and transfers or it can 
directly affect the distribution of gross income, i.e., income before taxes and transfers. The 
literature suggests that decreasing public spending on education can result in rising wage 
inequality to the extent that the level or the equality of educational attainment are adversely 
affected by it (Goldin and Katz 2010; De Gregorio and Lee 2002). Furthermore, the frequently 
included conditions demanding pension cuts or freezes are a potential channel. More 
generally, the fact that IMF programs restrict government expenditure during periods of 
economic liberalization limits the opportunities to ‘embed liberalism.’ As IMF conditionality 
typically combines liberalization and austerity, vulnerable segments of society, which usually 
benefit from insurance policies that governments often implement in order to provide 
protection against economic volatilities and risks resulting from increasing openness 
(“embedded liberalism”), may lack these “compensations” under IMF programs (see Cameron 
1978; Rodrik 1998; Ruggie 1982; Walter 2010). 
Labor Market Reforms 
A third policy area with potentially distributional implications often covered by IMF 
conditionality is the labor market. Depending on the definition of labor market policies such 
conditions can include, but are not limited to, reductions in minimum wage levels, dismissals 
in the public sector, pension cuts, the legalization of nonpermanent labor, and the privatization 
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of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). According to one count, at least a quarter of IMF programs 
launched since 1987 have been found to include labor market conditions (Caraway, Rickard, 
and Anner 2012).155 More than half include conditions that stipulate reforms of SOEs 
(Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016). 
Again, the preference for such policies can be linked to the interests of major shareholder 
governments and the bureaucracy. Coupled with the liberalization policies discussed above, 
privatizations during IMF programs, on the one hand, often resulted in firms from the United 
States and Europe winning the bids for privatized SOEs. Labor market deregulations in 
program countries also benefitted investors from major Fund shareholder countries.156 On the 
other hand, the gradual expansion of the scope of IMF conditionality into such areas as labor 
market policies has often been linked to the bureaucratic incentive to expand the 
organization’s mission: While initially not part of the IMF’s repertoire, conditions that address 
the details of structural policies in program countries (“microconditionality”) became 
increasingly frequent. Many scholars argue that this was driven by staff aiming to increase 
their power, responsibilities, and budget (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Dreher and Lang 2016; 
Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016; Polak 1991; Reinhart and Trebesch 2015).  
Caraway, Rickard, and Anner (2012) argue that “[r]eforms of this nature are costly for workers 
in the short to medium term.” The results of Vreeland (2002) indirectly support this by 
showing that IMF programs are associated with declines in the income share of labor 
manufacturing. Blanton, Blanton, and Peksen (2015) find IMF programs to reduce collective 
labor rights. Nooruddin and Vreeland (2010) find negative effects on public employment; 
Rickard and Caraway (2018) find IMF conditions targeting the public sector to reduce the 
public wage bill. Such cuts could both increase and reduce wage inequality, depending on the 
country-specific relation between public wages and median income. Other IMF labor 
conditions can adversely affect the distribution of gross income as minimum wage reductions 
and weaker collective labor rights have been found to increase wage inequality (Autor, 
Manning, and Smith 2016; Kerrissey 2015; Koeniger, Leonardi, and Nunziata 2007). 
Furthermore they can, at least in the short to medium term, increase unemployment resulting 
from layoffs in the public sector and in SOEs. 
                                                     
155 Note that Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King (2016, 14) apply a broader definition and report that “about 50% or 
more of lending programmes have carried at least one labour-related condition over the 1994-2007 period.” 
156 For anecdotal evidence see Klein (2007) and Stiglitz (2002). 
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In sum, the considerations up to this point suggest a first testable hypothesis: 
H1: IMF programs increase income inequality. 
 
4.2.3 IMF Programs and Domestic Democracy 
Testing H1, however, is only the first step of the empirical exercise. In order to shed more light 
on the theoretical question this paper poses, the interaction of IMF programs with democracy 
needs to be addressed.  
The standard theories in the literature on democracy and inequality suggest that democratic 
governments, responding to voter preferences, promote a more egalitarian distribution of 
income across society than non-democratic governments.157 For instance, Meltzer and 
Richard’s (1981) prominent model suggests that the decisive voters earn less than mean income 
and therefore have a preference for redistribution from the rich to the poor and, thus, lower 
inequality. Here as well as in subsequent research, broadened access to political power is thus 
closely linked to broadened access to economic resources (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Boix 
2003). While not all empirical studies find the effect the vast majority of the theoretical 
literature suggests, there is substantial empirical support for these arguments.158  
Going beyond this basic model and turning to the more specific policy areas discussed above, 
there is a well-established empirical link between democracy and the size of the government 
(Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Boix 2001; Jensen and Skaaning 2015). Democracies 
provide more public goods and spend more on education, health and social security. A 
prominent theoretical explanation for this finding is based on the idea of the “political 
survival” of leaders, according to which democratic leaders tend to provide public goods 
because they are accountable to a larger base of supporters, i.e., voters (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. 2003). The evidence furthermore suggests that democracies increase public spending 
particularly when they liberalize. Democracies that open up their economies tend to combine 
such liberalization policies with more social spending, a larger public sector and other 
compensation measures and policies that protect the vulnerable from the risks associated with 
                                                     
157 For a recent literature review see Acemoglu et al. (2015) 
158 Empirical support for the link between democracy and lower inequality is reported in, e.g., Blaydes and Kayser 
(2011), Reuveny and Li (2003), Rodrik (1999). Statistically insignificant or non-robust results for this relationship 
are, e.g., reported in Acemoglu et al. (2015), Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004), Scheve and Stasavage (2012). 
Dorsch and Maarek (2018) find an inequality-increasing effect when egalitarian (often communist) autocracies 
democratize and an inequality-reducing effect of democracy elsewhere. 
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higher exposure to global markets. Such policies include, for instance, public spending 
promoting human capital formation as well as social insurance against risks resulting from 
increased labor market volatilities like unemployment benefits (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 
2005). While democracies do not shy away from liberalizing trade and capital flows because 
of potentially adverse distributional consequences – if anything they tend to be more 
liberalized (Milner and Mukherjee 2009) – they usually ‘embed’ such liberalism. Adsera and 
Boix (2002) find democracy to be the key intervening variable explaining why some countries 
combine liberalization policies with larger public sectors while others do not (see also Rodrik 
1998). Similarly, Rudra and Haggard (2005) find that autocratic governments spend less on 
welfare when they globalize than their democratic counterparts. Voters appear to prefer 
external liberalization to be ‘embedded’ in the provision of social insurance against the 
(distributional) risks resulting from it. Democratic institutions ensure that these preferences 
translate into policy. 
These considerations suggest that democracies tend to pick different policies with 
distributional implications than what many IMF programs stipulate. Implementing typical 
IMF conditions concerning the public sector, social spending, compensation-for-liberalization 
policies and certain labor market policies are likely to mean a departure from a democracy’s 
policy path in the absence of an IMF program. Hence, an inequality-increasing effect of an IMF 
program in a democracy relative to the counterfactual of the same democracy not being under 
a program would mean that IMF programs reduce the democracy’s responsiveness to voter 
preferences. Such reduced responsiveness can result from rising costs for domestic political 
actors, e.g., parliaments, to block reforms under a program. The IMF itself states that its 
conditionality helps “strengthen […] the hand of reformers”(IMF 2007, 8). In other words, IMF 
programs ceteris paribus can tip the balance within the domestic political process in favor of 
those who support distributional policies closer to the IMF’s preferences. Similarly, democratic 
leaders can also use the IMF as a scapegoat and “dilute accountability by blaming IMF 
conditionality” for reforms that are unpopular with the electorate (Smith and Vreeland 2006). 
For the empirical test of whether IMF programs increase inequality by limiting democratic 
responsiveness to voter preferences I propose a hypothesis that exploits the difference in 
counterfactuals when democratic and non-democratic countries are considered. In the 
democratic sample, the “non-treated” counterfactual is a democracy with the same 
characteristics as the program country. The only difference is the exogenously determined 
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presence of an IMF program that may undermine the democracy’s responsiveness to the 
distributional preferences of its citizens. In the nondemocratic sample, the counterfactual is a 
political system in which the government’s responsiveness to voter preferences is already 
weak. If the reduction of democratic responsiveness is indeed behind the increase in 
inequality, then the potentially inequality-increasing effect should mainly be driven by the 
democratic sample. In non-democracies the democratic tendency towards a more egalitarian 
distribution of income cannot be undermined. While the discussed equalizing policies and 
institutions that are typically stronger in democracies can be reversed under IMF programs in 
democracies, this is not the case in non-democracies. On average, these considerations suggest 
that IMF programs will increase inequality particularly when the counterfactual is a 
democracy without IMF intervention.  
H2: The inequality-increasing effect of IMF programs is particularly driven by democratic 
program countries. 
4.2.4 Heterogeneous Effects and Channels 
To further investigate the ‘democratic deficit’ as a mechanism, I examine additional 
heterogeneous effects. Decision-making processes of the IMF have changed over time. 
Confronted with pressures for legitimization, international organizations have reacted by 
engaging in efforts to enhance accountability mechanisms with citizens (Grigorescu 2015). If 
the IMF’s relative lack of accountability to affected citizens is behind the inequality-increasing 
effect of its loan programs, then improvements to its accountability should mitigate this effect. 
I use two proxies to quantify such variation in IMF accountability. The first is an index 
developed by Tallberg and co-authors measuring the degree to which non-governmental 
transnational actors (TNAs) have access to IO decision-making processes (Tallberg et al. 2014). 
As it has often been argued that “[n]on-governmental organizations can democratize 
[international governmental organizations] by expanding participation and increasing 
accountability,” (Vabulas 2013, 194) their access is a potential mechanism that could increase 
the IMF’s responsiveness to the preferences of citizens in IMF program countries and thereby 
its sensitivity to adverse distributional effects. 
For the second measure I exploit the difference in IMF lending facilities under which programs 
are designed. In 1999, the Fund established the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
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(PRGF).159 According to the IMF, “foremost among them [the distinctive features of the new 
facility] is broad public participation and increased national ownership” (IMF 2001). In 
combination with the explicit focus on poverty reduction, the aims to let country authorities 
lead the process and involve civil society in the program design are an attempt to avoid 
extensive interference in domestic political systems and strengthen accountability. As PRGF 
programs thus aim to override the domestic democratic system to a lesser extent, the 
theoretical considerations suggest that their inequality-increasing effects should be smaller.160 
To explore the channels underlying the main effects I provide suggestive evidence on the 
correlation between IMF conditions and subsequent changes in inequality in the Appendix. 
Not all IMF programs are the same. Research has repeatedly highlighted important differences 
in the design of conditionality and challenged the claim that the IMF applies identical ‘cookie-
cutter’ programs (Stone 2008). To empirically investigate conditionality as a mechanism I run 
two different tests. The first examines whether the scope of conditionality makes a difference. 
Given the above discussion a natural expectation is that the inequality-increasing effect 
increases with the scope of conditionality. The second disaggregates conditions by policy area 
and tests which of these are likely mechanisms. The analysis above suggests that various 
typical IMF policy conditions – in particular those addressing liberalization, public spending 
and the labor market – could be potential channels for distributional effects. 
4.3 Method and Data 
4.3.1 Endogeneity 
There is no lack of anecdotal evidence linking IMF programs to rising inequality. Many Latin 
American, East Asian, and former Soviet countries experienced a divergence in income levels 
while IMF programs were in place (Klein 2008; Peet 2009; Stiglitz 2002). An illustrative 
example is the case of Argentina, which was under one of the economically largest and longest 
IMF programs of all time. Democratic since 1983, Argentina received financial assistance from 
the Fund for almost the entire 1983–2004 period. Over the course of these two decades the 
country’s Gini coefficient of net income rose from 38 to 45. Especially during the mass protests 
                                                     
159 In 2010, the “Extended Credit Facility” replaced the PRGF. 
160 I admit that both measures are imperfect proxies for a phenomenon that is difficult to quantify. It is controversial 
whether TNAs indeed ‘democratize’ IOs, and PRGF programs exhibit several additional distinctive features. While 
these results should thus be taken with a grain of salt, it is reassuring that both results, based on two proxies with 
different shortcomings, point in the same direction. 
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at the turn of the millennium many blamed this trend, as well as widespread poverty and 
unemployment, on reforms with origins in IMF conditions implemented by Carlos Menem’s 
government. The IMF had demanded and supported policies such as fiscal austerity that 
resulted in wage and pension cuts, the privatization of state-owned enterprises leading to 
mass layoffs, and during the 1998-2002 recession opposed social programs for the poor and 
government plans such as increasing teachers’ salaries (Klein 2008; Paddock 2002; Rodrik 
2003). When the program ended after Argentina’s last purchase of IMF resources in 2004, 
inequality started to decline and in 2013 the country’s Gini coefficient reached 38 again. 
While it is plausible that IMF programs contributed to rising inequality in Argentina, other 
simultaneous processes may explain this development just as well: The same period was also 
characterized by years of hyperinflation, economic crises, and high levels of debt – which, in 
turn, had made continued participation in IMF programs more likely in the first place. It is 
furthermore not excludable that Menem’s government would have implemented similar free-
market liberal reforms by itself in the absence of IMF influence and that the trend of decreasing 
inequality after 2004 is linked to the more egalitarian policies under Néstor and Cristina 
Kirchner’s governments rather than to the end of the IMF programs. 
The case of Argentina illustrates that the central challenge for any study investigating the 
causal effects of IMF programs on economic outcomes is nonrandom selection (Przeworkski 
and Vreeland 2000). The national economic and political conditions that drive selection into 
IMF programs are likely related to determinants of inequality and other economic and political 
outcomes. As IMF programs and inequality could thus be correlated in the absence of a causal 
effect, regression coefficients could be severely biased without a valid identification strategy. 
Problematically, not all of the potentially confounding variables are observable. While many 
key variables that explain IMF program participation161 suffer from missing data, the more 
limiting problem is that many relevant conditions are intrinsically difficult, if not impossible, 
to measure. Vreeland lists “political will” as an example (Vreeland 2002). Transferred to the 
focus of this study, this argument suggests that governments that favor IMF programs, e.g., 
due to a political preference for austerity policies, might also be more likely to implement 
policies leading to more inequality, irrespective of the presence of an IMF program. The lack 
of measurement of such variables as “political will” would thus bias the coefficient.  
                                                     
161 For an overview see Steinwand and Stone (2008); Berger, de Haan, and Sturm (2005); Moser and Sturm (2011). 
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In theory, there is a straightforward solution to this endogeneity problem, but to applied 
quantitative research on the IMF it presents a difficulty: “Instrumental variables can address 
this problem, but they are not easy to come by, especially since so much of what drives 
selection into IMF programs also influences IMF program effects” (Vreeland 2007, 82). So far 
one strand of this research has, for this reason, either limited itself to correct for selection-on-
observables (e.g., Doyle 2012; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer 2010), or additionally controlled for 
selection-on-unobservables by means of selection models without exclusion restrictions (e.g., 
Mukherjee and Singer 2010; Nooruddin and Simmons 2006; Przeworkski and Vreeland 2000). 
The former do not control for unobserved confounders while the latter have to make strong 
assumptions on the joint distribution of the error term and the correct specification of the 
participation equation.162 
The other strand of research has incorporated exclusion restrictions in their empirical models 
(e.g., Atoyan and Conway 2006; Barro and Lee 2005; Dreher and Gassebner 2012). In these 
studies the share of votes cast in line with the United States or other G7 countries in the UNGA 
has become the ‘standard instrument’ for IMF programs.163 However, as the other IVs used in 
this literature,164 this variable is not clearly excludable to macroeconomic outcomes. It rests on 
the assumption that the only channel through which a country’s UNGA voting behavior is 
linked to macroeconomic outcomes in the same country is the presence of an IMF program. 
But it is likely that a government’s foreign policy preferences articulated in UNGA voting are 
related to a government’s preferences in domestic policy, which in turn are clearly linked to 
macroeconomic outcomes.165 To paraphrase Moravcsik (1997), I argue that identification 
strategies should ‘take preferences seriously;’ especially since the authors of the most widely 
used UNGA voting data suggest that their data “can be interpreted as states’ positions towards 
                                                     
162 For further details regarding problems related to selection models without exclusion restrictions see Puhani 
(2000). 
163 Barro and Lee (2005) first proposed this IV. 
164 Alternatively, economic variables such as GDP, budget balance, inflation (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2010), growth, 
reserves (Bauer, Cruz, and Graham 2012), exchange rates (Clements, Gupta, and Nozaki 2013), trade with G5 
countries (Barro and Lee 2005), have been used. But the assumption that these country-specific macroeconomic 
variables do not affect the respective dependent country-specific macroeconomic variable of interest other than 
through the presence of an IMF program is not plausible as more direct channels within the country’s economy 
cannot be excluded. The country’s share of IMF staff also used by Barro and Lee is not excludable to the country’s 
economic and political power, its views on the IMF, and – as IMF staff was found to be mainly recruited from U.S. 
universities and to lean towards certain political views – to the program country’s ideological and political 
orientation. A proposed alternative is the number of countries under an IMF program or the number of past IMF 
program years (Oberdabernig 2013; Atoyan and Conway 2006). However the former is correlated with global 
economic crises, while the latter captures country-specific characteristics such as weak economic governance. 
165 For a theory along these lines, see Moravcsik (1997); for a recent empirical confirmation, see Mattes et al. (2015). 
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the U.S.-led liberal order” (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). The assumption that this 
political position is unrelated to domestic policies and the state of the domestic economy is not 
plausible. Hence, a new instrument is needed.166 
4.3.2 Identification Strategy 
My identification strategy exploits exogenous variation in the IMF’s liquidity of financial 
resources. I apply a recent methodological innovation (Nunn and Qian 2014; Werker, Ahmed, 
and Cohen 2009) and interact this time-variant variable with a country-variant variable 
indicating the country’s probability of receiving an IMF program. The resulting interaction 
term varies over time and across countries and, after controlling for the levels of the two 
variables, introduces exogenous variation to the extent that the isolated interaction effect is 
excludable from alternative channels. Thus, even if there was endogeneity between the time-
variant level variable and the outcome, the exclusion restriction would only be violated if the 
unobserved variables driving this endogeneity were affecting inequality differently in 
countries with different levels of the probability to be under an IMF program (for econometric 
details see Bun and Harrison 2018; Esarey 2015; Nizalova and Murtazashvili 2016). The 
identifying assumption that such a relationship does not exist resembles the identifying 
assumption of a difference-in-differences design (Dreher and Langlotz 2017). 
Specifically, I use the natural logarithm of the IMF’s liquidity ratio (LQRt) – defined as the 
amount of liquid IMF resources divided by its liquid liabilities167 – and interact it with the 
fraction of years country i has been under an IMF program between 1973 and year t (IMFprobit). 
 
 
 
In the first-stage equation IMFprogramit is regressed on this interaction term and on all second-
stage variables. While year fixed effects control for the level effect of the liquidity ratio, I also 
control for IMFprobit in both stages.168 The identification can therefore be interpreted as a 
                                                     
166 Of the existing studies on the IMF’s distributional effects Pastor (1987) conducts before-and-after comparisons, 
Garuda (2000) controls only for selection-on-observables, Vreeland (2002) addresses selection-on-unobservables 
without an exclusion restriction, and Oberdabernig (2013) relies on the excludability of UNGA voting. Foster et al. 
(2018), who cite an earlier version of this paper, apply an IV strategy that builds on the IV introduced in this paper. 
167 For further details on this variable and on all others see Appendix A. 
168 Note that Nunn and Qian (2014) use a time-invariant probability measure in their baseline and a time-variant 
measure in a robustness test, which produces very similar results. I use the time-variant measure in the baseline as 
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difference-in-difference approach: After controlling for the levels, the IV’s coefficient indicates 
how the IMF’s liquidity affects the likelihood of receiving an IMF program in year t differently 
in countries with different participation probabilities. 
I expect this coefficient to be negative for the following reason: Multiple studies show that 
“recidivism” is a prime determinant of IMF programs. Countries that have a history of 
frequently participating in IMF programs are much more likely to do so again. The IMF, thus, 
has a regular clientele that is routinely supplied (Bird, Hussain, and Joyce 2004). In years, 
however, in which the Fund has abundant liquid resources, it has the means to extend its 
clientele. The organizational incentive to do so is an important explanation of the IMF’s 
expansion since the 1970s (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Arguably, the higher its liquidity, the 
more generous the Fund will be and the more actively it will look for new clients.169 In times 
of high liquidity ratios, the Fund is thus more likely to grant loans to countries that would 
otherwise be less likely to receive IMF programs. This would be captured by a negative 
coefficient. 
While the instrument’s relevance can and will be tested empirically, its excludability is 
untestable and must be theoretically defended. Figure 4.1 shows the variation of the natural 
logarithm of LQR over time. The main sources of this variation are the IMF’s Quota Reviews.170 
The Articles of Agreement (Article III, Section 2a) require the Board of Governors to review 
the amount of financial resources members commit to the Fund (“quotas”) once every five 
years. In the observation period these reviews led to quota increases in all but three cases. In 
Figure 4.1 these jumps can be seen, for instance, in the late 1970s, early 1980s and late 1990s 
when member countries executed their respective payments of the 7th, 8th, and 11th General 
Review of Quotas. As the timings of the quota reviews follow the mentioned institutional rule 
                                                     
this increases the IV’s relevance and avoids using future events to predict present realizations, but show in 
robustness tests that my results also hold with the time-invariant measure. 
169 This is an argument that my conversations with IMF staff in November 2017 support. Several IMF staff suggested 
that the IMF’s re-designing and re-labelling of its lending facilities can be considered as a reaction to low demand 
for its programs and an attempt to make them more attractive for potential program countries. They supported the 
view that there is an incentive for the bureaucracy to ensure the IMF’s global relevance by promoting participation 
in its loan programs, and that this incentive is particularly strong when the IMF’s financial resources are relatively 
little used, which a high liquidity ratio indicates. 
170 A second source of variation is the fact that in some years repayments of individual, extraordinarily large loans 
affect liquidity liabilities. (In addition, minor changes in liquid liabilities can result from changes in IMF borrowing.) 
In the robustness section I show that this is unproblematic and that the results hold when this variation is excluded. 
A last source of variation is the fact that liquid resources additionally vary when the IMF adjusts the basket of 
currencies it considers “usable.” The usability status, however, is highly stable over time, changes mostly for small 
economies and therefore has a very minor effect on the amount of liquid resources. 
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and are thus predetermined, it is very unlikely that they are linked to intra-state income 
inequality through unobserved channels. Even if this was the case, the correlation between 
such unobserved variables and the outcome would bias the result only if it was dependent on 
a country’s probability of participating in IMF programs. In other words, a sceptic would have 
to find unobserved variables that affect the impact of the IMF’s liquidity ratio on income 
inequality conditional on how regularly the country has received IMF programs in the past – 
after controlling for country and year fixed effects and a large vector of control variables. It is 
unlikely that such variables exist.171 
Figure 4.1 – The IMF’s Liquidity Ratio  
 
4.3.3 Econometric Model and Data  
Armed with this excludable instrument, I estimate 2SLS dynamic panel regressions to identify 
the causal effect of IMF programs on income inequality: 
 
 
 
The annual time-series cross-sectional data cover the 1973-2013 period and a maximum of 155 
countries. As not all data are available for all countries and years, the panel is unbalanced and 
the number of observations depends on the explanatory variables used.  
                                                     
171 In addition, several robustness tests designed to challenge the identifying assumption fail to produce different 
results. See below and Appendix 4.G. 
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The dependent variable Gini is the Gini-coefficient of net income taken from the Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt 2016). The SWIID combines source data from 
multiple inequality databases and, in contrast to other panel datasets like All The Ginis (ATG) 
or the World Income Inequality Database, standardizes them to make the data comparable 
across countries and over time. Because of this standardization and its comprehensive 
coverage the SWIID is widely used in related research based on panel data (Acemoglu et al. 
2015; Dorsch and Maarek 2018; Oberdabernig 2013). I follow this literature in the choice of this 
database, but also run robustness tests with ATG data. 
The explanatory variable of interest, IMFprogram, is an indicator that equals 1 if country i was 
under an IMF program for at least five months in year t (Dreher 2006b, updated). In the 
baseline I follow the related literature on the effects of IMF programs and lag the variable by 
one year (Nooruddin and Simmons 2006). To look at longer-term effects I introduce different 
lags in additional regressions. It may take time for the effect to operate because of lagged 
consequences of economic reforms and it is relevant to see whether and when potential 
changes in inequality are undone. 
Furthermore, to account for unobserved country-specific characteristics and time-specific 
trends, I include country and year fixed effects (ξ and ρ). As current levels of inequality are 
heavily dependent on previous levels it is standard to also include the lagged dependent 
variable (LDV).172 In addition, I include a lagged vector of covariates consisting of two variable 
sets.173 The first comprises the standard covariates of inequality: GDP per Capita and its square 
to control for the country’s level of economic development including a potential non-linear 
relationship à la Kuznets (Kuznets 1955) as well as Education measured by average years of 
schooling, Trade (% GDP), Life Expectancy and Regime Type. The second set of covariates 
includes variables that the literature identified as key determinants of IMF programs: Current 
Account Balance (% GDP), Investments (% GDP), GDP Growth, UNGA Voting, and an indicator 
variable for the presence of a systemic Banking Crisis. I additionally interact the global total of 
both Banking Crises and Global GDP Growth with IMFprob to enhance the exclusion restriction’s 
plausibility by demonstrating that global economic developments do not influence both the 
                                                     
172 Acemoglu et al. 2015. As in all regressions T > 20, a potential Nickell bias (Nickell 1981) is negligible, see Beck 
and Katz (2009). A Fisher-type augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test rejects the hypothesis that Gini has a unit 
root. 
173 For descriptive statistics, definitions and sources see Appendix 4.A. 
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IMF’s liquidity ratio and inequality differently in countries with different levels of IMF 
participation probabilities.174 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 First-Stage Estimates 
I begin by testing the relevance of the instrument. Table 4.1 shows the first-stage estimates of 
the 2SLS regressions with different sets of control variables, whose coefficients are omitted to 
reduce clutter (see Appendix 4.B for the full table). The results demonstrate that the instrument 
is relevant. They show a highly significant, negative conditional correlation between the IV 
and the presence of an IMF program. The Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic rejects the null 
hypothesis that the equation is underidentified at the 0.1 percent level. The cluster-robust 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics easily surpass conventional levels of weak identification tests, 
such as Staiger and Stock’s (1997) threshold of ten as well as Stock and Yogo’s (2005) most 
conservative critical value of 16.38, which tolerates a maximum 2SLS size distortion of 10 
percent. 
Table 4.1 – First Stage Regressions 
 
These results are robust across different specifications. In column 1, only the levels of the 
interaction term, the LDV (Ginit-1), as well as country and year fixed effects are controlled for. 
Under the assumption that the IV is excludable conditional on these variables, this 
                                                     
174 This is analogous to Nunn and Qian’s (2014: 1643-5) choice of covariates. 
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specification without additional control variables already yields an unbiased coefficient of 
interest in the second stage. Nevertheless, in columns 2 and 3 I successively add the two sets 
of covariates described above. None of them significantly alters the relevant coefficient, its 
significance, the F-statistic or the underidentification test statistics. 
As previous studies found, countries that participated in IMF programs in the past are 
significantly more likely to participate in such programs in the present (“recidivism”) (Bird, 
Hussain, and Joyce 2004). A new finding, however, is that this effect depends on the Fund’s 
liquidity. As the negative sign of the interaction term’s coefficient indicates and Figure 4.2 
illustrates, in years with higher liquidity ratios the probability of past IMF participation is a 
weaker, but still significant, predictor of IMF programs. The Fund is, thus, not only more 
generous in years with higher liquidity ratios175 but in these years it also implements more 
programs for countries beyond its more regular clientele. In sum, the IV is plausibly excludable 
to inequality levels in specific countries, proves to be highly relevant, and allows an intuitive 
interpretation of its linkage with the presence of IMF programs. 
Figure 4.2 – Visualized Effect of the IV  
 
4.4.2 Main Results 
Table 4.2 presents the results of the second stage of the 2SLS regressions. Specifications 1-3 
correspond to those reported in Table 4.1.176 In line with H1, the results show that IMF 
programs significantly increase income inequality. Across all specifications the coefficient is 
                                                     
175 The liquidity ratio – which is not included in the regressions because of perfect multicollinearity with year fixed 
effects – is positively correlated with the number of countries under IMF programs in a given year (r = .3). 
176 See Appendix 4.D for the full table and an interpretation of all other coefficients. 
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statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level (1 percent in specification 2) and 
substantial in size. Having an IMF program in year t on average increases the country’s Gini 
coefficient of net income in year t+1 by a little more than one point. This result is robust both 
to different sets of control variables and to different samples, which vary because of missing 
data for the added controls. 
To assess the magnitude of the effect, note that it is equivalent to an increase in the Gini 
coefficient by at least 34 percent and up to 51 percent of a within-country standard deviation. 
As inequality is slow to change, increases of this size within one year are rare events (8.6 
percent of all observations in the sample). While this indicates a substantial effect size, 
differences in the Gini coefficient are difficult to interpret directly. Therefore, I elaborate on a 
method proposed by Blackburn (1989) to quantify the size of the effect in a more intuitive way. 
According to Blackburn’s metric, an increase in the Gini by 1.1 (1.3) points is equivalent to a 
lump-sum transfer of 2.2 (2.6) percent of the country’s mean income from the bottom half to 
the upper half. To view this from the perspective of an individual belonging to a country’s 
poorer half, consider that in the sample’s average country those below the median earn 
approximately 25 percent of the total national income. Hence, on average the change in 
inequality induced by having an IMF program in the previous year is equivalent to a transfer 
of four to five percent of the poorer half’s mean income by each person in the poorer half to 
each person in the richer half (see Appendix 4.B). 
Table 4.2 – Main Results 
  
 
Next, I test how IMF programs affect inequality in the longer term. Figure 4.3 illustrates and 
reports the estimates of the coefficient of interest for the baseline specification (1) with different 
levels of lags. It indicates that the effect is statistically significant during all of the following 
five years and strongest and most significant after three years. After six years the effect is no 
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longer significantly different from zero. Results are very similar when adding the control 
variables (see Appendix 4.E). 
 
Figure 4.3 – Long Term Effects 
 
 
4.4.3 Heterogeneous Effects 
To shed light on the underlying mechanisms I split the sample into democracies and non-
democracies.177 Note first the descriptive statistics in Table 4.3. They show the average of Gini 
depending on whether the observation is a democracy and on whether an IMF program was 
in place and reports t-tests comparing the respective means. As expected, inequality is 
significantly higher in non-democracies and in countries under an IMF program. It is 
furthermore interesting and in line with the hypotheses that the large and highly significant 
difference in inequality between democracies and non-democracies entirely disappears when 
only countries under IMF programs are compared. 
                                                     
177 The definition of democracy follows the Polity IV index and treats observations with a Polity score of 6 and 
higher as democracies (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011). 
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Table 4.3 – Conditional Means of the Gini Index 
 
 
 
As these descriptive statistics are obviously inadequate to isolate the IMF’s causal effect, Table 
4.4 presents the 2SLS regression results with the sample split into democracies and non-
democracies to test H2. In columns 1-2 and 5-6 the sample is split on both stages, in columns 
3-4 and 7-8 the fitted values of the variable of interest calculated by means of the entire sample 
are used.178 
Columns 1-4 show that IMF programs increase inequality in democracies.179 The effect is 
robust to whether or not control variables are included and whether fitted values from the full 
or only the democratic sample are used. The instrument maintains its relevance despite the 
smaller sample size in columns 1 and 2. The point estimates, which are statistically significant 
across all specifications, range from 1.8 to 2.3 and are, thus, larger compared to the full sample. 
Applying the metric based on Blackburn, this is equivalent to a transfer of about eight percent 
of the average poor person’s income to the average rich person. As soon as only non-
democracies are considered (columns 5-8) the effect entirely disappears. The coefficients are 
close to zero and not statistically significant at conventional levels.180 
 
 
 
                                                     
178 The latter is a valid strategy to the extent that there is no systematic difference of the IV’s effect on IMFprogram 
between democracies and non-democracies. Theoretically, there is no obvious reason why this should be the case. 
Empirically, the first-stage regressions for the split samples show that the coefficients of the IV are similar in both 
samples and only in column 5 do they not reach statistical significance at the 10%-level. This suggests that splitting 
the sample only on the second stage is also valid. Standard errors in these regressions are cluster bootstrapped to 
account for two-stage estimation. 
179 In accordance with the results for long-term effects reported in Table 4.3, in this and in the following table, 
IMFprogram is lagged by three years. The substance of the results, however, does not depend on this choice. 
180 Note that in column 5, the specification without control variables and with the sample split on both stages, the 
IV in the small non-democratic sample is not strong enough to reliably rule out weak instrument bias. Columns 6-
8, however, show that the coefficient of interest remains insignificant when the IV’s relevance is increased by 
adding control variables or by using fitted values from the full sample. In column 6 the F-statistic surpasses Stock 
and Yogo’s (2005) critical value of 6.66 that tolerates a 2SLS size distortion of 20%. 
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Table 4.4 – Sample Split 
 
 
 
In sum, the inequality-increasing effect of IMF programs seems to be entirely driven by the 
democratic sample. In line with the hypotheses, IMF programs appear to weaken the 
inclination of democratic governments to more egalitarian income distributions. The size of 
the effect is equivalent to cutting the average difference of approximately four Gini points 
between democracies and autocracies in half. 
Further examining the plausibility of this channel, I include the interaction IMF×TNA (= 
IMFprogram × TNAaccess) as an additional regressor (Table 4.5 columns 1-2). To estimate its 
coefficient I employ the IV estimator proposed by Bun and Harrison (2018).181 As expected, the 
interaction enters with a significantly negative coefficient. This supports the expectation that 
the ‘opening up’ of the IMF towards societal actors makes the organization more sensitive to 
the distributional effects of its activities. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
181 Bun and Harrison’s (2018) “IV3” estimator adds the IV multiplied by TNAaccess as well as IMF×TNA to the set 
of instruments for IMFprogram while treating IMF×TNA as exogenous. This identification is valid under the 
plausible assumptions that TNA access to the IMF is exogenous to inequality levels and that the degree of 
endogeneity of IMF programs and inequality does not depend on TNA access: E(IMF × Gini | TNA) = E(IMF × Gini). 
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Table 4.5 – TNA Access and PRGF Programs 
 
Columns 3-6 separately examine the effects of PRGF programs and other IMF programs in 
democracies and show a substantial difference. The coefficient for PRGF programs is small 
and not statistically significant at conventional levels. If all other types of IMF programs are 
considered, however, the effect on inequality is significantly positive. As discussed above, the 
IMF’s emphasis on public participation and national ownership in its PRGF programs could 
(but does not necessarily have to) explain why these kinds of lending arrangements have no 
significant adverse distributional effects. In sum, these empirical tests suggest that variation 
in the decision-making processes concerning the design of IMF programs explain variation in 
the programs’ effects on inequality. The more inclusive and ‘democratized’ these processes 
are, the smaller the adverse distributional consequences are. 
In Appendix 4.F, I extend the core analysis by providing correlational evidence on the role that 
IMF conditionality plays for the link between IMF programs and increasing inequality. I find 
that inequality increases more in IMF program countries that receive more extensive 
conditionality than in program countries that receive fewer conditions. When examining 
specific policy areas, the results are consistent with the theoretical considerations on the 
‘public spending’ and ‘labor market reforms’ channels discussed above: Conditionality 
addressing the social and pension sector as well as the labor market are associated with 
increasing inequality. I find, however, no evidence for the conjecture that IMF conditions 
targeting trade or capital account policies are associated to increasing inequality. While these 
results, which are discussed in more detail in the Appendix, do not provide causal evidence, 
they are consistent with the idea that conditionality is a plausible channel for the main effect 
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that this study identifies. Nevertheless, more research that focuses on specific IMF conditions 
as a channel for the distributional effects of IMF programs is needed. 
4.4.4 Robustness 
I run a series of additional tests to confirm the robustness of the main results.182 First, I address 
concerns regarding the exclusion restriction. The results are robust to excluding the country-
year observations with large purchases and repurchases of IMF credit as well as to using only 
the IMF’s liquid resources as the time-varying component of the IV (Table 4.11). Motivated by 
a recent finding by Christian and Barrett (2017), I then plot time trends in LQR and the cross-
country average of Gini for sets of countries with different levels of IMFprob and find no 
evidence for time trends that could threaten the exclusion restriction. I also randomize the 
order of the LQR values for 1000 placebo first-stage regressions. The resulting IV coefficients 
are, as expected, normally distributed around zero and have all smaller t-statistics than the IV 
coefficient in the first-stage regression with the real LQR values. Furthermore, substituting the 
time-varying probability (IMFprob) by a time-constant probability that is absorbed by country 
fixed effects also does not affect the results (Table 4.12). Tests à la Altonji, Elder, and Taber 
(2005) show that selection-on-unobservables relative to selection-on-observables would have 
to be more than three times as large and go in the opposite direction if the true reduced form 
effect was in fact zero (Table 4.13). The same table also reports OLS and reduced form 
estimates of the baseline specification for comparison. 
Second, to make the regressions comparable to previous studies I substitute my IV with 
UNGA voting (Table 4.14, columns 1-3). The results are similar. However, the UNGA voting 
IV is less relevant, with F-statistics below critical thresholds in two out of three specifications. 
Besides, the coefficients of interest are larger and the effect size that UNGA voting as IV 
identifies is somewhat doubtful (140 percent of a within-country standard deviation). Under 
the assumption that this study’s IV is excludable, this finding and the fact that UNGA voting 
enters with a significantly positive sign as a control in the baseline (see Full Table 4.2 in 
Appendix 4.D) suggest that UNGA voting is linked to inequality through more channels than 
only IMF programs. When used as an IV this violates the exclusion restriction and biases the 
coefficient upwards. 
                                                     
182 For a detailed description of these tests see Appendix 4.G. 
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Third, I modify the main variables of interest. While my baseline definition of IMF programs 
follows the literature’s standard, in a robustness test I use Barro and Lee’s (2005) definition 
and only consider Stand-By Arrangements (SBA) and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). The 
results are similar (Table 4.14, columns 4-6). When using the Gini coefficient of market income 
as an alternative outcome variable, the regressions again yield very similar results, suggesting 
that IMF programs tend to redistribute net income more via changes in gross income than by 
means of changes in taxes and transfers (Table 4.15, columns 1-3).183 Additionally, I employ 
ATG data as an alternative to the SWIID (Table 4.15, columns 4-6). Even though the use of this 
dataset dramatically reduces the sample size, the results are again robust. 
4.5 Conclusions 
IMF loan programs increase income inequality. According to the evidence presented in this 
paper, this effect is causal and economically significant. The effect’s heterogeneities – most 
importantly the finding that the effect is driven by the sample of democratic countries – are 
consistent with the theory that ‘democratically deficient’ international organizations that 
interfere in domestic politics are capable of temporarily restricting the responsiveness of 
democratic governments to the distributional preferences of their citizens. 
For the IMF the results highlight an unintended consequence of its lending arrangements. It 
may encourage the Fund to revise its policy advice and conditionality with regards to their 
distributional implications. The findings furthermore suggest that giving greater autonomy to 
program countries’ national political processes, as is the case in PRGF programs, and allowing 
societal actors to have more influence on decision-making processes, can mitigate adverse 
distributional effects. They thus support recent internal IMF reforms aimed at “country 
ownership” and “participatory processes” (IMF 2014b). 
While future research is needed to examine whether these findings are transferable to other 
IOs, the study’s main result suggest that the activities of at least one of the most powerful IOs 
can not only affect public goods provision and general welfare but can also have a 
distributional dimension. From a normative perspective, such distributional power points to 
the need for more effective accountability mechanisms between IOs and affected societies to 
ensure that the allocation of gains and losses is under democratic control. And apart from 
                                                     
183 See the Appendix for caveats regarding this inference. 
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being normatively desirable, the analyses suggest that enhanced democratic accountability 
mechanisms in IOs can also produce better policy results. 
Future research both on IMF program effects and on the drivers of income inequality can draw 
lessons from this study. First, the proposed identification strategy can be useful for scholars 
investigating the causal effects of IMF programs more broadly. The instrumental variable 
plausibly fulfills the exclusion restriction with regards to a range of additional political and 
economic outcomes. Second, the results add to the growing literature that stresses the role of 
policies and institutions as determinants of inequality. While their contribution to current 
trends of rising inequality across countries is well-established in this literature, it remains an 
open question as to why so many countries modify their national policies and institutions in 
a way that inequality increases. This study’s results suggest that inter-national policies and 
institutions can play a significant role in this regard. Examining the underlying mechanisms 
linked to how international organizations interact with democratic processes at the national 
level is a promising area for future research. 
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4.6 Appendices to Chapter 4 
4.6.1 Appendix 4.A: Variables 
Table 4.6 – Descriptive Statistics and Data Sources 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Description and Source 
Gini 38.08 9.23 17.96 68.16 
Gini coefficient of net income according to the 
SWIID version 5.0 (Solt 2016). 
IMF Program 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Indicator 1 if IMF program in place for at least 5 
months in year t, (Dreher 2006). 
LQR (ln) 5.42 0.75 4.1 7.11 
IMF liquidity ratio, which equals liquid 
resources (usable currencies plus Special 
Drawing Rights contributed) divided by liquid 
liabilities (total of members’ reserve tranche 
positions plus outstanding IMF borrowing from 
members); own calculation based on data from 
the IMF’s Annual Reports 1973-2013 and the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
IMFprob 0.25 0.25 0 1 
∑ I(IMFprogram
it
= 1)tT=1973
t-1973
 
Own calculation based on (Dreher 2006b).  
GDP per capita (ln) 8.21 1.61 4.92 11.38 
Gross domestic product per capita in constant 
2005 USD (World Bank 2016) 
Education 7.56 2.85 0.89 13.18 
Average years of schooling, linear interpolation 
of data for five-year periods (Barro and Lee 2013) 
Trade 77.09 51.26 12.01 439.66 
Trade (% GDP) 
(World Bank 2016) 
Life Expectancy 68.71 9.61 27.08 82.93 
Life expectancy at birth in years (World Bank 
2016b) 
Democracy 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Indicator 1 if Polity IV index is 6 or higher 
(Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011) 
Current Account 
Balance -2.1 6.53 -47.21 26.77 
Balance on current account (% GDP) (IMF 
2016d). 
Investments 23.11 7.14 -2.42 74.82 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) (World Bank 
2016). 
GDP growth 3.63 4.45 -50.25 35.22 
GDP growth (annual %) 
(World Bank 2016). 
Banking Crisis 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Indicator 1 if systemic banking crisis in year t in 
country i, (Laeven and Valencia 2012). 
UNGA voting 0.14 0.91 -2.14 3.01 
Ideal point of voting behavior in the UNGA 
(Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017).  
Global GDP Growth 3.03 1.51 -2.08 6.98 
Growth of global GDP; own calculations based 
on World Bank (2016). 
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Banking Crises 14.54 10.12 0 30 
Global total of Banking Crisis in year t, based on 
Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
TNA index 0.14 0.14 0 0.32 
Index of TNA access to the IMF in year t 
(Tallberg et al. 2014)  
PRGF program 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Indicator 1 if IMF program under the PRGF in 
place for at least 5 months in year t (Dreher 2006) 
Liquid Resources 
(ln) 11.3 0.66 9.84 12.96 IMF liquid resources (see LQR) 
Gross Gini 45.36 7.12 20.25 71.13 
Gini coefficient of market income according to 
the SWIID version 5.0 (Solt 2016) 
Gini (ATG) 39.63 9.91 20 69.8 
Gini coefficient (Giniall) according to the ATG 
Dataset (Milanovic 2014) 
Note: The sample of the full specification (Table 4.2, column 3) was used for calculating the values in 
this table. 
 
 
Conditionality      
Scope of 
Conditionality 5.46 2.26 0 9 
Number of policy areas covered by IMF 
Conditionality 
Foreign Exchange 
Systems 0.24 0.43 0 1 
IMF condition addressing foreign exchange 
systems and restrictions (current and capital) 
Trade Policy 0.44 0.50 0 1 
IMF condition addressing international trade 
policy 
Central Bank 0.13 0.33 0 1 IMF condition addressing the central bank 
Financial Sector 0.78 0.42 0 1 IMF condition addressing the financial sector 
Government 0.84 0.36 0 1 
IMF condition addressing the general 
government 
Public Employment 0.08 0.28 0 1 
IMF condition addressing the civil service, 
public employment and wages 
Pensions and  
Social Sector 0.10 0.30 0 1 
IMF condition addressing pensions and other 
social sector reforms 
SOE reform 0.77 0.42 0 1 
IMF condition addressing reforms of public 
enterprises in the non-financial sector 
Labor Market 0.03 0.17 0 1 
IMF condition addressing labor market reforms 
in the private sector 
Residual Category 0.63 0.48 0 1 
IMF condition addressing other structural 
reforms 
Note: The sample of the specifications 1 and 3 in Table 4.10 was used for calculating the values in 
this table. Source: Andone and Scheubel (2017) based on IMF (2016c) 
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4.6.2 Appendix 4.B: Interpreting Differences in Gini Coefficients 
Following Blackburn (1989), a change in the Gini coefficient (G ∈ [0, 100]) by ΔG points is 
equivalent to a lump-sum transfer of L from all those below the median to all those above the 
median, given by 
L = 
2ΔG
100
 × M  , where M is the country’s mean income. 
Knowing M and the poorer half’s share of total income S, the mean income of the poorer half 
P is given by 
(P × 0.5) + (P × 
1-S
S
 × 0.5)= M  
 P = 2MS 
The lump-sum transfer relative to the poorer half’s mean income is, hence, given by: 
L
P
 = 
ΔG
100
 × 
1
S
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4.6.3 Appendix 4.C: Full Table 4.1 
Table 4.7 – Baseline, First Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LQR × IMFprob -0.276*** -0.308*** -0.356*** 
 (0.052) (0.063) (0.067) 
IMFprob  2.760*** 2.673*** 3.172*** 
 (0.282) (0.315) (0.286) 
Gini  0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
GDP/Capita (ln)  -0.177 -0.135 
 
 (0.280) (0.331) 
GDP/Capita Squared (ln)  -0.002 -0.007 
 
 (0.017) (0.020) 
Education   -0.057** -0.058** 
 
 (0.025) (0.028) 
Trade  -0.000 -0.001 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Life Expectancy  0.008 0.010* 
 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Regime Type  -0.005 0.004 
 
 (0.049) (0.053) 
Current Account Balance   0.002 
 
  (0.003) 
Investments   -0.006** 
 
  (0.003) 
GDP Growth   0.002 
 
  (0.002) 
Banking Crisis   0.080** 
   (0.038) 
UNGA Voting   0.102*** 
   (0.034) 
Global GDP Growth ×
 IMFprob 
  0.002 
  (0.027) 
Banking Crises × IMFprob   0.006 
   (0.004) 
Observations 3766 3010 2625 
K.-P. underid. LM 18.452 16.045 18.973 
K.-P. underid. p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
K.-P. weak id. F 27.699 24.121 28.441 
Notes: Dependent variable IMFprogram. All regressions include country fixed effects and year fixed 
effects. Standard errors, robust to clustering at the country level, in parentheses. 
Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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4.6.4 Appendix 4.D: Full Table 4.2 and Discussion of Control Variable Results 
Table 4.8 – Baseline, Second Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
IMF Programt-1 1.130** 1.435*** 1.288** 
 (0.521) (0.550) (0.573) 
IMFprobt-1 -1.844** -1.901** -2.591** 
 (0.841) (0.881) (1.087) 
Ginit-1 0.916*** 0.915*** 0.911*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) 
GDP/Capita (ln)t-1  2.224** 2.728*** 
 
 (0.932) (0.868) 
GDP/Capita squared (ln)t-1  -0.077 -0.100** 
 
 (0.051) (0.050) 
Educationt-1  -0.066 -0.056 
 
 (0.079) (0.091) 
Tradet-1  -0.001 0.001 
 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Life Expectancyt-1  -0.025 -0.016 
 
 (0.019) (0.023) 
Regime Typet-1  0.020 -0.044 
 
 (0.110) (0.127) 
Current Account Balancet-1   0.003 
 
  (0.009) 
Investmentst-1   0.013 
   (0.009) 
GDP growtht-1   -0.018** 
   (0.008) 
Banking Crisis t-1   -0.235* 
   (0.134) 
UNGA Votingt-1   0.231* 
   (0.132) 
Global GDP Growth × IMFprobt-1   0.122** 
 
  (0.050) 
Banking Crises × IMFprobt-1   -0.003 
   (0.012) 
Observations 3766 3010 2625 
Adjusted R2 0.880 0.853 0.858 
Notes: Dependent variable Gini. Second-stage regressions corresponding to Table 4.1. All 
regressions include country and year fixed effects. Standard errors, robust to clustering at the 
country level, in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
As regards the coefficients of the control variables, the lagged dependent variable is, 
unsurprisingly, highly significant as inequality is a highly time-persistent phenomenon. The 
coefficient on IMFprob is not straightforward to interpret: It shows that – once the positive 
causal effect of a current IMF program is netted out – a more frequent past participation rate 
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in IMF programs is weakly associated with a lower Gini.184 Note, however, that this coefficient 
cannot be interpreted in isolation. This variable only captures the variation in inequality that 
the predicted values of IMFprogram, which themselves include possibly endogenous variation 
of IMFprob, do not already capture. The sole purpose of controlling for IMFprob is to make sure 
that this possibly endogenous part of the variation in predicted values is controlled for and 
netted out. 
GDP per capita is associated with higher inequality levels, while there is some weak evidence 
for the Kuznets curve hypothesis: Albeit consistently negative, the coefficient on the squared 
term is only significant in the third regression. As in previous studies, education is associated 
negatively with income inequality, even though the effect is not statistically significant. 
Systemic banking crises are also associated with decreasing inequality. As capital is usually 
distributed more unequally than income, the reduction of income from capital during such 
crises could explain this finding (see Piketty 2014). 
  
                                                     
184 An IMF program with average length (3 years) would increase IMFprob in the average sample year by 0.136 and 
would thus be linked to a Gini coefficient that is lower by 0.259 points (column 2). 
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4.6.5 Appendix 4.E: Full Table on Long-Term Effects 
Table 4.9 – Long-term Effects 
 
Lag: (1) (2) (3) 
t 
0.847* (0.506) 
[3766] 
1.417*** (0.543) 
[3010] 
1.525** (0.604) 
[2625] 
t-1 
1.130** (0.521) 
[3766] 
1.435*** (0.550) 
[3010] 
1.288** (0.572) 
[2625] 
t-2 
1.593*** (0.552) 
[3726] 
1.633*** (0.561) 
[2977] 
1.330** (0.702) 
[2625] 
t-3 
1.816*** (0.564) 
[3685] 
1.773*** (0.554) 
[2943] 
1.303** (0.664) 
[2625] 
t-4 
1.363*** (0.468) 
[3643] 
1.683*** (0.543) 
[2909] 
1.234** (0.632) 
[2625] 
t-5 
0.920** (0.450) 
[3598] 
1.401** (0.605) 
[2871] 
0.962** (0.675) 
[2625] 
t-6 
0.511 (0.758) 
[3556] 
0.914 (0.911) 
[2834] 
0.547 (0.907) 
[2625] 
Note: The table reports β-coefficients for different lags of the variable IMFprogram in 
specifications (1)-(3), which are otherwise identical to the regressions in Tables 4.1 and 
4.2. Standard errors in parentheses; number of observations in square brackets. 
 
 
4.6.6 Appendix 4.F: IMF Conditionality 
As an extension to the paper’s core analysis I examine suggestive evidence on the role of IMF 
conditionality in the link between IMF programs and increasing inequality. I use data 
extracted from the IMF’s Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA) database with an 
algorithm developed by Andone and Scheubel (2017) in order to create an annualized and 
harmonized dataset from both the archived (1993-2002) and the current (2002-2013) MONA 
data.185 First, I code the variable Scope of Conditionality defined as the number of policy areas 
conditionality covers.186 Second, I code binary variables indicating whether any condition 
addressed one of nine policy areas.187 For the analysis, I restrict the sample to country-years 
for which the MONA database indicates the start of an IMF program. Informed by the results 
of the main analysis I then regress the change in Gini over the subsequent three-year-period 
                                                     
185 I thank Beatrice Scheubel for sharing these data with me. 
186 This approach follows Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland (2015). 
187 See Appendix 4.A for a description of these policy areas. 
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on the conditionality variables at the time of the IMF program start. This sample restriction 
follows the approach by Rickard and Caraway (2018) to circumvent the selection-into-
program problem, but allows inferences only for countries under IMF programs and provides 
correlational evidence only. Like Rickard and Caraway (2018) I was unable to find a relevant 
and excludable instrument for IMF conditions. To nevertheless mitigate the selection-into-
conditions problem, I add the same set of control variables as before. The regressions, whose 
results are presented in Table 4.10, are run for both the full MONA sample (columns 1 and 3) 
as well as for the sample excluding the “archived” (1993-2002) version of the dataset, which 
Andone and Scheubel (2017) consider less reliable (columns 2 and 4). 
In both samples the results show that inequality increases more in IMF program countries that 
receive more extensive conditionality than in program countries that receive fewer conditions. 
When examining specific policy areas, it becomes apparent that conditions targeting the labor 
market or the social and pension sector are associated with rising inequality. In program 
countries in which IMF conditions address the labor market the Gini rises by almost three 
points more than in countries whose programs do not cover this policy area. In observations 
in which conditionality addresses the social and pension sector income inequality in the 
subsequent three-year period rises, on average, by about two Gini points more than otherwise. 
While they provide no causal evidence, these results are consistent with the idea that 
conditionality is a plausible channel for the main effect. They are also consistent with the 
theoretical considerations on ‘public spending’ and ‘labor market reforms’ discussed above. 
Regarding the ‘liberalization’ channel, however, conditions addressing trade policy or the 
financial sector are not significantly associated with rising inequality. Interestingly, there is a 
statistically significant, negative coefficient on Public Employment. Given that such conditions 
usually demand cuts in public sector wages (Rickard and Caraway 2018), this suggests that 
such reforms tend to be equalizing because public sector wages are above the median wage in 
typical IMF program countries. 
While these results tend to support the theoretical argument, a word of caution regarding their 
interpretation is in order. First, the data on conditionality is limited to a much shorter time 
period than the data used for the main analysis. Second, its structure does not allow a direct 
test of all channels discussed above, as the disaggregation by policy areas in the MONA 
database is not quite in line with the scholarly literature’s theoretical considerations on 
determinants of inequality. While social spending and labor market reforms can be captured, 
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the effects of more general spending cuts and capital account liberalization cannot be isolated. 
Third, the information that is included only provides the policy area and not the exact content 
of the condition. It does neither cover its stringency nor the extent of compliance. Fourth, while 
restricting the sample to IMF program countries circumvents the selection-into-program 
problem, potential endogeneity bias resulting from selection-into-conditions cannot be ruled 
out. For these reasons this evidence should be considered as suggestive and correlational 
rather than as definitive and causal. While this study’s focus is on causally identifying the 
aggregate effect, future research should zero in on the underlying channels.188 
Table 4.10 – Conditionality 
 
                                                     
188 In ongoing work with Alexander Kentikelenis we work on identifying a source of exogenous variation in IMF 
conditions. 
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4.6.7 Appendix 4.G: Robustness 
This section describes the robustness tests summarized in the results section in more detail.  
First, I address concerns regarding the exclusion restriction. Some readers might worry that 
the denominator of the liquidity ratio, i.e., the amount of the Fund’s liquid liabilities, threatens 
the excludability of the instrument. While most variation in the liquidity ratio is induced by 
the changing amount of liquid resources, to a significantly lesser extent it also depends on the 
liquid liabilities.189 These vary when economically large members obtain and repay loans that 
are large relative to total IMF resources (“purchase” and “repurchase” in IMF jargon).190 In 
Figure 4.1 this is visible, for instance, in the mid-2000s when Brazil and Turkey repaid 
extraordinarily large loans. In general, I argue that this does not undermine the excludability 
of the IV: First, the vast majority of these flows are not sizable enough to significantly affect 
the liquidity ratio. As in most cases the amount of resources transferred is significantly less 
than 1 percent of total IMF quotas, any concern regarding excludability would relate to very 
few observations. Second, the timing of such transactions is agreed upon years in advance. 
Given also that explanatory variables are lagged, it is unlikely that the schedule of large 
transactions developed with economically large countries is correlated with future levels of 
inequality in specific countries. Third, even if there was a correlation it would have to be 
conditional on IMFprob because of the difference-in-differences style model the interacted IV 
estimates. 
Nevertheless, to be cautious I run a robustness test in which I exclude the 100 observations 
that exhibit the largest flows from and to the IMF.191 As the first three columns in Table 4.11 
show, the results do not differ substantially. To address these concerns in the most cautious 
way possible, I also run regressions using only liquid resources as the time-variant factor of 
the IV. This variable is, by construction, not determined by the Fund’s liquid liabilities. By 
refraining from dividing the variable by liquid liabilities, I only exploit variation in liquid 
resources, whose only substantial source of variation is the exogenous timing of quota reviews. 
These results are presented in the last three columns of Table 4.11. While the instrument’s 
                                                     
189 The logged liquidity ratio’s correlation with logged liquid resources is r = 0.83, while with logged liquid liabilities 
it is r = 0.23. 
190 The liquid liabilities’ second source of variation is the Fund’s borrowing from its members. While total borrowing 
by the Fund is zero in many years, its average share of the liquid liabilities is approximately 15%. 
191 This leaves only observations with a (re)purchase to total quota ratio of less than 0.57% (0.37%) in the sample. 
Regressions with 50 and 200 excluded observations produce virtually the same results.  
208 
relevance naturally decreases because some valuable variation is lost, it is still strong enough 
to confirm the robustness of the result to this alternative specification. 
In addition, I examine whether there are general trends of inequality in sets of countries with 
different levels of IMFprob that could be correlated with the IMF’s liquidity ratio. Christian 
and Barrett (2017) show that the findings by Nunn and Qian (2014) could be driven by a 
spurious correlation between the time-varying constituent term of their interacted IV and a 
particular time trend in their outcome variable for a set of countries with a specific level of 
their probability measure. This is why in Figure 4.4, I plot year-specific cross-country averages 
of Gini for countries with different levels of IMFprob over time. I find no evidence for trends 
that could threaten the exclusion restriction. Instead, the Gini trends seem to be parallel across 
these groups and substantially different as compared to the LQR time series. As Christian and 
Barrett (2017) show, a problem in Nunn and Qian (2014) arises from the fact that the time series 
of the time-varying constituent term of their interacted IV is remarkably similar to a simple 
(inverse-U shaped) trend and does not vary strongly from one period to the next. As LQR 
exhibits no obvious similarity to any such simple trend and is subject to several idiosyncratic 
shocks (see Figure 4.1), it is much less likely to be correlated with a similar trend in the outcome 
variable. 
In addition, and to increase the confidence that the first stage does not pick up an artefact, I 
run placebo regressions in which I randomize the values of LQR. I run 1000 iterations of such 
regressions, which are based on a randomized order of the actual values of LQR, and find that 
the resulting first-stage IV coefficients are normally distributed around zero, and that the 
coefficient’s t-statistics are all smaller than in the first-stage regression based on the actual 
values of LQR. This increases confidence in the mechanism driving the first-stage and suggests 
that it is unlikely that in the first stage the IV picks up an artefact. 
Another modification concerns the second factor of the interacted instrument (Table 4.12). Like 
Nunn and Qian (2014) I also report results employing an IV based on a country-specific 
probability that does not vary over time, substituting IMFprobit by IMFprob_consti, which is 
given by 
IMFprob_consti = 
∑ I(IMFprogram
iT
 = 1)2013T=1973
41
 
I thereby make the probability multicollinear with the country fixed effects. While I am more 
convinced by the time-varying probability because it avoids using future realizations to 
explain the present, the results are robust to this modification. 
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In the next table I report OLS and reduced form estimates (Table 4.13). First, I run OLS and 
OLS-fixed effect (FE) models (columns 1-2) and then calculate the OLS estimates for the 
baseline model, i.e., I do not instrument for IMF programs, ceteris paribus (columns 3-5). As the 
results show, IMF programs are correlated with higher inequality in OLS and OLS-FE 
regressions without control variables but there is no correlation when endogeneity is only 
insufficiently addressed in OLS-FE models with different sets of control variables. Together 
with the statistically significant effect found in the 2SLS regressions these results suggest that 
the proposed IV is able to eliminate the selection bias the OLS coefficients suffer from. In 
columns 6-8 I report the results of reduced form regressions of the baseline specifications. They 
show that the IV has a statistically significant effect on inequality. This relationship is not 
significantly affected when a large vector of control variables is added to the regression. 
Following Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) this enhances the plausibility of the exclusion 
restriction: The comparison of the β-coefficients of the models with and without these 
covariates (6 vs. 8) shows that the so-called “selection ratio” is 3.12. This means that if the 
effect, which I claim is causal, was in reality driven by unobserved variables, this selection on 
unobservables would have to be more than three times as large as the selection on observed 
variables, and it would have to go in the opposite direction. 
To compare the results to studies using the current standard instrument for IMF programs, I 
substitute the IV with UNGA voting behavior ceteris paribus (Table 4.14, columns 1-3). These 
regressions estimate IMF programs to cause rises in inequality of approximately four Gini 
points, comparable to Oberdabernig (2013), who uses the same IV. Considering that the 
estimated coefficients are equivalent to a change of up to 140 percent of a within-country 
standard deviation, this effect is strikingly large. One reason why these coefficients may be 
biased is that the instrument is not relevant enough; in specifications 2 and 3 the Kleibergen-
Paap F-statistics fall below Stock and Yogo’s (2005) lowest critical value of 5.53 that tolerates a 
2SLS size distortion of 25 percent. A second reason could be that the instrument is not 
excludable. As argued above, plausible alternative channels are governments’ political and 
ideological preferences. Under the assumption that my IV strategy identifies the true causal 
effect of IMF programs, the baseline regressions reported in Table 4.2 (see also Appendix 4.D) 
provide empirical evidence for the violation of the exclusion restriction of UNGA voting: In 
the full baseline specification voting similarity with the United States in the UNGA is 
associated with higher levels of inequality when controlling for the causal effect of IMF 
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programs. This finding suggests that UNGA voting is linked positively to inequality through 
channels other than IMF programs and is, thus, an invalid instrumental variable when the 
outcome of interest is inequality.192  
As a last step, I modify the main variables of interest. Regarding the independent variable, the 
paper so far followed the conventional practice of the literature on IMF program effects by 
jointly considering Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), the 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) 
(e.g., Oberdabernig 2013). Barro and Lee (2005, 1248), however, argue that only SBA and EFF 
programs should be considered while the others “should be viewed more as foreign aid, rather 
than lending or adjustment programs”. In Table 4.14 (columns 4-6) I follow their approach and 
find that the results hold when only SBA and EFF programs are considered. 
Regarding the dependent variable, I first substitute the Gini coefficient of net income by that 
of gross income (Gross Gini), which is also taken from the SWIID. The fact that the results are 
very similar, could indicate that IMF programs affect inequality mainly by leading to changes 
in the distribution of wages in contrast to affecting the extent of redistribution. This could, for 
instance, be driven by labor market reforms such as minimum wage reductions, cuts in 
pensions or by rising short-term unemployment after privatizations. An important caveat of 
these findings, however, is that the differences between market and net inequality that the 
SWIID indicates are not reliable for all countries (Solt 2016, 1274-5). Future research could 
investigate the exact channels in more detail. As a final robustness test, I change the inequality 
dataset. Until here I followed the related literature (Acemoglu et al. 2015; Dorsch and Maarek 
2018; Oberdabernig 2013) in choosing the SWIID as the source for panel data on Gini 
coefficients. Jenkins (2015) however, voices concerns about the SWIID’s methodology and 
recommends the World Income Inequality Database (WIID), on which the SWIID builds, over 
the SWIID.193 The WIID, however, offers multiple Gini coefficients for many country-year 
observations. Since there is no commonly accepted procedure for choosing the respective 
values, the use of the WIID for regression analyses necessitates highly arbitrary decisions. This 
is presumably also why the SWIID is used much more frequently than the WIID. An 
                                                     
192 As inequality is clearly linked to other economic conditions, analyses of IMF program effects on other economic 
outcomes are likely to suffer from the same problem when UNGA voting is used as an IV. 
193 Jenkins’ (2015) concerns, however, relate to an older version of the SWIID and Solt (2015) is able to overcome 
many of these concerns. The reader is referred to the entire special issue of the Journal of Economic Inequality 
(December 2015, Volume 13, Issue 4) for details on this debate. 
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alternative is offered by Milanovic (2014), who derives the final Gini value if multiple 
observations exist through “choice by precedence.” While this approach makes sure that in 
each case the observation of the highest possible quality is chosen, it combines data from nine 
different sources with different methodologies without further standardization. Milanovic 
himself advises caution when using the resulting variable Giniall in regressions as the concepts 
underlying the calculation of the Gini coefficients are based on income and consumption, net 
and gross, as well as household and individual levels. Unfortunately, too few observations 
remain if the sample is restricted to one concept. Nevertheless, to address this issue I control 
for dummy variables that indicate the respective concepts interacted with country fixed 
effects. Columns 4-6 in Table 4.15 report the results. Note that, compared to the baseline, the 
sample size is severely limited. Nevertheless, the coefficient of interest is positive and 
statistically significant in the specifications that include control variables. 
I conclude that the results are robust to these modifications. 
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Figure 4.4 – Spurious Correlations Between Inequality and IMF Liquidity? 
 
Note: The figure plots the year-specific cross-country averages of the Gini index of net income 
for three sets of countries with different levels of IMFprob. For the bottom line all countries that 
never received an IMF program are included for calculating these averages. For the middle line 
all countries whose IMFprob is in the bottom half of this variable’s distribution are included. For 
the top line all countries whose IMFprob is in the upper half of this variable’s distribution are 
included. The dashed line plots the IMF liquidity time-series for comparison. 
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Table 4.11 – Robustness 1: Challenging the Liquidity Variable 
 Excluding large (re)purchases IV with liquid resources 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2nd stage results      
IMF 
Programt-1 
1.244** 1.727*** 1.403** 1.172* 2.037** 1.351** 
 (0.546) (0.610) (0.568) (0.668) (0.970) (0.615) 
1st stage results      
IVt-1 -0.277*** -0.299*** -0.357*** -0.168*** -0.177*** -0.387*** 
(0.053) (0.064) (0.069) (0.043) (0.056) (0.087) 
K.-P.  
underid. LM  
17.480 14.320 17.423 12.652 9.325 18.762 
K.-P. 
underid. p 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
K.-P. 
weak id. F 
27.240 21.671 26.727 15.599 10.058 19.818 
Inequality 
Controls (t-1) 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
IMF  
Controls (t-1) 
No No Yes No No Yes 
N 3654 2901 2536 3766 3010 2625 
Adjusted R2 0.878 0.840 0.853 0.879 0.823 0.855 
Note: Dependent variable Gini. All regressions control for IMFprob, country fixed effects and year fixed 
effects as well as the lagged dependent variable. Standard errors, robust to clustering at the country 
level, are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
Table 4.12 – Robustness 2: Challenging the Probability Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
2nd stage results    
IMF Programt-1 1.901* 1.691** 1.634** 
 (1.145) (0.746) (0.788) 
1st stage results    
IMFprob_const x LQRt-1 -0.173** -0.271*** -0.300*** 
 (0.071) (0.072) (0.075) 
K.-P. underid. LM 4.877 10.832 12.933 
K.-P. underid. p 0.027 0.001 0.000 
K.-P. weak id. F 5.876 14.241 15.906 
Inequality Controls No Yes Yes 
IMF Controls No No Yes 
N 3766 3010 2625 
Adjusted R2 0.851 0.838 0.841 
Note: Dependent variable Gini. All regressions control for country fixed effects and year fixed effects 
as well as the lagged dependent variable. Note that IMFprob_const does not need to be controlled for 
because it is fully absorbed by country fixed effects. Standard errors, robust to clustering at the country 
level, are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 4.13 – Robustness 3: Selection on Unobservables 
 OLS OLS-FE OLS (Baseline) Reduced Form (Baseline) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2nd stage results        
IMF Programt-1 5.113*** 0.651** 0.016 0.082 0.122    
 (0.903) (0.270) (0.071) (0.073) (0.076)    
1st stage results        
IVt-1      -0.312** -0.442*** -0.459** 
      (0.142) (0.168) (0.201) 
Selection Ratio 
β8 / (β8 – β6) 
     3.12 
Country & 
Year fixed 
effects 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LDV & 
IMFprobt-1 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inequality 
Controls (t-1) 
No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
IMF 
Controls (t-1) 
No No No No Yes No No Yes 
N 3963 3963 3768 3012 2627 3768 3012 2627 
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.120 0.898 0.885 0.884 0.898 0.885 0.884 
Note: Dependent variable Gini. Standard errors, robust to clustering at the country level, are in 
parentheses. Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 4.14 – Robustness 4: Alternative IV, Alternative Treatment 
 UNGA voting as IV Only SBA & EFF Programs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2nd stage results      
IMF 
Programt-1 
4.644*** 4.258** 4.259*    
(1.773) (2.002) (2.247)    
SBA/EFF  
Programt-1 
   0.762*** 0.805*** 0.722* 
   (0.286) (0.312) (0.389) 
1st stage results      
UNGA 
votingt-1 
0.061*** 0.073** 0.075**    
(0.023) (0.033) (0.034)    
IV t-1    -0.558*** -0.576*** -0.531*** 
    (0.059) (0.068) (0.071) 
K.-P. 
underid. LM 
6.084 2.546 3.005 18.574 19.987 19.963 
K.-P.  
underid. p 
0.014 0.111 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 
K.-P.  
weak id. F 
7.139 4.999 4.961 89.310 72.677 56.272 
Inequality 
Controls (t-1) 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
IMF 
Controls (t-1) 
No No Yes No No Yes 
N 3520 3001 2682 3766 3010 2625 
Adjusted R2 0.626 0.635 0.620 0.890 0.875 0.874 
Note: Dependent variable Gini. All regressions include country fixed effects and year fixed effects 
as well as the lagged dependent variable. In columns 4-6 only SBA and EFF programs are used to 
calculate the variable IMFprob, which the regressions also control for. Standard errors, robust to 
clustering at the country level, are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 4.15 – Robustness 5: Alternative Inequality Data 
 
 Gross Gini (SWIID) ATG Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2nd stage results       
IMF Programt-1 1.666*** 1.544*** 1.222** 1.220 1.974** 2.043** 
 (0.561) (0.579) (0.575) (1.155) (0.927) (1.014) 
1st stage results       
IVt-1 -0.276*** -0.314*** -0.363*** -0.557*** -0.699*** -0.624*** 
 (0.053) (0.063) (0.067) (0.113) (0.130) (0.135) 
K.-P. underid. LM 18.804 16.732 19.608 12.093 12.857 10.483 
K.-P. underid. p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
K.-P. weak id. F 27.637 24.864 29.173 24.112 28.779 21.447 
Inequality 
Controls (t-1) 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
IMF 
Controls (t-1) 
No No Yes No No Yes 
ATG 
Controls (t-1) 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 3765 3009 2624 928 814 758 
Adjusted R2 0.870 0.862 0.859 0.493 0.512 0.491 
Note: Dependent variables Gross Gini (columns 1-3) and Giniall (columns 4-6). All regressions control 
for IMFprob, country fixed effects and year fixed effects as well as the lagged dependent variable. 
Standard errors, robust to clustering at the country level, are in parentheses. 
Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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